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Introduction
1.1 Background
One of the most remarkable ndings in population health is the strong relationship be-
tween health and socio-economic status (SES). Figure 1.1 displays the principal features
of the SES health gradient in the U.S. (left-hand side) and the Netherlands (right-hand
side) by plotting at each age the fraction of people who self-report themselves in poor or
fair health by age-specic household income quartiles (quartile 1 representing the lowest
and quartile 4 the highest household incomes). At each age a downward movement in
income is associated with poorer health.
The health dierences by income quartile are large. For example, in the U.S. at around
age 60 the fraction in poor or fair health in the top income quartile, at about 8 percent,
is some 35 percentage points smaller than the fraction in the lowest income quartile, at
about 44 percent (left-hand side of Figure 1.1). Similarly, Case and Deaton (2005) show
how in the United States, a 20 year old low-income (bottom quartile of family income)
male, on average, reports to be in similar health as a 60 year old high-income (top quartile)
male. In Glasgow, U.K., life expectancy of men in the most deprived areas is 54 years,
compared with 82 years in the most auent (Hanlon et al. 2006).
Not only do low SES individuals start adulthood in worse health but their health also
deteriorates faster with age than the health of their high SES peers. In cross sectional
data the disparity in health between low and high SES groups appears to increase over the
life cycle until ages 50-60, after which it narrows (see, e.g., Figure 1.1). Similar patterns
hold for other measures of SES, such as education and wealth and other indicators of
health, such as onset of chronic diseases, disability and mortality (e.g., Adler et al. 1994;
Marmot, 1999; Smith, 1999).2 Chapter 1
Figure 1.1: Percent reporting fair or poor health by age-specic household income quar-
tiles.
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FIGURE 2   Percent reporting fair or poor health status by age-specific
household income quartiles
Quartile 1 Quartile 2
Quartile 4
Quartile 3
SOURCE: Calculations by author from the pooled National Health Interview Surveys 1991–96.
whether the so-called direct causation from SES to health really matters.
Because the answer is yes, a subtheme in this section concerns which di-
mensions of SES—income, wealth, or education—matter for individual
health. The answer to that question turns out to be education, and the third
section deals with the much more difficult issue of why education matters
so much. The evidence in these first three sections relies on data for people
above age 50. Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the nature of the SES health
gradient may be quite different after age 50 than before. In the final section
I test the robustness of my answers to these basic questions about the mean-
ing of the SES health gradient, using data that span the entire lifecourse.
Does health affect socioeconomic status?
The primary focus among epidemiologists and those in the health research
community more generally has been on disentangling the multiple ways in
which socioeconomic status may influence health outcomes. Consequently,
much less is known about the possible impacts health may have on SES.
But for many individuals, especially those who are middle aged, health feed-
backs to labor supply, household income, or wealth may be quantitatively
important. I explore this question by estimating the effect of new health
events on subsequent outcomes that are both directly and indirectly related
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Notes: Percent reporting fair or poor health (bottom two categories of self-reported health) by age-specic
household income quartiles. Left: U.S. National Health Interview Surveys, 1991-1996, taken from Smith
(2004). Right: Dutch Statistics Netherlands (CBS) Health Interview Surveys, 1983-2000 (courtesy Hans
van Kippersluis).
These patterns are remarkably similar between countries with relatively low levels of
protection from loss of work and health risks, such as the U.S., and those with stronger
welfare systems, such as the Netherlands (compare the left with the right-hand side of
Figure 1.1; House et al. 1994; Kunst and Mackenbach, 1994; Preston and Elo, 1995;
Smith 1999; 2004; 2007; Case and Deaton, 2005; van Kippersluis et al. 2010).
There is a widespread view that these large disparities in health between SES groups
represent an infringement of social justice. The notion is that such inequities in health
are avoidable and arise because of the circumstances in which people grow, live, work,
and age, and the systems put in place to deal with illness (e.g., CSDH, 2008). With this
viewpoint, the World Health Organization's (WHO) Commission on the Social Determi-
nants of Health (CSDH) has called for global action on the social determinants of health
with the aim of achieving health equity within a generation (CSDH, 2008).
This noble aim is, however, hampered by the fact that the causes of socioeconomic
health disparities are not well understood. Studies across multiple disciplines (including
epidemiology, sociology, demography, psychology, evolutionary biology and economics)
reveal that the proposed explanations are multiple and diverse, that consensus on their
importance is lacking and that it has been dicult to establish causality and even harder to
rmly establish underlying mechanisms (e.g., Cutler et al. 2011). For example, education
is found to have a causal protective eect on health (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos,1.1 Background 3
2006; van Kippersluis et al. 2011) but it is not known exactly how the more educated
achieve their health advantage.
Some of the proposed mechanisms imply that SES inuences (\causes") health, others
imply the reverse path of causation, and some imply that SES and health are jointly
determined, without direct causal link. Some mechanisms may fall in all three cate-
gories. Proposed explanations for the SES-health gradient include: access to medical
care, health-enabling labor-force attachment, health behaviors (e.g., smoking, drinking,
exercise), psychosocial and environmental risk factors, neighborhood social environment,
social relationships and supports, sense of control, fetal and early childhood conditions,
and physical, chemical, biological and psychosocial hazards and stressors at work. So-
called \third factor" explanations posit that individual dierences, e.g., in time pref-
erences and the ability to delay gratication, aect SES and health in similar ways and
thereby give rise to the SES-health gradient. Many of these explanations have been shown
to explain each a piece of the puzzle (for a review see Galama and van Kippersluis, 2010
[Chapter 5]).
Advancement of understanding of the relative importance of the causal mechanisms
responsible for the observed relationships is hampered by the lack of a suciently com-
prehensive theory. The signicant social and economic patterning of disease suggests that
social interventions have great potential for improving the health of, in particular, dis-
advantaged groups, and knowing qualitatively and quantitatively how these mechanisms
operate informs the development of eective social interventions. Without knowledge of
the mechanisms, it is dicult to design policies that are eective in reducing disparities
(Deaton, 2002). Thus, integrating the roles of proposed mechanisms and their long-term
eect into a comprehensive framework is a crucial rst step towards designing and evaluat-
ing eective policy. It allows researchers across multiple disciplines to assess the relative
importance of each proposed mechanism, the interaction between mechanisms, and to
disentangle the dierential patterns of causality. Case and Deaton (2005) argue that it is
extremely dicult to understand the relationships between health, education, income and
labor-force status without some guiding theoretical framework. It is therefore no surprise
that several authors (e.g., Case and Deaton, 2005; Cutler et al. 2011) have pointed to
the absence of a theory of SES and health over the life cycle and have emphasized the
importance of developing one.
The aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to a theory of socioeconomic disparities
in health over the lifecycle. That limited progress so far has been made in constructing
such a theory can probably be understood as a consequence of the following. Some of
these mechanisms have direct short-term eects, but most operate over the longer term,4 Chapter 1
for example, through a relatively small but persistent eect on the health deterioration
rate or asset accumulation. Health disparities, as well as SES dierences (e.g., wealth)
accumulate over the life course, and are considerably larger at old ages. In other words,
in order to fully assess the contribution of each explanation it is essential that we take
a life-course approach. A suitable framework in which multiple mechanisms and their
cumulative long-term eects can be studied is a structural model of SES and health over
the life cycle. Structural economic life-cycle models, in which individuals maximize their
life-time utility over their decision options (such as consumption and saving) subject to
budget and other constraints, have provided valuable insight into economic behavior such
as consumption, saving, and labor-force participation. However, up to very recently,
life-cycle models of health, medical care, and SES, suered serious technical diculties.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis are therefore aimed at addressing these technical
issues. Chapter 5 then presents a theory of socioeconomic disparities in health over the
lifecycle.
1.2 Overview of this thesis research
This thesis research began with a simple idea: to construct a theory of health and re-
tirement. Economists have argued that an important part of the health dierences by
nancial indicators of SES can be explained by the fact that bad health impinges on the
ability to work, thereby reducing income (Smith, 1999, 2004, 2007). Retirement is thus
an essential component of a theory of SES and health.
Our approach was to integrate the retirement decision into the formulation of the
canonical model of the demand for health and health investment due to Grossman (1972a,
1972b). In Grossman's human capital framework individuals demand medical care for the
consumption benets (health provides utility) as well as production benets (healthy in-
dividuals have greater earnings) that good health provides. Arguably the model has been
one of the most important contributions of Economics to the study of health behavior.
The model has become the standard (textbook) framework for the economics of the de-
mand for health and medical care, and theoretical extensions and competing economic
models are still relatively few.
Integrating the retirement decision into the health production literature (the literature
spawned by Grossman's seminal 1972 papers) was, however, not as straightforward as one
had hoped. An important artifact of the solution for health was a discontinuity near the
age of retirement (see Galama et al., 2008 [Chapter 3]). The theory predicted that imme-
diately following retirement health would fall (or in some cases increase) instantaneously1.2 Overview of this thesis research 5
due to the substitution of health for leisure and the disappearance of the production ben-
et of health (during retirement health does not provide a production benet as retirees
do not earn wages). This cannot be correct. In the health production literature, health is
a stock and in contrast to ows (such as health investment and consumption) it cannot be
adjusted instantaneously. Health can only change gradually through health investment
and biological aging.
This curious feature of the solution for health relates to an observation rst made by
Wolfe (1985). Wolfe noted that, in the health production literature, health is characterized
by a so-called \bang-bang" solution. If, at any time, the health stock is not at its \optimal"
level, individuals invest a large positive (or negative, depending on the direction of the
adjustment) amount of medical care (or other forms of health investment) in a single
period.1 Wolfe (1985) further noted that there is no reason to expect the initial endowment
of health to exactly equal the \optimal" level of health and that in fact humans may have
been endowed with \excessive" health (see Wolfe, 1985, and Galama et al. 2008 [Chapter
3]). Individuals might then prefer to exchange health for consumption. But, because
individuals cannot \sell" their health through negative health investment, the optimal
decision is to initially not invest in health (this represents a corner solution). Health
then deteriorates gradually as a result of the biological aging process. At a certain age
health may reach the \optimal" health level and the individual begins to counter the
aging process by investing in health. Wolfe interprets this onset of \...a discontinuous
mid-life increase in health investment ..." with retirement.
Inspired by these ndings, Chapter 2 (Galama and Kapteyn, 2009) explores a general-
ized solution to Grossman's model of health capital, relaxing the widely used assumption
that individuals can adjust their health stock instantaneously to an \optimal" level with-
out adjustment costs. The model then predicts the existence of a health threshold above
which individuals do not demand medical care (a corner solution). We nd that the gen-
eralized solution can account for a greater number of observations than can the traditional
solution. Importantly it can deal with a signicant criticism of health production models:
that the predicted positive association between health and medical care is consistently
rejected by the data (e.g., Wagsta, 1986a; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997, p. 62). Chapter
2 also provides structural and reduced form equations to facilitate empirical tests of our
generalized solution.
Chapter 3 (Galama et al. 2008) then formulates a stylized structural model of health,
wealth accumulation and retirement decisions, utilizing the generalized solution developed
1In a continuous time formulation individuals would consume an innitely large amount of medical
care in an innitesimally small period of time.6 Chapter 1
in Chapter 2. We derive analytic solutions for the time paths of consumption, health,
health investment, savings and retirement. Exploring the properties of corner solutions
we nd that advances in population health decrease the retirement age, while at the same
time individuals retire when their health has deteriorated. This potentially explains why
retirees point to deteriorating health as an important reason for early retirement, while
retirement ages have continued to fall in the developed world, despite continued improve-
ments in population health and mortality. The model further predicts that workers with
higher human capital invest more in health and because they stay healthier retire later
than those with lower human capital whose health deteriorates faster.
While the corner solutions employed in Chapters 2 and 3 initially appeared promising,
issues with the characteristics of the solutions for health and health investment remained.
For example, the model's predictions seem caricatures of real life: in the corner solution
healthy individuals do not invest in health at all for periods of time, while in reality most
people see the doctor at least once per year. Further, while the \bang-bang" issue appears
to have been addressed for individuals whose initial health is above the health threshold
(but see Galama, 2011 [Chapter 4]) this is not the case for solutions where initial health is
below the threshold. A review of the literature highlighted at least ve main limitations of
health production models. Briey these are: a) the indeterminacy problem (\bang-bang"
solution) for investment in health (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990), b) the inability of the model
to predict the observed negative relation between health and the demand for medical care
(e.g., Wagsta, 1986a; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997), c) the inability to explain dierences in
the health deterioration rate (not just the level) between socioeconomic groups (e.g., Case
and Deaton, 2005), d) the lack of \memory" in the model solutions (e.g., Usher, 1975)
and e) the need to assume that the biological aging rate is increasing with age to ensure
that life is nite and health falls with age and to reproduce the observed rapid increase
in medical care near the end of life (e.g., Case and Deaton, 2005).
Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) point out that under the constant returns to scale (CRTS)
health production process assumed in the health production literature, the marginal cost
of investment is constant, and no interior equilibrium for health investment exists. The
authors argue that this is a serious limitation of health production models. Their nding
suggests that introducing diminishing returns to scale (DRTS) in the health production
process might be an avenue worth pursuing in order to address the alleged technical issues
associated with health production models.
At the time, however, it was far from obvious that introducing DRTS in the health
production process would bear fruit. First, Ehrlich and Chuma's claim was disputed
(e.g., Reid, 1998; Grossman, 2000). Reid (1998) argued that \...the authors [Ehrlich and1.2 Overview of this thesis research 7
Chuma] fail to substantiate either claim [bang-bang and indeterminacy] ...". This may
have been because Ehrlich and Chuma's argument is brief and technical. Further, Ehrlich
and Chuma's nding that health investment is undetermined (under the usual assump-
tion of a CRTS health production process) was incidental to their main contribution of
modeling the demand for longevity and the authors did not explore the full implications
of a DRTS health production process. Second, a DRTS health production process was
believed to increase the complexity of the problem substantially, rendering theoretical and
econometric analysis very dicult (e.g., Grossman, 2000, p. 364). This notion may have
been reinforced by the fact that Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) had to resort to comparative
dynamics to illustrate the properties of the model. This technique (Oniki, 1973) is essen-
tially a sensitivity analysis in which the directional eect of a parameter change can be
investigated. Ehrlich and Chuma's (1990) insightful work is therefore limited to generat-
ing directional predictions. Third, it was not apparent that the introduction of DRTS in
the health production process would substantially change the nature of the model. For
example, there was the notion that introducing DRTS would result in individuals reaching
the desired stock gradually rather than instantaneously (e.g., Grossman, 2000, p. 364) {
perhaps not a suciently important improvement to warrant the increased level of com-
plexity. Last, plausibly as a result of the above factors the health production literature
never adopted a DRTS health production process,2 i.e. developing a health production
model with a DRTS health production process was relatively uncharted territory.
Chapter 4 (Galama, 2011) presents a theory of the demand for health, health invest-
ment and longevity based on Grossman (1972a, 1972b) and the extended version of this
model by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990). In this chapter I make several contributions to the
literature. First, I argue for a dierent interpretation of the health stock equilibrium con-
dition, one of the most central relations in the health production literature: this relation
determines the optimal level of health investment (and not the health stock as is assumed
in the health production literature). Second, I show that this alternative interpretation
necessitates the assumption of DRTS in the health production process, or no solution to
the optimization problem exists (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). Third, I provide a detailed
assessment of the implications of the alternative interpretation of the rst-order condition
for health investment and of the assumption of DRTS in the health production process,
and show that this can address the ve technical diculties discussed above. In contrast
to the health production literature I predict a negative correlation between health in-
vestment and health, that the health of wealthy and educated individuals declines more
2To the best of my knowledge the only exception is an unpublished working paper by Dustmann and
Windmeijer (2000) who take the model by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) as their point of departure.8 Chapter 1
slowly and that they live longer, that current health status is a function of the initial
level of health and the histories of prior health investments made, that health investment
rapidly increases near the end of life and that length of life is nite as a result of limited
life-time resources (the budget constraint). Fourth, I derive structural relations between
health and health investment (e.g., medical care) that are suitable for empirical testing.
These structural relations contain the CRTS health production process as a special case,
thereby allowing empirical tests to verify or reject this common assumption in the health
production literature. Last, I nd that the theory does not support the common notion
that individuals aspire to a certain \optimal" level of the health stock. Rather, given any
level of their health stock individuals decide about the optimal level of health investment.
With these essential issues addressed our formulation can account for a greater number
of observed empirical patterns and suggests that the Grossman model provides a suitable
foundation for the development of a life-cycle model of the SES-health gradient. Chapter
5 (Galama and van Kippersluis, 2010) completes this thesis research and presents a life-
cycle model that incorporates multiple mechanisms explaining (jointly) a large part of the
observed disparities in health by SES. The framework includes simplied representations
of major mechanisms, which allows us to improve our understanding of their operational
roles in explaining the SES health gradient and make predictions. Our starting point is
the health production literature spawned by Grossman (Grossman, 1972a; 1972b) and the
extensions presented by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and Case and Deaton (2005). Our
contribution is as follows.
First, we employ the alternative interpretation of the equilibrium condition for health
as determining the optimal level of health investment (as in Galama, 2011 [Chapter 4]).
This interpretation addresses the ve before mentioned limitations of health production
models.
Yet, utilization of medical services and access to care explain only part of the associa-
tion between SES and health (e.g., Adler et al. 1993). Our second contribution is therefore
to incorporate many potential mechanisms in the model that could explain disparities in
health by SES and to include a multitude of potential bi-directional pathways between
health and dimensions of SES. One important concept in our work is \job-related health
stress", which can be interpreted broadly and can range from physical working conditions
(e.g., hard labor) to the psychosocial aspects of work (e.g., low status, limited control,
repetitive work, etc). The notion here is that job-related health stress can include any as-
pect of work that is detrimental to health and as such is associated with a wage premium
(a compensating wage dierential). Other important features of the model are lifestyle1.2 Overview of this thesis research 9
factors (preventive care, healthy and unhealthy consumption), curative (medical) care,
labor force withdrawal (retirement) and mortality.
We nd that greater initial wealth, permanently higher earnings (over the life cycle)
and a higher level of education induce individuals to invest more in curative and in
preventive care, shift consumption toward healthy consumption, and enable individuals
to aord healthier working environments (associated with lower levels of physical and
psychosocial health stresses) and living environments. The mechanism through which
initial wealth, permanent income and education operates is by increasing the demand for
curative care and raising the marginal cost of curative care. A higher marginal cost of
curative care, in turn, increases the health benet of (and hence demand for) preventive
care and healthy consumption, and the health cost of (and hence reduced demand for)
unhealthy working and living environments, and unhealthy consumption. Jointly these
behavioral choices gradually lead to growing health advantage with age. Further, the
model predicts an initial widening and potentially a subsequent narrowing of the SES-
health gradient, as low SES individuals increase their health investment and improve their
health-related behavior faster as a result of their worse health. Results from earlier studies
(Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Ehrlich, 2000; Galama et al. 2008 [Chapter 3]) suggest that
the more rapidly worsening health of low SES individuals could lead to early withdrawal
from the labor force, potentially widening the gradient in early and mid age, and shorter
life spans, potentially narrowing the gradient in late age. Our model thus holds promise
in explaining empirical health patterns. Such a model has not been available before and
economists have highlighted the signicance of its development (e.g., Cutler et al. 2011;
Case and Deaton, 2005).Chapter 2
Grossman's Missing Health
Threshold
We present a generalized solution to Grossman's model of health capital (1972a,
1972b), relaxing the widely used assumption that individuals can adjust their health
stock instantaneously to an \optimal" level without adjustment costs. The Grossman
model then predicts the existence of a health threshold above which individuals do
not demand medical care. Our generalized solution addresses a signicant criticism:
the model's prediction that health and medical care are positively related is consis-
tently rejected by the data. We suggest structural and reduced form equations to test
our generalized solution and contrast the predictions of the model with the empirical
literature.
|||||||||||||{
This chapter is based upon:
Galama, T.J. and A. Kapteyn (2009), \Grossman's Missing Health Threshold", RAND Working
Paper, WR-684.12 Chapter 2
2.1 Introduction
Grossman's model of health capital (1972a, 1972b, 2000) is considered a breakthrough
in the economics of the derived demand for medical care. In Grossman's human capi-
tal framework individuals demand medical care (e.g., invest time and consume medical
goods and services) for the consumption benets (health provides utility) as well as pro-
duction benets (healthy individuals have greater earnings) that good health provides.
The model has been employed widely to explore a variety of phenomena related to health,
medical care, inequality in health, the relationship between health and socioeconomic sta-
tus, occupational choice, etc (e.g., Muurinen and Le Grand, 1985; Case and Deaton, 2005;
Cropper, 1977).
Yet the Grossman model has also received signicant criticism. For example, the model
has been criticized for its simplistic deterministic nature (e.g., Cropper, 1977, Dardanoni
and Wagsta, 1987), for not determining length of life (e.g., Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990),
for allowing complete health repair (Case and Deaton, 2005), and for its formulation in
which medical investment in health has constant returns which is argued to lead to an
unrealistic \bang-bang" solution (e.g., Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). The criticism has led
to theoretical and empirical extensions of the model (often by the same authors who
provided the criticism), which to a large extent address the issues identied.1 For an
extensive review see Grossman (2000) and the work referenced therein.
However, there is one most signicant criticism that thus far has not satisfactorily
been addressed. Zweifel and Breyer (1997; p. 62) reject the Grossman model's central
proposition that the demand for medical care is derived from the demand for good health:
\ ... the notion that expenditure on medical care constitutes a demand derived from an
underlying demand for health cannot be upheld because health status and demand for
medical care are negatively rather than positively related ..." In a review of the empirical
literature Zweifel and Breyer conclude that the model's prediction that health and medical
care should be positively related (healthy individuals consume more medical goods and
services) is consistently rejected by the data. For example, Cochrane et al. (1978) nd
in a study of various determinants of mortality across various countries that indicators
of medical care usage are positively related to mortality. And more specically, Wagsta
(1986a) and Leu and Gern (1992), in estimating structural and reduced form equations
1With the exception perhaps of the \bang-bang" solution and for allowing complete health repair,
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of the Grossman model, nd that measures of medical care are negatively correlated with
measures of health and that the relationships are highly signicant.2
It is of importance that this criticism be addressed. Dismissal of the central proposition
of the Grossman model essentially amounts to rejecting the model itself. And a model of
health and medical care should at a minimum predict the correct sign of the relationship
between the two.
Several authors have sought to explain the consistently negative relation between
health and medical care in empirical studies. For example, Grossman argues that the
observed negative relation could be attributed to biases that arise if the conditional de-
mand function is estimated with health treated as exogenous (Grossman 2000; p. 386).
Further, Grossman (2000; pp. 369-370) shows that the model does not always produce
the incorrect sign for the relationship between health and investment in medical care. For
the pure investment model and assuming that the \natural" deterioration rate increases
with age (a necessary assumption for the health stock to decline with age in Grossman's
formulation), Grossman nds that investment in medical care increases with age while
the health stock falls with age if the elasticity of the marginal production benet of health
with respect to health is less than one (Grossman refers to this as the MEC schedule).
Thus it is the relation between earnings and health (the marginal production benet of
health or MEC schedule) that is responsible for the observed negative relation.
Muurinen and Le Grand (1985), in attempting to explain the positive relation between
mortality and medical care usage found by Cochrane et al. (1978), suggest that the
negative relation between indicators of health and of medical care (apart from suggesting
that medical care is actually harmful) could be explained by dierences in socioeconomic
status. Individuals with fewer resources derive relatively higher production benets from
their health stock. They thus would have relatively greater usage of the stock (i.e., higher
rates of health deterioration) which would require higher medical care to compensate
for health losses. But if health cannot be completely repaired due to the increased use-
intensity they would have inferior health states. High mortality would then be positively
correlated with use of health services.
Wagsta (1986a) provides a detailed discussion of potential reasons why estimates
of the Grossman model may lead to a negative relation between measures of medical
care usage and measures of health. On the one hand, one might argue that the coe-
2Numerous other studies do not specically test Grossman's structural and reduced form equations,
but broadly test similar relations between measures of health and measures for the demand for medical
goods and services, controlling for relevant demographic and other characteristics. These studies nd
similar results. See section 2.4 for a discussion.14 Chapter 2
cients determined in Wagsta (1986a) and similar analyses are not reliable estimates of
the model's parameters. For example, Wagsta suggests that in moving from the theo-
retical to the empirical model inappropriate assumptions may have been introduced (see
Wagsta, 1986a, for details). Or the identication of medical care with market inputs may
insuciently characterize health inputs if non-medical inputs are important in the pro-
duction of health. On the other hand, one may take the estimates at face value and seek
explanations in terms of the underlying model. Interestingly, Wagsta (1986a) suggests
that, contrary to what is assumed in Grossman's theoretical work, the negative relation-
ship may reect a non-instantaneous adjustment of health capital to its \optimal" value.3
This, Wagsta argues, may be the result of a constraint on medical care or be due to
the existence of adjustment costs. Wagsta nds in subsequent analysis (Wagsta, 1993)
that a reformulation of Grossman's empirical model with non-instantaneous adjustment
is not only more consistent with Grossman's theoretical model but also with the data.
Indeed, in earlier theoretical work building on a simplied version of the Grossman
model (Galama et al. 2008; see Chapter 3) we concluded that the widely employed as-
sumption in the Grossman literature that any health \excess" or \decit" can be adjusted
instantaneously and at no adjustment cost may be too restrictive. Any \excess" in health
capital cannot rapidly dissipate as individuals with \excessive" health can at best decide
not to consume medical care.4 As a consequence their health deteriorates at the natural
deterioration rate d(t) (i.e., non instantaneous) until health reaches Grossman's \optimal"
level. Thus an individual's health is not always at the predicted \optimal" level. While
the widely employed assumption that an individual's health follows Grossman's solution
for the \optimal" path allows one to derive simple model predictions for empirical valida-
tion (and indeed this may be the primary reason for its use), it is otherwise unnecessary
and is not demanded by theory. Importantly, Wagsta's (1993) work suggests that in-
dividuals do not adjust their health stocks instantaneously. In other words, not only is
there no theoretical basis for the assumption, empirical evidence suggests the assumption
is not valid.
In this paper we relax the widely used assumption that individuals can adjust their
health stock to Grossman's \optimal" level instantaneously. We do not restrict an in-
3Throughout this paper we will refer to Grossman's solution for the optimal health level as \optimal"
health (using quotation marks) to reect the fact that the Grossman solution is not always the optimal
solution. Grossman's solution is optimal only in the absence of corner solutions. In this work we explore
corner solutions in which individuals do not consume medical care for periods of time. The Grossman
solution is then strictly speaking not the optimal solution.
4In other words medical care is restricted to be non-negative and the situation where individuals do
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dividual's health path to Grossman's \optimal" solution but allow for corner solutions
where the optimal response for healthy individuals is to not consume medical goods and
services for some period of time. We then nd that the Grossman model predicts a sub-
stantially dierent pattern of medical care over the life-time than previously was assumed.
Healthy individuals initially do not demand medical care till their health has deteriorated
to a certain threshold level given by Grossman's \optimal" health. Subsequently their
health evolves as the Grossman solution for the \optimal" path as individuals begin to
demand medical care. In other words, Grossman's \optimal" health level is in fact a
\health threshold" rather than an \optimal" trajectory. This simple pattern potentially
addresses the most damning criticism: we nd that the Grossman model predicts that
healthy individuals (those above the threshold) do not consume medical care, but the un-
healthy (at the threshold) do. Grossman's model thus predicts that healthy individuals
demand less medical care, not the opposite, in agreement with the empirical literature.
Our working hypothesis is that a signicant share of the population is healthy for
much of their life. In our denition the healthy do not demand medical care. This would
help explain the observed negative relation between measures of health and measures of
medical care. Further, as we will see, this hypothesis can explain a number of other
empirical facts.
A consequence of the assumption that a signicant share of the population is healthy
for much of their life, combined with the threshold nature of the demand for medical
care, is that health investment in the Grossman model is to be strictly interpreted as
medical care. It is the type of health investment (own time inputs and purchases of goods
and services in the market) that individuals engage in when they are unhealthy and seek
to \repair" their health. The Grossman literature sometimes views health investment as
including a wide range of other types of investments, such as: preventive care (e.g., medical
check ups), healthy dieting, and sports / exercise. Strictly speaking, the Grossman model
does not contain the concept of healthy or unhealthy consumption nor of preventive care.
In contrast to medical care, individuals engage in such activities when they are healthy
as well as when they are unhealthy. In other words, these types of health investment
are not part of the current formulation of the Grossman model where health investments
take place only when individuals are unhealthy. The Grossman model, however, does
oer an alternative way to include such health investments, by slowing the deterioration
rate. For example, Case and Deaton (2005) model the eect of healthy consumption (e.g.,
healthy dieting, sports / exercise) as slowing and unhealthy consumption (e.g., smoking,
excessive alcohol consumption) as accelerating the rate of deterioration. Preventive care16 Chapter 2
may operate in a similar manner. Here we consider these extensions as beyond the scope
of the current paper.
As mentioned before, we are motivated by the lack of a theoretical justication in the
Grossman literature for employing the assumption that health is always at Grossman's
\optimal" level (see Galama et al. 2008 [Chapter 3]) and by Wagsta's (1993) empirical
analysis that suggests the assumption is not valid. A further motivation comes from the
observation that the above attempts to explain the observed negative relationship between
measures of health and measures of medical care do not pass the principle of Occam's
razor when compared to the simple explanation put forward here that individuals cannot
adjust their health stocks instantaneously (Wagsta 1986a, 1993; Galama et al. 2008
[Chapter 3]). Our proposed explanation is the simplest in that we adopt the Grossman
model as is and make one fewer assumption than is commonly made in the Grossman
literature.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the solutions and predictions of the Grossman
model without restricting the solutions to Grossman's so-called \optimal" solution by
allowing for corner solutions. We proceed as follows. In section 2.2, we reformulate
the Grossman model in continuous time allowing for corner solutions, solve the optimal
control problem and derive rst-order conditions for consumption and health. In section
2.3 we present structural form and reduced form solutions for health, medical care and
consumption to enable empirical testing of our reformulation of the Grossman model. In
section 2.4 we contrast the predictions of our generalized solution of the Grossman model
with the traditional solution and with the empirical literature. We conclude in section
2.5 and provide detailed derivations in the Appendix.
2.2 General framework: the full Grossman model
We present the original human-capital model of the derived demand for health by Gross-
man (Grossman, 1972a, 1972b, 2000) in continuous time (see also Wagsta, 1986a; Wolfe,
1985; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). Health is treated as a form of
human capital (health capital) and individuals derive both consumption (health provides
utility) and production benets (health increases earnings) from it. The demand for med-
ical care is a derived demand: individuals demand \good health", not the consumption
of medical care. In the original formulation of the Grossman model (Grossman, 1972a,
1972b, 2000) health yields an output of healthy time and consumption and medical care
constitute both own-time inputs and goods or services purchased in the market. Sim-
plied versions of the Grossman model have been presented by Case and Deaton (2005)2.2 General framework: the full Grossman model 17
who assume consumption and production benets are functions of health rather than
healthy time, Wolfe (1985) who assumes health does not provide utility, and Case and
Deaton (2005) and Wagsta (1986a) who do not include time inputs into the production
of consumption nor in the production of medical care. For an excellent review of the basic
concepts of the Grossman model see Muurinen and Le Grand (1985).





where T denotes total life time,  is a subjective discount factor and individuals derive util-
ity UfC(t);s[H(t)]g from consumption C(t) and from reduced sick time s[H(t)]. Sick time
is assumed to be a function of health H(t). Time t is measured from the time individuals
begin employment. Utility decreases with sick time @U(t)=@s(t)  0 and increases with
consumption @U(t)=@C(t)  0. Sick time decreases with health @s(t)=@H(t)  0. Further
we assume diminishing marginal benets: @2U(t)=@2s(t)  0 and @2U(t)=@2C(t)  0.
The objective function (2.1) is maximized subject to the following constraints:
_ H(t) = I(t)   d(t)H(t); (2.2)
_ A(t) = A(t) + Y fs[H(t)]g   pX(t)X(t)   pm(t)m(t); (2.3)
and we have initial and end conditions: H(0), A(0) and A(T) are given.
_ H(t) and _ A(t) in equations (2.2) and (2.3) denote time derivatives of health H(t) and
assets A(t). Health (equation 2.2) can be improved through medical health investment
I(t) (medical care) and deteriorates at the \natural" health deterioration rate d(t). Using
















Assets A(t) (equation 2.3) provide a return  (the interest rate), increase with income
Y fs[H(t)]g and decrease with purchases in the market of goods X(t) and medical goods
and services m(t) at prices pX(t) and pm(t), respectively. Income Y fs[H(t)]g is assumed
to be a decreasing function of sick time s[H(t)].












The left-hand side of (2.5) represents life-time consumption of market goods and life-time
consumption of medical goods and services, and the right-hand side represents life-time
nancial resources in terms of life-time assets and life-time earnings.
Goods X(t) purchased in the market and own time inputs C(t) are used in the pro-
duction of consumption C(t). Similarly medical goods and services m(t) and own time
inputs I(t) are used in the production of medical care I(t). The eciencies of production
are assumed to be a function of the consumer's stock of knowledge E (an individual's
human capital exclusive of health capital [e.g., education]) as it is generally believed that
the more educated are more ecient consumers of medical care (see, e.g., Grossman 2000),
I(t) = I[m(t);I(t);E]; (2.6)
C(t) = C[X(t);C(t);E]: (2.7)
The total time available in any period 
(t) is the sum of all possible uses w(t) (work),
I(t) (medical care), C(t) (consumption) and s[H(t)] (sick time),

(t) = w(t) + I(t) + C(t) + s[H(t)]: (2.8)
In this formulation one can interpret C(t), the own-time input into consumption C(t) as
representing leisure.
Income Y fH[s(t)]g is taken to be a function of the wage rate w(t) times the amount
of time spent working w(t),
Y fH[s(t)]g = w(t)f
(t)   I(t)   C(t)   s[H(t)]g: (2.9)
So far we have simply followed Grossman's formulation in continuous time. See
Wagsta (1986a), Wolfe (1985), Zweifel and Breyer (1997), and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990)
for similar formulations. Our formulation diers however in one crucial respect from prior
work: we explicitly impose the constraint that medical care is non-negative for all ages
and allow for corner solutions in which individuals do not demand medical care (I(t) = 0).
2.2.1 Periods where individuals do not demand medical care:
I(t) = 0
It is commonly assumed that any initial \excess" in health capital can be shed and any
\decit" can be repaired over a small period of time and at negligible cost. In other
words, individuals are capable of ensuring that their health is at a certain desirable or
\optimal" level (e.g., Grossman, 1972a, 1972b, 2000; Case and Deaton, 2005; Muuri-
nen, 1982; Wagsta, 1986a; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Ried,2.2 General framework: the full Grossman model 19
1998).5 This assumption is not necessarily always stated explicitly. The literature gener-
ally assumes that there are no corner solutions. In making this assumption the literature
restricts the solution to Grossman's \optimal" solution. While this allows one to derive
simple model predictions for empirical validation, it is unnecessary.
It is useful to view medical health investment I(t) as encompassing activities related
to health repair (e.g., purchases of medical goods and services and own-time inputs)
and to view health-damaging environments (e.g., work and living environments, etc) as
aecting the rate d(t) at which health capital deteriorates (see, e.g., Wagstaf, 1986a;
Case and Deaton, 2005). Similar to Grossman (1972a, 1972b, 2000) we treat the health
deterioration rate d(t) as strictly exogenous.
Healthy individuals, those with health levels above the \optimal" level, may desire to
substitute health capital for more liquid capital. In other words, individuals may wish to
\sell" their health. But, as equation (2.4) shows individuals cannot \choose" health opti-
mally. Instead they can consume medical care (medical health investment) I(t) optimally.
But medical care I(t), viewed as health-promoting cannot be traded (individuals cannot
\sell" health through negative medical health investment) and is therefore positive for all
ages I(t)  0. As a result health cannot deteriorate faster than the health deterioration
rate d(t). This corresponds to the corner solution I(t) = 0.
Thus, we have the following optimal control problem: the objective function (2.1)
is maximized with respect to the control functions C(t) and I(t) and subject to the
constraints (2.2 and 2.3). The Lagrangean or generalized Hamiltonian (see, e.g., Seierstad
and Sydsaeter 1987) of this problem is:
= = UfC(t);s[H(t)]ge
 t + qH(t)fI(t)   d(t)H(t)g
+ qA(t)fA(t) + Y fs[H(t)]g   pX(t)X(t)   pm(t)m(t)g + qI(t)I(t); (2.10)
where qH(t) is the adjoint variable associated with the dierential equation (2.2) for health
H(t), qA(t) is the adjoint variable associated with the dierential equation (2.3) for assets
A(t), and qI(t) is a multiplier associated with the condition that health investment is non
negative, I(t)  0.
5While many authors realize that medical health investments cannot be negative (i.e. that corner
solutions exist), the literature has not fully explored the implications of this constraint.20 Chapter 2
2.2.2 First-order conditions
The rst-order condition for maximization of (2.1) with respect to consumption, subject
to the conditions (2.2) and (2.3) is (see the Appendix for details)
@U(t)=@C(t) = qA(0)C(t)e
( )t; (2.11)
where the Lagrange multiplier qA(0) is the shadow price of wealth (see, e.g., Case and








The rst-order condition for maximization of (2.1) with respect to health, subject to





 qA(0)[H(t)   'H(t)]e
( )t + [_ qI(t)   qI(t)d(t)]e
t; (2.13)
where H(t) is the user cost of health capital at the margin,
H(t)  I(t)[d(t) +    ~ I(t)]; (2.14)
















Note that we have to impose that the user cost of health capital at the margin exceeds
the marginal production benets of health H(t) > 'H(t). Without this condition, the
consumption of medical care would nance itself by increasing wages by more than the
user cost of health. As a result of this, consumers would choose innite medical care paid
for by innite earnings increases to reach innite health.
Equations (2.11) and (2.13) describe the rst-order conditions for the constrained
optimization problem. Equation (2.11) is similar to equation 4a by Wagsta (1986a) and
equation 6 by Case and Deaton (2005). Equation (2.13) is similar to equations 13, 1-13
and 11 of Grossman (1972a), (1972b) and (2000), respectively, equation 4b by Wagsta
(1986a), equation 3.5 of Zweifel and Breyer (1997), and equation 6 by Case and Deaton
(2005), for qI(t) = 0 (i.e., I(t) > 0).6 The essential dierence between our results and
those of fore mentioned authors is in the term qI(t) which is non-vanishing for I(t) = 0.
6Various other authors have presented rst-order conditions for the Grossman model. The list provided
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2.2.3 Grossman's solutions for consumption and health
The rst-order condition (2.13) contains an expression in the multiplier qI(t) which is non-
vanishing (qI(t) 6= 0) for corner solutions in which individuals do not demand medical care
(I(t) = 0). Let's rst focus on the solution where qI(t) = 0. This special case corresponds
to the solutions found by Grossman (1972a, 1972b, 2000). The rst-order condition (2.13)
determines the \optimal" level of health for the \traditional" Grossman solution.
Denoting Grossman's \optimal" solutions for consumption, consumption goods, med-
ical care, medical goods and services, own time input into the production of consumption,
own time input into the production of medical care, sick time and health by C(t), X(t),


















 qA(0)[H(t)   'H(t)]e
( )t: (2.18)
The rst-order condition (2.17) determines the level of consumption. It requires the
marginal benet of consumption to equal the product of the shadow price of wealth qA(0),
the marginal cost of consumption C(t), and a time varying exponent that either grows
or decays with time, depending on the dierence   between the time preference rate 
and the interest rate . Increasing lifetime resources will lower qA(0)7 and hence increase
consumption. The marginal cost of consumption C(t) increases with the price pX(t)
of consumption goods X(t) and with wages w(t), and decreases with the eciency of
consumption goods in producing consumption, @C(t)=@X(t) and with the eciency of
time inputs C(t) in producing consumption, @C(t)=@C(t) (see equation 2.12). Since
the marginal benet of consumption @U(t)=@C(t) is a decreasing function of consumption
C(t), higher prices of consumption goods pX(t), higher wages w(t) and lower eciencies
@C(t)=@X(t) and @C(t)=@C(t)8 lower the equilibrium level of consumption C(t).
The marginal benet of health (equation 2.18) equals the product of the shadow price
of wealth qA(0), the user cost of health capital at the margin H(t) minus the marginal
production benets of health 'H(t), and a time varying term with exponent  (   )t.
7This result can be obtained by substituting the solutions for consumption, health, and medical care
in the budget constraint (equation 2.5) and solving for qA(0). See, for example, Galama et al. (2008)
[Chapter 3].
8I.e., where large increases in X(t) and/or C(t) result in an insignicant increase in C(t).22 Chapter 2
Since the marginal benet of health [@U(t)=@s(t)][@s(t)=@H(t)] is a decreasing function
in health H(t), lower lifetime resources (higher qA(0)), higher user cost of health capital
H(t) and lower production benets of health 'H(t) will lower the level of health H(t).
The user cost of health capital (see equations 2.15 and 2.14) increases with the price
pm(t) of medical goods/services, with wages w(t), the health deterioration rate d(t) and
the rate of return on assets  (reecting an opportunity cost). The user cost of health
capital decreases with the eciency of medical goods/services in producing medical care,
@I(t)=@m(t), the eciency of time input I(t) in producing medical care, @I(t)=@I(t),
and with ~ I(t), the rate of relative change in the marginal cost of medical care I. The
marginal production benet of health 'H(t) (equation 2.16) increases with the extent to
which health increases earnings [@Y (t)=@s(t)][@s(t)=@H(t)].
A lower price of medical goods/services thus increases health. This is pertinent in a
cross-country comparison, but also when comparing across the life-cycle, for instance if
health care is subsidized for certain age groups (like Medicare in the U.S.) Also, more
ecient medical care will lead to greater health. Eciency can explain variations within
a country (if for instance individuals with a higher education level are more ecient
consumers of medical care, Goldman and Smith, 2002) or across countries (if health care
is more ecient in one country than in another).
2.2.4 Corner solutions
We allow for corner solutions in which individuals do not demand medical care I(t) = 0.
This situation occurs when individuals have initial health endowments H(0) that are
greater than Grossman's \optimal" level of health H(0).
We follow a simple intuitive approach. The corner solution is associated with a non-
vanishing Lagrange multiplier qI(t). The solution for consumption is still provided by the
rst-order condition (2.11) as this condition is independent of the Lagrange multiplier
qI(t). The solution for medical care is simply
I(t) = 0: (2.19)
We do not need to use the rst-order condition (2.13) to obtain the solution for health.







In other words, in the absence of medical care health deteriorates at the natural deterio-
ration rate d(t). The corner solution is fully determined by equations (2.11), (2.19) and
(2.20).2.3 Empirical model 23
2.3 Empirical model
The Grossman literature assumes that an individual's health follows Grossman's \opti-
mal" health path, H(t) (e.g., Grossman, 1972a, 1972b, 2000; Case and Deaton, 2005;
Muurinen, 1982; Wagsta, 1986a; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990;
Ried, 1998). In other words, the literature assumes that either the initial health en-
dowment H(0) is at or very close to Grossman's \optimal" health stock H(0) or that
individuals nd this health level desirable and are capable of rapidly dissipating or re-
pairing any \excess" or \decit" in health.
Corner solutions, where individuals do not demand medical care (I(t) = 0), occur
when individuals are healthy, i.e. H(t) > H(t). Health then deteriorates at the natural
deterioration rate d(t) (see equation 2.20) until it reaches Grossman's level H(t) = H(t).
Individuals then begin to demand medical care I(t) > 0. In other words, the Grossman
solution for the \optimal" health stock represents a health \threshold" instead. In our
generalized solution of the Grossman model, H(t) is the minimum health level individ-
uals \demand" to be economically productive (production benets of health) or satised
(consumption benets of health). Individuals only consume medical care when they are
\unhealthy" (health levels at the threshold) and not when they are \healthy" (health
levels above the threshold).
Wolfe (1985) assumes an initial surplus of health and is, to the best of our knowledge,
the only researcher who has attempted to explore the consequences of corner solutions
in Grossman's model in some detail. Wolfe employs a simplied Grossman model where
health (or, alternatively, reduced sick time as in Grossman's original formulation) does
not provide utility. Wolfe interprets the onset of \ ...a discontinuous mid-life increase
in health investment ..." with retirement. We however do not associate the discontinu-
ous increase in medical health investment with retirement but with becoming unhealthy
(health levels at the health threshold leading to consumption of medical care to improve
health). We allow the onset of medical health investment to take place anytime during
the life of individuals, including allowing for the possibility that the onset never occurs.
While Wolfe (1985) provides a convincing argument that high initial health endowments24 Chapter 2
are plausible9, we simply assume that initial health H(0) can take any positive value
(including values below the health threshold).
We distinguish three scenarios as shown in Figure 2.1. We show the simplest case in
which the health threshold H(t) is constant across age (e.g., for constant user cost of
health capital H(t) = H(0), constant production benets of health 'H(t) = 'H(0)
and for  = ; see equations 2.17 and 2.18) but the scenarios are valid for more general
cases. Scenarios A and B begin with initial health H(0) greater than the initial health
threshold H(0) and scenario C begins with initial health H(0) below the initial health
threshold H(0). In scenario A health H(t) reaches the health threshold H(t) during life
(before the age of death T) at age t1. In scenario B health H(t) never reaches the health
threshold H(t) during the life of the individual. In scenario C individuals begin working
life with health levels H(0) below the initial health threshold H(0).
In scenarios A and B the solution for health is determined by the corner solution
presented in section 2.2.4 for young ages (scenario A) or all ages (scenario B). In scenario
A, after health reaches the threshold level the solutions are determined by the \traditional"
Grossman solution. In scenarios A and B we do not have to assume that individuals adjust
their health to reach the health threshold.
In contrast, in scenario C we follow the traditional Grossman model and assume that
an individual is able to adjust his/her health level to reach the health threshold (\optimal"
health). Individuals will invest initial assets A(0) to improve initial health H(0) such that
initial health equals the initial health threshold H(0) = H(0). These solutions have been
criticized by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) as being unrealistic \bang-bang" solutions; the
adjustment takes place instantaneously. It is, however, not necessary to assume that
the adjustment is instantaneous as individuals will have had ample time to consume
medical care before they enter the labor force. There is also naturally an adjustment
cost associated with these medical investments in the sense that such individuals begin
their work life with fewer assets as a result of the purchase of medical care in the market
before they entered the labor force. In other words, by the time individuals enter the
labor force their health has gradually reached the health threshold and the adjustment
9On the grounds that \... the human species, with its goal of self-preservation, confronts a dierent
problem than the individual who seeks to maximize utility. The evolutionary solution to the former may
entail an excessive health endowment in the sense that an individual might prefer to have less health and
to be compensated with wealth in a more liquid form ..." In other words, humans may have been endowed
with \excessive" health as a result of our evolutionary history which required good physical condition
to hunt and gather food, defend ourselves, survive periods of hunger etc. Today's demands on human's
physical condition are essentially based on the utility of good health and on economic productivity, which
in an increasingly knowledge-intensive environment may be signicantly smaller than in pre-historic times.2.3 Empirical model 25
cost is reected in reduced assets. The health of such individuals will then continue to
evolve along the health threshold (the \optimal" health path).
Further, as mentioned before, our working hypothesis is that most individuals are
healthy for most of their life (health levels above the health threshold). A consequence
of this is that scenario C, where initial health is below the initial health threshold, is less
relevant for our discussion. That is, we do not disagree with Ehrlich and Chumas criticism
of the Grossman model. The formulation could benet from a more realistic incorporation
of medical technology (allowed to instantaneously take eect in the Grossman model)
or from diminishing returns to medical care so that a consumer doesn't demand such
investment all at once (the solution Ehrlich and Chuma oer; see also Case and Deaton,
2005). For the purpose of the current research such extensions would complicate the
model and provide relatively little benet.
Figure 2.1: Three scenarios for the evolution of health.
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Notes: t1 in scenario A denotes the age at which health (solid line) has evolved towards the threshold
health level (dotted line).
Following Grossman (1972a, 1972b, 2000) and Wagsta (1986a) we derive structural
and reduced form equations for empirical testing. Empirical tests of Grossman's model
in the empirical literature have been based on estimating two sub-models (1) the \pure
investment" model in which the restriction @U(t)=@H(t) = 0 is imposed and (2) the
\pure consumption" model in which the restriction @Y (t)=@H(t) = 0 is imposed. To
allow comparison with previous research we adopt the same restrictions and explore the
same two sub-models. As Wagsta (1986a) notes equation (2.18) can be transformed into
a linear estimating equation with the restriction @U(t)=@H(t) = 0 or @Y (t)=@H(t) = 0,
but this is not the case for the more general model. In addition, without imposing
these restrictions analytical solutions for health, medical care and consumption cannot be
obtained without making further assumptions. Lastly, the two sub models represent two26 Chapter 2
essential characteristics of health: health as a means to produce (investment) and health
as a means to provide utility (consumption). We now discuss each sub-model in turn.
2.3.1 Pure investment model
In the following we follow Grossman (1972a, 1972b, 2000). We impose
[@U(t)=@s(t)][@s(t)=@H(t)] = 0; (2.21)
assume that sick time is a power law in health
s(t) = 0 + 1H(t)
 2; (2.22)
where 1 and 2 are positive constants (e.g., Wagsta, 1986a).10 We thus have
[@Y (t)=@s(t)][@s(t)=@H(t)] = 12w(t)H(t)
 (2+1): (2.23)
We further assume that medical health investment (medical care) is produced by combin-
ing own time and medical goods/services according to a Cobb-Douglass constant returns





where I(t) is an eciency factor, 1 kI is the elasticity of medical care I(t) with respect
to medical goods/services m(t), kI is the elasticity of medical care I(t) with respect to
health time input I(t), and I determines the extent to which education E improves the
eciency of medical care I(t). Further, the ratio of the marginal product of medical care
with respect to medical goods/services @I(t)=@m(t) and the marginal product of medical
care with respect to own time investment @I(t)=@I(t) equals the ratio of the price of
medical goods/services pm(t) to the wage rate w(t) (representing the opportunity cost of












Lastly, we follow Wagsta (1986a) and Cropper (1981) and assume the health deteriora-
tion rate d(t) to be of the form
d(t) = de
3t+4X(t); (2.26)
where d  d(0)e 4X(0) and X(t) is a vector of environmental variables (e.g., working
and living conditions, hazardous environment, etc) that aect the deterioration rate. The
vector X(t) may include other exogenous variables that aect the deterioration rate, such
as education (Muurinen, 1982).
10But note that negative values can be allowed as long as 12 > 02.3 Empirical model 27
Health threshold
Structural form equations
The structural form equation for the health \threshold" (Grossman's solution for \opti-
mal" health) is as follows (see the Appendix for details)
lnH(t) = 5 + (1   kI)lnw(t)   (1   kI)lnpm(t) + IE   (3 + 6)t   4X(t)
  lnd   lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t 4X(t)[   kI ~ w(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   6]g; (2.27)
where   (2+1) 1, the constant 5  ln(12)+ln[k
kI
I (1 kI)(1 kI)]+lnI(0), and
we allow medical technology I(t) = I(0)e 6t to depend on age (e.g., the eciency of
medical goods/services m(t) and own time inputs I(t) in improving health could diminish
with age).11 It is customary to assume that the term lnd in equation (2.27) is an error
term with zero mean and constant variance 1(t)   lnd (as in Wagsta, 1986a, and
Grossman, 1972a, 1972b, 2000) and that the term ln[1+=d(t)  ~ I(t)=d(t)] (the last term
in equation 2.27) is small or constant (see, e.g., Grossman, 1972a, 2000),12 or that it is
time dependent ln[1 + =d(t)   ~ I(t)=d(t)] / t (e.g, Wagsta, 1986a). We do not have to
make these assumptions as in our generalized solution of the Grossman model the rate of
deterioration d(t) is observable for those times that individuals do not demand medical
care (i.e., for corner solutions). While we assume that the last term in equation (2.27) is
small, our formulation allows us to estimate and test this common assumption.
The demand for health (equation 2.27) thus increases with wages w(t) and with edu-
cation E and decreases with prices pm(t) and the health deterioration rate (terms d, 3
and 4X(t)). The relation with age t is ambiguous. To ensure that health declines with
age, it is commonly assumed that health deterioration increases with age, _ d(t) > 0 (i.e.
that 3 > 0).13 But since wages w(t) generally increase with years of experience (e.g.,
Mincer 1974) it is possible that the health threshold initially increases with age t.
11For example, elderly and frail patients may not be able to cope with certain aggressive chemotherapy
regiments. Note also that advances in medical technology could be modeled by an increasing I(0) with
time (e.g., I(0) increases with subsequent cohorts).
12This would require that the real interest rate  and changes in the ratio of the price of med-
ical goods/services and the eciency of medical goods/services in producing medical care I(t) =
pm(t)=[@I(t)=@m(t)] are much smaller than the health deterioration rate d(t) or that changes in the
interest rate and in ~ I(t) follow the same pattern as changes in d(t) (so that the term is approximately
constant).
13Assuming that the eciency of medical care decreases with age 6 > 0 provides an alternative means
to achieve the same result.28 Chapter 2
The structural equation for the \optimal" consumption of medical goods/services is
as follows
lnm(t) = 7 + lnH(t) + kIlnw(t)   kIlnpm(t)   IE




where 7   lnI(0) kI ln[kI=(1   kI)]. It is customary to assume that the last term in
equation (2.28), ln[1+ ~ H(t)=d(t)] = ln[1+ ~ H(t)d 1
 e 3t 4X(t)], is small and can be ignored
(Grossman, 1972b) or treated as an error term (Wagsta, 1986a). This would require that
the eective rate of change in health _ H(t) is smaller than d(t)H(t). This assumption is
perhaps not unreasonable if medical care is ecient and slows down the eective health
decline _ H(t). Note, once more that in our generalized solution of the Grossman model
d(t) can be observed during times when corner solutions hold. The last term in equation
(2.28) can thus be estimated. For small ~ H(t)=d(t), we have ln[1+ ~ H(t)=d(t)]  ~ H(t)=d(t).
Equation (2.28) predicts that Grossman's \optimal" demand for medical goods/services
and Grossman's \optimal" demand for health are positively related. This is the crucial
prediction which empirical studies consistently reject. Further, the demand for medical
goods/services increases with wages w(t) and the health deterioration rate (terms d, 3
and 4X(t)), and decreases with education E and prices pm(t).
The literature usually focuses on the equations for health (2.27) and medical care
(2.28), but note that equation (2.11) provides a condition for consumption C(t) as well,
which, after making some reasonable assumptions, can be utilized to obtain expressions
for consumption goods X(t) (see the Appendix for details). The budget constraint (equa-
tion 2.5) then provides the solution for assets A(t).
Reduced form equations
Wagsta (1986a) notes that one way of overcoming the unobservability of health capital
is to estimate reduced-from demand functions for health and medical goods/services.
Combining (2.27) and (2.28) and eliminating any expression in health H(t) we nd (see
the Appendix for details):
lnm(t) = 8 + [kI + (1   kI)]lnw(t)   [kI + (1   kI)]lnpm(t)
  (1   )IE   [3   (1   )6]t   4X(t)   lnd
  lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t 4X(t)[   kI ~ w(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   6]g
+ lnf(1   kI)[~ w(t)   ~ pm(t)]   (3 + 6)   4@X(t)=@t
+ de
3t+4X(t) + O(t)g; (2.29)2.3 Empirical model 29
where 8  5 + 7 and
O(t) =
~ d(t)[   kI ~ w(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   6]




w(t)   ~ w(t)2] + (1   kI)[
 pm(t)
pm(t)   ~ pm(t)2]
[d(t) +    kI ~ w(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   6]
(2.30)
which we assume to be small (of the order ~ d(t)  , ~ d(t)  ~ w(t), etc).
The demand for medical goods/services (equation 2.29) increases with wages w(t) and
the eciency of medical care (term 6), and decreases with prices pm(t), education E,
and the health deterioration rate (terms d, 3 and 4X(t)).14
Corner solution
We have (using equations 2.20 and 2.26)






m(t) = 0: (2.32)
Note that during periods in which the corner solutions hold it is in principle possible to
determine the rate of deterioration d empirically. Hence we do not have to assume that
the term lnd in equations (2.27) and (2.28) is an error term.
Regime switching
The time t1 when health has deteriorated to the \threshold" level must satisfy the follow-
ing condition (given by equating 2.27 with 2.31):
lnH(t1) = 5 + (1   kI)lnw(t1)   (1   kI)lnpm(t1) + IE   (3 + 6)t1   4X(t1)
  lnd   lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t1 4X(t1)[   kI ~ w(t1)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t1)   6]g





The model thus implies a switch of regimes at time t1. Before t1 the evolution of health
is given by equation (2.31), whereas after t1 it is given by (2.27). Empirically, this would
generate a switching regression model with endogenous switching. Once health hits the
\optimal" path, the process governing health switches from (2.31) to (2.27). Similarly,
before t1 the demand for medical goods/services is given by equation (2.32), whereas after
t1 it is given by (2.28) or, alternatively, by (2.29).
14For 0 <  < 1.30 Chapter 2
2.3.2 Pure consumption model
In the following we follow Wagsta (1986a). We impose
[@Y (t)=@s(t)][@[s(t)=@H(t)] = 0: (2.34)
To convert (2.18) into estimable equations we have to specify a functional form for the
utility function.
Utility specication
Grossman (1972a, 1972b, 2000) formulates his model in terms of sick time15 and assumes
that sick time s(t) is a function of health H(t); s(t) = s[H(t)]. An alternative formulation
is provided by Case and Deaton (2005). Case and Deaton formulate a simplied Grossman
model in which utility and income are functions of health H(t) directly, rather than
indirectly through sick-time s(t) which in turn is assumed to be a function of health
s(t) = s[H(t)] (as in Grossman, 1972a, 1972b, 2000). Following Case and Deaton we write
utility UfC(t);s[H(t)]g = U[C(t);H(t)] and income Y fs[H(t)]g = Y [H(t)] as functions
of health H(t) instead of sick time s(t). Essentially both formulations are equivalent
except that Case and Deaton's formulation is more general, allowing for example for
earnings to be inuenced not only by reductions in sick time but also increased worker
eciency resulting from good health. And, at any time we can revert back to the original
specication in terms of sick time if deemed desirable.




 1 [H(t)   'H(t)]
@U(t)
@C(t)
+ [_ qI(t)   qI(t)d(t)]e
t: (2.35)
In other words, the marginal benet of health @U(t)=@H(t) is given by the function
C(t) 1[H(t)   'H(t)] times the marginal benet of consumption @U(t)=@C(t) and an
additional expression in qI(t). For Grossman's solutions we have qI(t) = 0 and the
additional term vanishes.
Equation (2.35) suggests that the marginal utility of health @U(t)=@H(t) and the
marginal utility of consumption @U(t)=@C(t) are functions of both health H(t) and con-










15One possible reason for this formulation is that the NORC data set the author employed in empirical
testing of the model contained information on sick days2.3 Empirical model 31
where  (0    1) is the relative \share" of consumption versus health and  ( > 0)
the coecient of relative risk aversion.
The functional form for the utility function can account for the observation that the
marginal utility of consumption declines as health deteriorates (e.g., Finkelstein, Luttmer
and Notowidigdo, 2008). The authors nd that a one-standard deviation increase in
the number of chronic diseases is associated with an 11 percent decline in the marginal
utility of consumption relative to this marginal utility when the individual has no chronic
diseases (the 95 percent condence interval ranges between 2 percent and 17 percent). This
would rule out the strongly separable functional form for the utility function employed
by Wagsta (1986a), where the marginal utility of consumption is independent of health.




The structural equation for the health \threshold" (Grossman's solution for \optimal"
health) is as follows (see the Appendix for details)
lnH(t) = 9 + lnX(t) + lnpX(t)   kI lnw(t)   (1   kI)lnpm(t)
+ IE   (3 + 6)t   4X(t)   lnd
  lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t 4X(t)[   kI ~ w(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   6]g; (2.37)
where 9  lnI(0)   ln(1   kC) + ln[k
kI
I (1   kI)(1 kI)] + ln[(1   )=]. The health
threshold thus increases with consumption goods X(t), prices for consumption goods
pX(t), and education E and decreases with wages w(t), prices of medical goods/services
pm(t), and the health deterioration rate (terms d, 3 and 4X(t)). The last term is
generally assumed to be small and can be estimated in our formulation.
The structural form equation for medical goods/services is the same as for the pure
investment model (equation 2.28) and is repeated for convenience:
lnm(t) = 7 + lnH(t) + kIlnw(t)   kIlnpm(t)   IE




where 7   lnI(0)   kI ln[kI=(1   kI)].32 Chapter 2
Combining equation (2.37) with (2.38) and eliminating any expression in health H(t)
we nd (see the Appendix for details):
lnm(t) = 12 + lnX(t) + lnpX(t)   lnpm(t)   lnd   3t   4X(t)
  lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t 4X(t)[   kI ~ w(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   6]g
+ lnfde
3t+4X(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   kI ~ w(t)   (3 + 6)   4@X(t)=@t
+ ~ X(t) + ~ pX(t) + O(t)g; (2.39)
where 12  7 + 9, and the expression for O(t) is provided by equation (2.30).
Reduced form equations
Note that the health threshold (equation 2.37) is expressed directly as a function of
consumption goods X(t). This relation is dierent from the one found by Wagsta (1986a;
his equation 12), which is the result of our choice for the functional form of the utility
function (equation 2.36). Wagsta (1986a) nds that health H(t) is a function of the
shadow price of wealth qA(0). We can obtain a similar reduced form expression to the
one found by Wagsta (1986a) by using the rst-order condition (2.11) and making some
reasonable assumptions to obtain an expression for consumption good X(t). We then nd
(see the Appendix for details):
lnH(t) = 10   (1=   1)(1   kC)lnpX(t)   (1   kI)lnpm(t)
  [kI + (1=   1)kC]lnw(t) + [I + (1=   1)C]E
  [(3 + 6) + (1=   1)11 + (   )=]t   4X(t)
  lnd + lnqA(0)
 1=
  lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t 4X(t)[   kI ~ w(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   6]g; (2.40)
where
10  lnI(0) + (1=   1)lnC(0) + ln[k
kI
I (1   kI)
(1 kI)]
+ (1=   1)ln[k
kC
C (1   kC)




1 +    

; (2.41)
and we allow the eciency of consumption to depend on age C(t) = C(0)e 11t.
An expression for the shadow price of wealth qA(0) in equation (2.40) can be obtained
by using the life-time budget constraint (equation 2.5), substituting the solutions for
consumption, health, and medical care and solving for qA(0) (see, for example, Galama2.3 Empirical model 33
et al. 2008 [Chapter 3]). The shadow price of wealth qA(0) is found to be a complicated
function of wealth (assets, life-time income), wages w(t), prices pm(t), pX(t), education E
and the health deterioration rate (terms d, 3 and 4X(t)). Wagsta (1986a) provides
a simple approximation for the shadow price of wealth qA(0) (his equations 15 and 16)
which may be easier to use in empirical testing of the model.
Assuming that both medical goods / services m(t) and time input I(t) increase med-
ical care suggests 0  kI  1, and if education E increases the eciency of medical
care then I > 0 (see equation 2.24). Similarly we have 0  kC  1 and C > 0 (see
equation 2.63). Finkelstein, Luttmer and Notowidigdo (2008) provide evidence that the
marginal utility of consumption declines as health deteriorates. Assuming further dimin-
ishing marginal benets of health @2U(t)=@2H(t) < 0 we nd 1 <  < 1+1= (and hence
0 <  < 1 and 1= > 1).
For these parameter values we nd that the health threshold (equation 2.40) increases
with education E, wealth qA(0) 1=, and decreases with the price of consumption goods
pX(t), the price of medical care pm(t), wages w(t), and the health deterioration rate (terms
d, 3 and 4X(t)). The health threshold could increase or decrease with age depending
on the sign of (3 + 6) + (1=   1)11 + [(   )=] and on the evolution of wages
w(t) with years of experience (e.g., Mincer, 1974).
Combining equation (2.38) with (2.40) we nd:
lnm(t) = 13   (1=   1)(1   kC)lnpX(t)   [kI + (1   kI)]lnpm(t)
  [(1   1=)kI + (1=   1)kC]lnw(t) + [(1   1=)I + (1=   1)C]E
  [(1   1=)(3 + 6) + (1=   1)11 + (   )=]t
  (   1)4X(t)   (   1)lnd + lnqA(0)
 1=
  lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t 4X(t)[   kI ~ w(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   6]g; (2.42)
where 13  7 + 10. The demand for medical goods/services (equation 2.42) increases
with education E, wealth qA(0) 1=, and decreases with the price of consumption goods
pX(t), the price of medical goods/services pm(t), wages w(t), and the health deterioration
rate (terms d, 3 and 4X(t)). The health threshold could increase or decrease with age
depending on the sign of (1   1=)(3 + 6) + (1=   1)11 + [(   )=] and on the
evolution of wages w(t) with years of experience (e.g., Mincer, 1974).
Corner solution
The solutions are given by the corner solutions (2.31) and (2.32) derived in section 2.2.4.34 Chapter 2
Regime switching
The time t1 when health has deteriorated to the \threshold" level must satisfy the follow-
ing condition (given by equating 2.37 or 2.40 with 2.31):
lnH(t1) = 9 + lnX(t1) + lnpX(t1)   kI lnw(t1)   (1   kI)lnpm(t1)
+ IE   (3 + 6)t1   4X(t1)   lnd
  lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t1 4X(t1)[   kI ~ w(t1)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t1)   6]g
= 10   (1=   1)(1   kC)lnpX(t1)   (1   kI)lnpm(t1)
  [kI + (1=   1)kC]lnw(t1) + [I + (1=   1)C]E
  [(3 + 6) + (1=   1)11 + (   )=]t1   4X(t1)
  lnd + lnqA(0)
 1=
  lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t1 4X(t1)[   kI ~ w(t1)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t1)   6]g





Similar to the previous discussion for the pure investment model, the model thus
implies a switch of regimes at time t1. Before t1 the evolution of health is given by
equation (2.31), whereas after t1 it is given by (2.37) or by (2.40). Empirically, this would
generate a switching regression model with endogenous switching. Once health hits the
optimal path, the process governing health switches from (2.31) to (2.37), or alternatively
to (2.40). Similarly, before t1 medical care is given by equation (2.32), whereas after t1 it
is given by (2.38) or alternatively (2.39) or (2.42).
2.4 Model Predictions
The Grossman model has been tested in a number of empirical studies on a variety of
datasets from dierent countries (Grossman, 1972a; Wagsta 1986a, 1993; Leu and Dopp-
man, 1986; Leu and Gern, 1992; van Doorslaer, 1987; Van de Ven and van der Gaag,
1982; Erbsland, Ried and Ulrich, 2002; Gerdtham et al. 1999; Gerdtham and Johannes-
son, 1999).16 Despite the large variety in methodologies and the diversity in cultural and
institutional environments these datasets represent, the studies are broadly in agreement
16Grossman (1972a) employs the 1963 health interview survey conducted by the National Opinion
Research Center (NORC) of the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population. Grossman employs mea-
sures of sick time and self-reported health and restricts the dataset to individuals with positive sick time.
Wagsta (1986a) employs the 1976 Danish Welfare Survey (DWS) and uses principal components analysis
(PCA) to derive a smaller number of health components from a long list of health indicators. Wagsta
also uses the wealth of DWS measures of work environment and use-related health depreciation. Measures2.4 Model Predictions 35
with one another and conrm the predictions of the Grossman model for the demand for
health. Health is found to increase with income (wages, life-time earnings), and educa-
tion, and decreases with age, the price of medical goods/services, being single, and with
environmental factors, such as, physically and mentally demanding work environments,
manual labor, psychological stress factors.17
While reduced form estimates of the demand for medical care are generally in agree-
ment with the predictions of the Grossman model, this is not true for structural estimates
(see Wagsta, 1986a). Structural estimates allow for direct testing of the relationship
between health (most often a latent health variable is employed) and medical care. The
most noticeable feature of such structural estimates is the consistently negative relation-
ship between health and medical care (healthy individuals do not go to the doctor). But
this relationship is predicted to be positive in the traditional solution of the Grossman
model (see equation 2.28; those who consume more medical care are healthier). Further,
the negative relationship between health and medical care is found to be the most sta-
of medical care employed are general practitioner visits, weeks in hospital and number of complaints for
which medicine are taken. Wagsta (1993) employs the Danish Health Survey (DHS) and uses a latent
variable health model (multiple indicators multiple causes; MIMIC). Leu and Doppman (1986) employ a
latent health variable, latent earnings and latent transfer income model based on Socio-medical indica-
tors for the population of Switzerland (SOMIPOPS) data combined with the Swiss income and wealth
study (SEVS). General practitioner consultations, hospital days and sick days are used as measures of
medical care. Leu and Gern (1992) employ the same datasets as Leu and Doppman (1986) but follow
a dierent methodology (health is a latent variable but no other latent variables are employed). Van
Doorslaer (1987) estimates a latent health and latent medical knowledge variable model to the Health
Interview Survey of the Belgian National Health Research Project on Primary Health Care conducted
in 1976 among the Dutch-speaking (Flemish) population. Van de Ven and van der Gaag (1982) employ
a MIMIC model with latent health and data from a health-care survey among 8000 households in the
Netherlands. Erbsland, Ried and Ulrich (2002) use data from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP).
They use a model with a latent health and a latent environment variable and restrict the analysis to the
working population and to those with a positive demand for medical services. Gerdtham et al. (1999)
use a rating scale and a time-trade o method to obtain measures of health as well as a self-reported
measure of health from data collected in Uppsala County in Sweden. Gerdtham and Johannesson (1999)
use a self-reported health measure from 1991 data of the Level of Living Survey (LNU), a random sample
of the Swedish population. Both Gerdtham et al. (1999) and Gerdtham and Johannesson (1999) provide
estimates of the demand for health but no structural estimates for the demand of medical care.
17In addition, these studies nd that health increases with healthy behavior (sports, healthy eating and
sleeping habits) and decreases with being overweight and with smoking. Females are found to be in lower
health. And, moderate alcohol consumption is found to have a positive or negligible impact on health
(e.g., Gerdtham et al. 1999, Leu and Doppman, 1986). Since the eect of consumption (healthy and
unhealthy forms) on health as well as health behaviors (exercise, sleeping habits) and gender dierences
are not part of the Grossman model we do not discuss these here.36 Chapter 2
tistically signicant of any relationship between medical care and any of the independent
variables (see, e.g., Grossman, 1972a; Wagsta, 1986a, 1993; Leu and Doppman, 1986;
Leu and Gern, 1992; van Doorslaer, 1987; Van de Ven and van der Gaag, 1982; Erbsland,
Ried and Ulrich, 2002).
We assume that each of the scenarios A, B and C occur in reality (see Figure 2.1). In
other words, that there exist healthy individuals who consume medical care during some
part of their life (scenario A; initial health above the initial health threshold and the
threshold reached during life), very healthy individuals who never consume medical care
(scenario B; initial health well above the initial health threshold and the threshold never
reached), and ill individuals who consume medical care their entire life (scenario C; initial
health at the health threshold). We do not a-priori know the distribution of healthy,
very healthy and ill individuals in the population but if a statistically signicant share of
individuals have initial health endowments H(0) above the initial health threshold H(0)
(scenarios A and B) then empirical tests should be able to distinguish between the inter-
pretation of the Grossman model advocated here (represented by the joint occurrences of
scenarios A, B and C) and the interpretation adopted in the literature (represented by
scenario C only).
In the following we will contrast the predictions of our interpretation of the Grossman
model with the more generally held interpretation and with empirical observations from
the literature.
2.4.1 Similarities
The predictions for the demand for health and for medical care for unhealthy individuals
(those individuals whose health is at the threshold) in our generalized solution of the
Grossman model are, with the exception of some minor dierences in formulation, the
same as for the original solution of the Grossman model. Those predictions have largely
been veried in the empirical literature, with the exception of the relation between the
demand for health and the demand for medical care (see for details the earlier discussion
and references therein). We summarize our predictions in Table 2.1.
Our generalized solution of the Grossman model broadly replicates the predictions of
the traditional solution of the Grossman model. This can be seen as follows. Since the
empirical literature has not distinguished between healthy and unhealthy individuals (a
concept introduced in this work) a mixture of healthy and unhealthy individuals will have
been included in the samples investigated. If at any time the proportion of unhealthy
individuals (those whose health is at the health threshold and who behave according to2.4 Model Predictions 37
the traditional Grossman solution) is signicant this could produce the observed relation-
ships, with the exception of the relation between health and medical care. The reason
that the relationship between health and medical care is dierent stems from the signi-
cantly dierent behavior between healthy and unhealthy individuals. The healthy do not
consume medical care while the unhealthy do. If both healthy and unhealthy individuals
are included in a sample this would produce the observed strong negative relationship
between measures of health and measures of medical care. At the same time, if we can
restrict the sample to the unhealthy, we should observe the positive relationship between
health and medical care as predicted by Grossman.18
As Table 2.1 shows we expect health to decrease with the price of medical goods/services
pm(t), unhealthy environmental factors (X(t), d, 3), and increase with education E19
and with the eciency of medical care  6. The relation with age t is ambiguous as
wages w(t) increase with working experience (e.g., Mincer, 1974) potentially countering
the \aging" variables 3, 6,    . The eect of wages w(t) is unclear, with a positive
eect on health in the pure investment (PI) and a negative eect on health in the pure
consumption (PC) model. Do note however that the predictions for the PC model have
less predictive power than for the PI model. The structural form equation (2.37) includes
consumption good X(t), an endogenous variable, which in turn is a function of exogenous
variables, such as wages w(t), the price of medical goods/services pm(t), education E,
etc. The inclusion of consumption good X(t) in the structural form equation may distort
the relationships between health and the exogenous variables. While the structural form
equation (2.40) does not suer from this problem, the predictions shown in the table de-
pend on assumptions about model parameters (see table note b in Table 2.1). In addition,
the shadow price of wealth qA(0) is a complicated function of various exogenous variables
over the life cycle. Equation (2.40) thus suers from a similar lack of transparency.
With regard to the demand for medical care, Table 2.1 shows that we expect the
demand for medical goods/services to decrease with the price of medical goods/services
pm(t), education E and the eciency of medical care  6, and to increase with health
18Note that in retirement there is no production benet from health as income (a pension / savings) is
independent of the health status of the individual. Whether individuals demand less health as a result is
unclear. The increased availability of leisure could reduce or increase the demand for health depending
on whether leisure is a substitute or compliment of health (see for a discussion Galama et al. 2008
[Chapter 3]). Given potential dierences in the demand for health between workers and retirees it may
be necessary to distinguish between workers and retirees to potentially establish the positive relationship
between health and medical care.
19Note that education could possible enter through lowering the rate of health deterioration d(t) in
addition, or as an alternative, to increasing the eciency of medical care; see, e.g., Muurinen (1982)38 Chapter 2
Table 2.1: Relationships between the health threshold, the demand for medical care and
various model variables, for the pure investment and pure consumption models.
Health Medical care
PIa PC PC (Full)b PI/PC
Eq. 2.27 Eq. 2.37 Eq. 2.40 Eqs. 2.28, 2.38
Health H(t) n/a n/a n/a +
Wages w(t) + - - +
Price of medical goods/services pm(t) - - - -
Education E + + + -
Age t ? ? ? ?
(Un)healthy environment X(t); d; 3 (-)+ (-)+ (-)+ (+)-
Consumption good X(t) n/a + n/a n/a
Price of consumption good pX(t) n/a + - n/a
Life-time wealth qA(0) 1= n/a n/a + n/a
Eciency of medical care  6 + + + -
Notes: Health threshold denoted by \Health"; demand for medical care denoted by \Medical care"; pure
investment model denoted by \PI" and pure consumption model by \PC". Equation numbers (Eq.) refer
to the structural form equations in section 2.3.
a Relations are valid for  = 1=(1 + 2) > 0.
b For plausible parameter choices. Precise relationships and conditions under which relations are valid
are provided in section
H(t), wages w(t) and unhealthy environmental factors (d, 3, X(t)). The predictions
for the PI and PC models are the same. As discussed earlier the positive relationship
between health and medical care is expected to be observable only if the sample can be
restricted to unhealthy individuals.
2.4.2 Dierences
In addition to the above predictions of our generalized solution of the Grossman model
that are the same as in the traditional solution of the model, there are a number of
distinctly dierent predictions. Those are discussed in detail below. We denote the
predictions of the more generally held interpretation of the Grossman model by \Optimal"
stock, our interpretation of the Grossman model by Health threshold, and the empirical
observations from the literature by Empirical literature.2.4 Model Predictions 39
1. Medical care and health are negatively correlated if measured across
healthy and unhealthy individuals
\Optimal" stock: Health and medical care are positively correlated (see equations
2.28 and 2.38), i.e. individuals who consume more medical care are healthier.
Health threshold: Healthy individuals (H(t) > H(t)) do not consume medical care,
while unhealthy individuals (H(t) = H(t)) do. I.e. healthy individuals do not
go to the doctor much, do not take much medicine, are not found to stay often in
hospitals. Measured across a sample of healthy and unhealthy individuals we expect
unhealthy individuals to consume more medical care than healthy individuals.
Empirical literature: As discussed earlier the most striking feature of structural form
estimates of the demand for medical care (see, e.g., Grossman, 1972a; Wagsta,
1986a, 1993; Leu and Doppman, 1986; Leu and Gern, 1992; van Doorslaer, 1987;
Van de Ven and van der Gaag, 1982; Erbsland, Ried and Ulrich, 2002) is the persis-
tent and highly statistically signicant negative relation found between measures of
health and measures of medical care. The studies employ a variety of methodologies
and a variety of datasets representing dierent cultural and institutional settings in
a number of dierent countries (Europe and U.S.), yet their ndings are largely
in agreement with one another. None of these studies separate a healthy from an
unhealthy population and hence we expect to observe a strong negative correlation
between health and medical care if the population consists of both healthy and
unhealthy individuals.20
2. Healthy people do not consume medical care
\Optimal" stock: In the standard solution of the Grossman model individuals con-
sume medical care at all ages.
Health threshold: In our generalized solution healthy individuals (individuals whose
health H(t) is above the threshold H(t)) do not consume medical goods/services,
20Grossman (1972a) however selected a sub sample of the NORC dataset by restricting the data to
those individuals that reported positive sick time and Erbsland, Ried and Ulrich (2002) restricted the
sample to individuals reporting positive demand for health services. Interestingly Grossman (1972a)
shows the least statistically signicant negative relation between health and medical outlays of all the
studies (t-stat of -5.84 [see Table 7 OLS estimates]). Erbsland, Ried and Ulrich (2002) report t-values of
around -10 for three measures of medical care usage. Other studies, on the other hand, report values of
at least -10 and up to -90. Perhaps the restriction of the samples to individuals that report positive sick
time or positive medical care partially limited the sample to unhealthy respondents.40 Chapter 2
i.e. we would expect some fraction of the population at any given time to not
consume medical goods/services.
Empirical literature: We would expect that healthy people pay few visits to the
doctor (perhaps only to prevent illness, such as for a \health check up") and that
they do not require much medical care (hospital stays, use medicine, etc). For
example, Wagsta (1986a) observes that 48% of the 1976 Danish Welfare Survey
(DWA) sample he employed recorded zero general practitioner visits and 46.5%
recorded zero weeks in hospital.
3. Eective health deterioration slows when individuals reach the health
threshold
\Optimal" stock: In the standard solution of the Grossman model health evolves
as Grossman's \optimal" health stock, i.e. we do not expect to see discontinuous
changes in the evolution of health.
Health threshold: Healthy people (H(t) > H(t)) do not consume medical goods/services
and their health deteriorates at the \natural" deterioration rate _ H(t) =  d(t)H(t).
When, as a result of health deterioration their health reaches the health threshold
H(t) = H(t) (i.e., they have become unhealthy by our denition) they begin to
consume medical goods / services and their health deteriorates at a lower eective
rate _ H(t) = I(t)   d(t)H(t). If medical care improves one's health (e.g., medical
care is eective), we expect to observe slower eective health deterioration _ H(t) or
even health improvement when individuals reach the health threshold and begin to
consume medical goods/services).21
Empirical literature: Van Kippersluis et al. (2008) examine inequality in self-
reported health (SRH) as a function of income in 11 European countries. The
authors transform the ordinal SRH information onto a cardinal scale using utility
scores for the SRH categories taken from the 2001 Canadian Community Household
Survey (CCHS). The authors nd a remarkable consistency in the pattern of health
with age. In most countries health deteriorates gradually from early adulthood until
around age 50 after which it generally levels o before accelerating rapidly after age
70. The authors nd this middle-age plateau (ages 50-70) rather puzzling, but it
would be consistent with a slowing of the decline in health resulting from increased
medical care as the average individual reaches a health threshold. After age 70, as
terminal illnesses set in, health again declines rapidly.
21Note the distinction between the eective health deterioration rate _ H(t) and the \natural" health
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Smith (2004, 2007) uses self-reported health (SRH) status from the National Health
Interview Survey (NHIS) and PSID to show how disparity in health between low- and
high-income individuals (the so-called socio-economic status [SES]-health gradient)
increases with age till about age 60 after which the disparity narrows (see Van
Doorslaer et al. 2008 for an excellent review of the literature on the SES-health
gradient over the life cycle). The percentage of individuals reporting excellent or
very good health status declines rapidly till age 60 for the rst income quartile
households (lowest income) and then remains fairly constant out till age 90. The
2nd to 4th income quartiles however show a more gradual decline.
Similarly, Case and Deaton (2005) present several plots of self-reported health (SRH)
status from the NHIS as a function of age. Women and men in the bottom income
quartile show a rapid deterioration in SRH between ages 20 and 60 after which the
SRH curve attens signicantly (see their Figure 2). Again we see no evidence for
a attening of SRH with increasing age for the upper income quartile (in fact we
see gradually deteriorating SRH status). This suggests that high SES individuals
reach a health threshold much later (their SRH deteriorates slower) than low SES
individuals. As a result they see no need to consume medical goods/services even
at late ages and their eective health deterioration does not slow with age.
Van Kippersluis et al. (2009) nd similar results for the Netherlands using a rich
dataset based on the Health Interview Surveys and administrative data from Statis-
tics Netherlands (CBS). The data allows the authors to study SRH as well as mor-
tality, to disentangle the eect of ageing from that of cohort eects and to use actual
(not reported) income from tax les. The authors nd the pattern of the SES-health
gradient over the life cycle in the Netherlands to be remarkably similar to that in
the U.S., despite signicant dierences in the two countries' institutions.
Wagsta (1993) ts an empirical reformulation of the Grossman model to two data
subsets, those aged under 41 and those aged over 41. The author nds that for the
over 41s the rate of eective health deterioration _ H(t) is lower than for the under 41s
(the estimated relationship is Ht / 0:849Ht 1 for the over 41s [Table 2b in Wagsta,
1993] and Ht / 0:687Ht 1 for the under 41s [Table 2a in Wagsta, 1993]). Further,
the t is better for the over 41s (R2 = 0:595) than for the under 41s (R2 = 0:394).
Since we expect that an older population will have relatively more individuals with
health levels at or near the health \threshold" we would expect this population to
provide a better t to the \traditional" solution of the Grossman model.42 Chapter 2
So, perhaps older individuals, and in particular low income individuals, are slowing
their eective health deterioration _ H(t) in late age by consuming medical goods /
services as a threshold model would predict.22
4. Eective health deterioration and medical care are negatively correlated
\Optimal" stock: According to the structural form equation (2.27) we nd _ H(t) /
 (3 + 6)H(t) (assuming variation in wages w(t), prices pm(t) and environment
X(t) is slow). Thus, high eective health deterioration requires that 3 + 6 is
large and/or that health H(t) is large ( > 0 is required to reproduce other em-
pirical ndings; see note a in Table 2.1). The model then predicts that medical
goods/services m(t) / H(t)e(3+6)t are also high and increase exponentially with
age (see equation 2.28). This would produce a positive correlation between eective
health deterioration and medical goods/services.
Health threshold: Measured across healthy and unhealthy individuals we expect
to observe that healthy individuals will have rapid health deterioration ( _ H(t) =
 d(t)H(t)) and low demand for medical care (I(t) = 0; they do not consume medical
goods/services) while unhealthy individuals will be characterized by low eective
health deterioration rates ( _ H(t) = I(t)   d(t)H(t)) and high demand for medical
care (I(t) > 0). This would produce a negative correlation between eective health
deterioration and the consumption of medical goods/services.
Empirical literature: The discussion under item 3 suggests that individuals may
slow their eective health deterioration as they age and begin to consume medical
care. Further research is needed to empirically test this prediction.
5. Medical care increases discontinuously when individuals become unhealthy
\Optimal" stock: In the standard solution of the Grossman model health evolves
as the \optimal" health stock and individuals consume medical care continuously,
i.e. there is no switching of dynamics and we do not expect to see discontinuous
changes in medical care.
22At these high ages SRH may suer from selection eects. Unhealthy individuals may have higher
mortality and drop out of the sample in higher numbers than healthy individuals. Further, SRH status
suers from framing bias, that is, individuals compare their health with a reference of what constitutes
good health in their respective age group. In other words, they may be answering the question \Consid-
ering my age I am in good/bad health" instead of \I am in good/bad health". Both eects would either
reduce the signicance of the observed attening of SRH or could provide an alternative explanation for
the observation.2.4 Model Predictions 43
Health threshold: Healthy people (H(t) > H(t)) do not consume medical care.
When, as a result of health deterioration their health reaches the health threshold
H(t) = H(t) (i.e., they have become unhealthy by our denition) they begin to
consume medical care.
Empirical literature: The literature has, as far as we know, not tested this prediction
before. The empirical test is described in Section 2.3. Some moderate support for
the notion that the dynamics of healthy and unhealthy individuals are signicantly
dierent comes from the following observation. Grossman noted in his original work
(Grossman, 1972a; Chapter V, p. 56) that over two thirds of the NORC sample he
used in empirical testing of his model, reported no sick days. He notes that \...
Since the characteristics of these two groups [reporting sick days and no sick days]
are very similar, it is dicult to explain the behavior of the [group that had no sick
days]. Put dierently, the two groups essentially represent \two dierent samples,"
and problems arise when the data are pooled ..."23
6. Blue collar workers let their health deteriorate faster and to lower levels
than white collar workers
\Optimal" stock: Blue and white collar workers24 consume medical care at all times.
Blue collar workers (see equation 2.27) have lower levels of health, assuming lower
wages w(t), lower levels of education E, higher \natural" deterioration rates d(t)
(i.e. higher values of d, 3, and 4 and assuming  > 0, 0 < kI < 1 and I > 0; see
equation 2.26). The \traditional" solution of the Grossman model is unclear about
the eective health deterioration rate _ H(t) for blue versus white collar workers.25
23Strictly speaking we distinguish healthy from unhealthy individuals by whether they are above
(healthy) or below (unhealthy) the health threshold and whether they do not (healthy) or do (unhealthy)
consume medical care. But the number of sick days is assumed to be a function of health, and healthy
individuals are expected to report relatively fewer sick days than unhealthy individuals.
24Blue collar workers are broadly dened as individuals who generally have 1) lower levels of education,
2) lower wages, and 3) perform \hard" labor (e.g., construction). White collar workers on the other hand
generally 1) are more educated, 2) earn higher wages, and 3) perform \light" jobs (e.g., oce workers).
As a result of \hard" labor and worse working environments blue collar workers are believed to be
characterized by higher \natural" health deterioration rates d(t) than white collar workers (e.g., Case
and Deaton, 2005; Muurinen and Le Grand, 1985).
25Assuming wages w(t), medical prices pm(t) and environmental variables X(t) are relatively constant
with age t we have _ H(t) /  (3 + 6)H(t). From this it is not immediately obvious that the eec-
tive health deterioration rate would be dierent for blue versus white collar workers, though 3 (the
exponential rate of decay of d(t); see equation 2.26), may be higher for blue collar workers.44 Chapter 2
Health threshold: In scenario A, initially while blue and white collar workers are
healthy (health above the \threshold"), a blue collar worker's health deteriorates
faster than that of a white collar worker, assuming blue collar workers have higher
health deterioration rates d(t) as a result of physically demanding work and working
environments that are more detrimental to health (see equation 2.31). The health of
blue collar workers deteriorates to lower levels as their health threshold is lower (see
discussion above under \Optimal" stock and equation 2.27). Once workers reach
the health threshold it is unclear what the nature of dierences (if any) is for the
eective health deterioration rate _ H(t) for blue versus white collar workers (see
discussion above under \Optimal" stock).
Empirical literature: Case and Deaton (2005) investigate the rate of change in self
reported health by occupation using data from the NHIS. The authors nd that
those who are employed in manual occupations have worse health than those who
work in professional occupations and that the health eect of occupation operates
at least in part independently of the personal characteristics of the workers. Cutler
et al. (2011) present similar results using mortality as an indicator of health. Van
Kippersluis et al. (2009) present similar results using the self reported health status
of Dutch working males.
Further, as discussed earlier under item 3, the health of women and men in the
bottom income quartile deteriorates much faster than that of the top income quar-
tile. It is much harder to assess from the self-reported health measures presented
in Smith (2004, 2007), Case and Deaton (2005) and Van Kippersluis et al. (2009)
whether blue collar workers let their health deteriorate to lower levels of health,
though generally speaking blue collar workers are found to be in worse health than
white collar workers (e.g., Case and Deaton, 2005; Smith, 1999, 2004, 2007; Van
Kippersluis et al. 2008, 2009; as well as the evidence provided by the aforemen-
tioned studies that estimated the demand for health and found health to increase
with, e.g., education, wages and to decrease with, e.g., physically demanding work).
Similar patterns hold for other measures of socioeconomic status, such as education
and wealth and other indicators of health, such as disability, and mortality (e.g.,
van Doorslaer et al. 2008).
7. The relationship between education and health is expected to be positive
and diers for healthy and unhealthy individuals
\Optimal" stock: Health and education are positively related if the eciency of med-
ical care increases with education (equation 2.27 for I > 0). If health deterioration2.5 Discussion 45
d(t) decreases with education E, i.e., education is part of the vector X(t) of environ-
mental variables that aect the deterioration rate, then the education component
of 4 (4;E) is negative and hence higher levels of education E through their aect
on the deterioration rate d(t) increase the level of health. The eect is similar to
the presumed increased eciency of medical care usage through education, I > 0,
and both eects cannot be separated in the \traditional" solution of the Grossman
model (the term in the structural form equation is lnH(t) / (I  4;E)E). There
is no dierence between healthy and unhealthy individuals as in the \traditional"
solution of the Grossman model this distinction is not made.
Health threshold: In scenario A, initially while individuals are healthy any relation-
ship between health and education (see equation 2.31) works only through the eect
(if any) of education on the rate of deterioration d(t) and we have lnH(t) /  e4;E
(4;E < 0). When individuals have reached the health \threshold" both pathways
(through the presumed increased eciency of medical care usage and through any
aect on the rate of deterioration d(t)) are relevant and we have the same relation-
ship as for the \optimal" stock: lnH(t) / (I   4;E)E.
Empirical literature: A positive association between education and health has been
established in the empirical literature (see, e.g., the evidence provided by the afore-
mentioned studies that estimated the demand for health and found health to in-
crease with education). To the best of our knowledge the literature has not yet
made an attempt to test the interpretation of the Grossman model advocated here,
i.e., to distinguish between healthy and unhealthy individuals and test dierences
in their respective relationships between health and education. The empirical test
is described in Section 2.3.
2.5 Discussion
We have presented arguments for a generalized solution of the Grossman model (Gross-
man, 1972a, 1972b). Our generalized solution of the Grossman model can deal with an
important criticism of the model: that the model's prediction that health and medical
care are positively related is consistently rejected by the data (e.g., Zweifel and Breyer,
1997, p. 62). We nd that this prediction is based on the widely used and unnecessary
assumption that the health stock is always at Grossman's solution for \optimal" health.
There is no theoretical basis for this assumption and empirical evidence suggests it is not
valid. Removing this widely used restriction and allowing for the existence of corner so-46 Chapter 2
lutions where individuals do not consume medical care, we nd that the Grossman model
predicts the existence of a health threshold.
We have contrasted the predictions of the generalized solution of the Grossman model
advocated here with the empirical literature. Our generalized solution replicates the
predictions of the traditional Grossman model (which have largely been veried in the
empirical literature) with the exception of the problematic prediction that health and
medical care should be positively correlated (which has been rejected in the empirical
literature). As with the traditional solution of the Grossman model (a special case of
our generalized solution) we broadly expect health to decrease with the cost of medical
goods/services and with environmental factors that are detrimental to health (e.g., work-
ing conditions) and to increase with education. The eect of income is unclear as dierent
sub models predict a dierent relation with health. With regard to the demand for medi-
cal care, we expect medical care to decrease with the cost of medical goods/services pm(t)
and with education, and to increase with wages and with environmental factors that are
detrimental to health.
In addition, our generalized solution of the Grossman model produces a number of
predictions that are dierent from the traditional solution of the Grossman model. First,
it replicates the observed negative relation between health and medical care as in our
generalized solution of the Grossman model healthy individuals (whose health is above
the health threshold) do not consume medical care while the unhealthy (at the thresh-
old) do. Second, we nd that individuals do not consume medical care at all times as
healthy people do not consume medical care. Basically our generalized solution of the
Grossman model predicts the intuitively natural behavior that healthy individuals do not
go to the doctor or stay in hospital while the unhealthy do (except for preventive care
or as a result of a sudden health shock, both phenomena are currently not part of the
Grossman model). Third, we nd that eective health deterioration slows as individuals
reach the health threshold and begin to consume medical care. Fourth, our generalized
solution of the Grossman model predicts that the eective health deterioration rate _ H(t)
(the net eect of \aging" and medical care) will be smaller for individuals who consume
more medical care. Fifth, we predict that the consumption of medical care increases
discontinuously as healthy individuals begin to consume medical care once their health
reaches the health threshold. Sixth, our generalized solution of the Grossman model can
account for the observation that blue collar workers tend to have faster rates of eective
health deterioration _ H(t) than white collar workers (e.g., Case and Deaton, 2005). Lastly,
because the model distinguishes between healthy and unhealthy individuals who behave
dierently, the model allows for a number of tests that are not possible in the traditional2.5 Discussion 47
interpretation of the Grossman model. For example, Muurinen (1982) has argued that
education improves health through lowering the natural health deterioration rate d(t)
(aging) and not just (or perhaps not at all) through improving the eciency of an indi-
vidual's consumption of medical care (Grossman, 1972a, 1972b). Since the rst pathway
(lowering the deterioration rate) operates only for healthy individuals and both pathways
operate for unhealthy individuals it should in theory be possible to establish empirically
the relative importance of both pathways. Also, while the natural deterioration rate d(t)
is not directly observable in the traditional interpretation of the Grossman model, it is
directly observable in our interpretation as individuals who are healthy let their health
deteriorate at exactly this rate (assuming good empirical measures of health status are
available).
A review of the empirical literature suggests that our generalized solution of the Gross-
man model can account for a greater number of observations than can the traditional
solution. Ultimately though, the model needs to be veried in direct empirical testing.
To this end we have provided detailed structural and reduced form equations for the pure
consumption and pure investment models for both the healthy and unhealthy phases of
life. Empirically, the proposed model is a switching regression model with endogenous
switching. Once health hits the health threshold, the process governing health and med-
ical care switches.
The corner solutions presented in this work contribute to better describing the behavior
of individuals whose health is above the threshold level for parts of the life cycle (the
healthy and the very healthy). However, for those individuals whose health is at the
threshold over the life cycle (the ill) we have simply adopted the assumption commonly
made in the Grossman literature that individuals are able to adjust their health to a
desirable level. This assumption may be less severe though in the case of the ill. It is, for
example, not necessary to assume that the adjustment is instantaneous as individuals will
have had ample time to consume medical care before they enter the labor force. There is
also naturally an adjustment cost associated with these investments in the sense that such
individuals begin their work life with fewer assets as a result of the purchase of medical
care in the market before they entered the labor force.
Natural extensions of the model would be to include uncertainty and health shocks
(e.g., to address the criticism by Cropper, 1977; Dardanoni and Wagsta, 1987), to revisit
the assumption of complete health repair (e.g., the criticism by Case and Deaton, 2005),
to revisit the unrealistic so-called \bang-bang" solutions that the model produces when
an individual's health is initially below the threshold (the ill; the criticism by Ehrlich and
Chuma, 1990), to include length of life as a decision variable (endogenous T; e.g., Ehrlich48 Chapter 2
and Chuma, 1990), to include healthy and unhealthy behaviors such as unhealthy con-
sumption (e.g., smoking), healthy consumption (e.g., dieting; see Case and Deaton, 2005)
and preventive care, and to explore the solutions in which the decision to perform \hard"
labor is endogenous (see, e.g., Case and Deaton, 2005). Following Cropper (1981) and
Wagsta (1986a) we have assumed that the natural deterioration rate d(t) is exogenously
determined by environmental factors such as, e.g., working conditions, hazardous environ-
ment, etc. The model thus assumes that blue collar workers have no choice but to perform
hard labor and face worse living, working and schooling environments. But, as Case and
Deaton (2005) argue, individuals may accept risky and unhealthy work environments, in
exchange for higher pay.2.6 Appendix 49
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 First-order conditions
Associated with the Lagrangian (equation 2.10) we have the following conditions:
_ qA(t) =  @=(t)=@A(t) )
_ qA(t) =  qA(t) ,
qA(t) = qA(0)e
 t; (2.44)
_ qH(t) =  @=(t)=@H(t) )
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Equation (2.46) provides the rst-order condition for maximization of (2.1) with re-
spect to consumption, subject to the conditions (2.2) and (2.3). Using (2.48) to obtain50 Chapter 2
an expression for _ qH(t) and substituting the results for qH(t) and _ qH(t) in (2.45) we nd
the rst-order condition for maximization of (2.1) with respect to health, subject to the
conditions (2.2) and (2.3). The resulting rst-order conditions are provided by equations
(2.11) and (2.13) in section 2.2.
2.6.2 Structural and reduced form: pure investment model
We begin with the rst-order condition for optimal health (2.18). We have (using equa-






[d(t) +    ~ I(t)]
 1 (2.50)
= 12w(t)H(t)









I (1   kI)(1 kI)w(t)
kIpm(t)
(1 kI): (2.52)
This leads to the structural form equation (2.27).
Now consider the equations for medical health investment (equations 2.2 and 2.24)
and using (2.25),
lnI(t) = IE + (1   kI)lnm(t) + kIlnI(t) + lnI(t) (2.53)
= IE + lnm(t) + kIlnpm(t)   kIlnw(t)
+ lnI(t) + kI ln[kI=(1   kI)] (2.54)
= ln[ _ H(t) + d(t)H(t)] (2.55)
= lnd(t) + lnH(t) + ln[1 + ~ H(t)=d(t)]: (2.56)
This leads to the structural form equation (2.28).
Using (2.27) and (2.28) we nd
lnm(t) = 8 + [kI + (1   kI)]lnw(t)   [kI + (1   kI)]lnpm(t)
  (1   )IE + (1   )lnd + (1   )(3 + 6)t + (1   )4X(t)
  lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t 4X(t)[   kI ~ w(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   6]g
+ ln[1 + ~ H(t)=d(t)]; (2.57)
where 8  5 + 7.
Combining equations (2.54) and (2.55) we nd:
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Substituting equation (2.60) into equation (2.57) and dierentiating the result with
respect to time t we nd the reduced form expression (2.29).
While the literature largely focuses on the relations for health H(t) and medical
goods/services m(t) the model does allow for the derivation of relations for consumption
goods X(t) and assets A(t). In the pure investment model we have @U(t)=@H(t) = 0, i.e.










Grossman (1972a, 1972b, 2000) assumes that medical health investment is produced
by combining time and medical goods/service according to a Cobb-Douglass constant
returns to scale production function (see equation 2.24). A similar assumption can be






where C(t) is an eciency factor, 1 kC is the elasticity of consumption C(t) with respect
to consumption goods X(t), kC is the elasticity of consumption C(t) with respect to time
input C(t), and C determines the extent to which education E improves the eciency
of consumption C(t).
Further the ratio of the marginal product of medical care with respect to medical
goods/services @I(t)=@m(t) and the marginal product of medical care with respect to
own-time investment @I(t)=@I(t) equals the ratio of the price of medical goods/services
pm(t) to the wage rate w(t) (representing the opportunity cost of time; see equation 2.25).
Similarly, the ratio of the marginal product of consumption with respect to consumption
goods @C(t)=@X(t) and the marginal product of consumption with respect to time inputs52 Chapter 2
@C(t)=@C(t) equals the ratio of the price of consumption good pX(t) to the wage rate
















C (1   kC)(1 kC): (2.65)
Assuming the Cobb-Douglass constant returns to scale production function for medical
health investment (equation 2.24) and for consumption (equation 2.63) we obtain the
following expressions for consumption goods X(t) and medical goods/services m(t)




m(t) = (1   kI)
I(t)
pm(t)
[ _ H(t)   d(t)H(t)]: (2.67)
Using equations (2.62, 2.65, and 2.66) we nd
lnX(t) = 13   [kC + (1   kC)=]lnpX(t) + kC[(   1)=]lnw(t)
  C[(   1)=]E   [(   )=]t + lnqA(0)
 1=; (2.68)
where 13  ln(1   kC)   [(   1)=]ln[k
kC
C (1   kC)(1 kC)]   [(   1)=]lnC(t).
It is straightforward though tedious to derive an expression for the shadow price of
wealth qA(0), using the life-time budget constraint (2.5), the expression for sick time
s[H(t)] (equation 2.22), income Y [H(t)] (equation 2.9), consumption good X(t) (the
above equation), health H(t) (equation 2.27), and medical goods/services m(t) (equation
2.28). qA(0) is then found to be a complicated function of life-time wealth (assets, life-
time income), wages w(t), prices pm(t), pX(t), education E and the health deterioration
rate (terms d, 3 and 4X(t)). The expression itself is not very insightful and is hence
not reproduced here.2.6 Appendix 53
2.6.3 Structural and reduced form: pure consumption model
Using the utility specication (2.36), the rst-order conditions (2.11) and (2.13), and










= (1   )C(t)
 H(t)
  +
= qA(0)[H(t)   'H(t)]e
( )t + [_ qI(t)   qI(t)d(t)]e
t
= C(t)
 1 [H(t)   'H(t)]
@U[C(t);H(t)]
@C(t)
+ [_ qI(t)   qI(t)d(t)]e
t (2.70)
The solution for the health threshold (Grossman's solution for \optimal" health) fol-
lows from combining equation (2.69) with (2.70), assuming 'H(t) = 0 (pure consumption)
and using qI(t) = _ qI(t) = 0. We then nd:





+ lnC   lnI   lnd(t)
  ln[1 + =d(t)   ~ I(t)=d(t)]: (2.71)
Combining equations (2.26, 2.64, 2.65, 2.66 and the above expression) leads to the













 [1 + =d(t)   ~ I(t)=d(t)]
  (2.72)
which leads to the structural form equation (2.40).
As in the pure investment model one can nd and expression for the shadow price of
wealth qA(0) for the pure consumption model, using the life-time budget constraint (2.5),
the expression for income Y [H(t)] (equation 2.9), consumption good X(t) (equation 2.66),
health H(t) (equation 2.40), and medical goods/services m(t) (equation 2.38). As in the
pure investment model the expression is found to be a complicated function of life-time
wealth (assets, life-time income), wages w(t), prices pm(t), pX(t), education E and the
health deterioration rate (terms d, 3 and 4X(t)).
Combining equation (2.37) with (2.38) we nd:
lnm(t) = 12 + lnX(t) + lnpX(t)   lnpm(t) + ln[1 + ~ H(t)=d(t)]
  lnf1 + d
 1
 e
 3t 4X(t)[   kI ~ w(t)   (1   kI) ~ pm(t)   6]g; (2.73)54 Chapter 2
where 12  7 + 9.
Substituting equation (2.60) into equation (2.73) and dierentiating the result with
respect to time t we nd the reduced form expression (2.39).Chapter 3
A Health Production Model with
Endogenous Retirement
We formulate a stylized structural model of health, wealth accumulation and retire-
ment decisions building on the human capital framework of health and derive analytic
solutions for the time paths of consumption, health, health investment, savings and
retirement. We argue that the literature has been unnecessarily restrictive in assuming
that health is always at the \optimal" health level. Exploring the properties of corner
solutions we nd that advances in population health decrease the retirement age, while
at the same time individuals retire when their health has deteriorated. This potentially
explains why retirees point to deteriorating health as an important reason for early
retirement, while retirement ages have continued to fall in the developed world, despite
continued improvements in population health and mortality. In our model, workers
with higher human capital invest more in health and because they stay healthier retire
later than those with lower human capital whose health deteriorates faster.
|||||||||||||{
This chapter is based upon:
Galama, T.J., Kapteyn, A., Fonseca, R. and Michaud, P.-C. (2009), \Grossman's Health Threshold
and Retirement", RAND Working Paper, WR-658.56 Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction
Models of retirement need to be able to reconcile the counterintuitive observations that
a) retirees mention deteriorating health as an important reason for early retirement, b)
population health and mortality have continued to improve, but c) the age of retirement
has declined for nearly a full century in the developed world (though the decline in re-
tirement age has leveled o and reversed somewhat in the last decade; see, e.g., Blau and
Goodstein, 2010). Some of this could be explained by justication bias. Individuals may
mention health as a reason to justify the fact that they are retired but in fact retire for
other reasons, with health actually playing a minor role in the decision. For example,
French (2005) estimates a life cycle model of labor supply, retirement, and savings behav-
ior using the panel study of income dynamics (PSID). He nds that the structure of the
Social Security system and of pensions are key determinants of the high observed job exit
rates at ages 62 and 65 while Social Security benet levels, health, and borrowing con-
straints are less important determinants of job exit at older ages. In line with this result
Lazear (1986) nds that pensions are typically actuarially unfair and that sharp decreases
in the actuarial value of retirement with continued work are used as a device by employers
to induce earlier retirement of workers. Also Bazzoli (1985) nds that economic variables
play a more important role than health in retirement decisions. On the other hand, Dwyer
and Mitchell (1999) nd the opposite: that health problems inuence retirement plans
more strongly than do economic variables. Specically, Dwyer and Mitchell nd that men
in poor overall health retire between one and two years earlier than others. In other words,
while there is agreement that health inuences retirement there is disagreement about the
importance of health in the retirement decision. Regardless of its current importance, the
increased uptake of dened-contribution type pension vehicles such as 401(k)'s, which are
actuarially fair, may reduce the importance of pension structure as a key determinant of
retirement. This may warrant the inclusion of health as a more prominent determinant
of future retirement.
While health may inuence the decision to retire, it is unclear whether retirement in
turn has an impact on health. Retirement may be a taxing event, resulting in the loss
of friends and support networks, or retirement may be health preserving as it is work
that is taxing, not retirement. Empirical evidence on the health eects of retirement
is ambiguous (see for instance the literature review in Dave et al. 2006). Using the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Dave et al. (2006) nd that retirement has a
detrimental eect on health. On the other hand, Coe and Zamarro (2010) in a cross
country comparison nd evidence that retirement may actually be health preserving.3.1 Introduction 57
Lacking the possibility of a controlled experiment, establishing the direction of causality
is wrought with diculties. The decision to retire may be motivated by a desire to preserve
health and/or by bad health hampering one's ability to be a productive member of the
workforce.
With aging populations and trends towards earlier retirement despite signicant im-
provements in the health of populations in the developed world, societies are increasingly
burdened by the rising costs of a growing elderly economically inactive population that is
supported by a relatively shrinking economically active group. Understanding what pol-
icy instruments can be used to reduce this burden is therefore essential and requires the
inclusion of health in retirement models. Potential levers are: universal healthcare pro-
vision, subsidized healthcare for low income workers (weighing societal versus individual
benets from delayed retirement), promotion of healthy lifestyles etc.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the inuence of various conditions, in particular
that of an individual's health, on the decision to retire. To this end we formulate a
theory of health and retirement.1 In section 3.2, we formulate a stylized structural model
of consumption, leisure, health, health investment, wealth accumulation and retirement
decisions using the human capital framework of health provided by Grossman (1972).
Health provides utility and healthy individuals have greater earnings causing individuals
to invest in their health. Individuals can accumulate savings and/or borrow without
restriction, and they are free to decide when to retire. We nd that the inclusion of
retirement in the formulation complicates matters in that at the age of retirement the
\optimal" level of the health stock is discontinuous. This implies that individuals invest
an innite amount (positive or negative) of health investment over an innitesimally small
period of time around the age of retirement. We address this feature of the literature
spawned by Grossman by introducing corner solutions in which individuals do not invest
in health for periods of time. In section 3.3 we rst solve the optimal control problem
conditional on retirement age. Specication of a functional form for the utility function
allows us to derive analytical solutions for consumption, health, health investment and
wealth, conditional on a given retirement age. In section 3.4 we discuss an extension
of the model, and in section 3.5 we then maximize the implied indirect utility function
with respect to the retirement age. In the model individuals nd retirement increasingly
attractive as they age as a result of three eects: (1) wage declines as a result of gradual
health deterioration reducing income from work with age, (2) increased leisure time during
retirement and (3) accumulation of pension wealth with years in the workforce. We
1For other models of endogenous health and retirement see Wolfe (1985), French and Jones (2007)
and Fonseca et al. (2009).58 Chapter 3
provide simulations in section 3.6 and nd that our model can explain that improvements
in population health decrease the retirement age, while at the same time individuals
retire when their health has deteriorated. We conclude in section 3.7 and provide detailed
derivations in the Appendix.
3.2 General framework: a health production model
A natural framework for our analysis is provided by Grossman (1972a). For an excellent
review of the basic concepts of this model see Muurinen and Le Grand (1985). Our
formulation is most closely related to Case and Deaton (2005), Wagsta (1986a), Wolfe
(1985) and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990).
Let us assume that a consumer is endowed with an intra-temporal utility function
U[L(t);C(t);H(t)] at age t, where leisure L(t), consumption C(t), and health H(t) are
all positive quantities. The utility function has diminishing marginal returns and is an
increasing function in its arguments L(t), C(t) and H(t). Let leisure during one's working
life be equal to L0 and during retirement equal to L0, with  > 1. Assuming separability
of the utility function we can then write utility before retirement as Uw[C(t);H(t)], and









where T denotes total life time, R is the age of retirement and  is a subjective discount
factor. Time t is measured from the time individuals begin employment. The objective
function (3.1) is maximized subject to the following constraints:
_ H(t) = (t)m(t)   d(t)H(t) 0  t  T
_ A(t) = A(t) + Y [H(t)]   C(t)   p(t)m(t) 0  t  T
Y [H(t)] =
(
w0(t) + '(t)H(t) 0  t  R
b R < t  T
(3.2)
Furthermore we have initial and end conditions: H(0), A(0) and A(T) are given.
_ H(t) and _ A(t) denote time derivatives of health H(t) and assets A(t). The rst equa-
tion of (3.2) shows that an individual can invest in the stock of health H(t) by investing
m(t) in medical care and/or other health promoting activities (e.g., exercise, diet, etc)3.2 General framework: a health production model 59
with an eciency (t) to improve health and counter the \natural" health deterioration
rate d(t). While Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) argue that medical technology should realis-
tically exhibit diminishing returns to scale we use the more commonly used assumption
of a medical technology that has constant returns to scale (as in the rst equation of 3.2).
As Grossman (2000) argues, diminishing returns to scale would greatly complicate the
model, while the benets (certainly for the purpose of our simplied analytical model)
may be limited. We further note that we impose diminishing returns of the utility of
health, to ensure that innite medical care is not demanded by consumers.
The second equation is simply the inter-temporal budget constraint, where  is the
interest rate, Y [H(t)] is income, C(t) is consumption and p(t) is the price of health
investment at time t. The product p(t)m(t) is out-of-pocket medical expenditures. One
way to interpret prices is by dening m(t) as the \true" medical expenditures and p(t) as
the co-payment. In such a formulation \prices" vary dramatically depending on insurance
status. For uninsured individuals in the U.S. the co-pay may eectively be 100%.
The third equation in (3.2) shows how income Y [H(t)] consists of earnings during
working life and pension income during retirement. Earnings are a function of health,
with w0(t) a base wage rate that is age dependent (but independent of health) and the
marginal production benet of health @Y [H(t)]=@H(t) = '(t)  0 determines the extent
to which health increases one's wage. Retirement income b is independent of health. Note
that the system dynamics change at the age of retirement R (where income, consumption,
health investment and prices can be discontinuous and the dynamic equations change).
The essential features of the human-capital model of health are: 1) that the demand for
medical care is a \derived" demand in that consumers demand good health, not medical
care per se, 2) that health provides consumption benets (utility is a function of health)
and 3) that health provides production benets (health increases earnings; see equation
3.2).
















The left-hand side of (3.3) represents life-time consumption and life-time health in-
vestment, and the right-hand side represents life-time nancial resources in terms of (from
left to right): use of life-time assets, life-time income from wages and from benets, and
lastly, additional life-time earnings, resulting from good health and health investment.60 Chapter 3
















As the relation suggests, individuals cannot \choose" health optimally. Instead they can
invest in health m(t) optimally.
We demand that health investment m(t)  0, i.e., that individuals cannot \sell" their
health through negative health investment m(t). Health H(t) at time t is path dependent;
it is a function of the entire history 0  t0 < t of health investment m(t0) and of initial
health H(0). In the optimization problem we thus have to optimize with respect to the
entire prior history of health investment m(t0).
Thus, we have the following optimal control problem: the objective function (3.1)
is maximized with respect to the control functions C(t) and m(t) and subject to the
constraints (3.2). The Lagrangean or generalized Hamiltonian (see, e.g., Seierstad and
Sydsaeter 1987) of this problem is:
= = U[C(t);H(t)]e
 tdt + pA(t)fA(t) + Y [H(t)]   C(t)   p(t)m(t)g
+ q(t)m(t); (3.5)
where U[C(t);H(t)] = Uw[C(t);H(t)] for t  R; U[C(t);H(t)] = Ur[C(t);H(t)] for t > R;
pA(t) is the adjoint variable associated with the dierential equation (3.2) for assets A(t)
and q(t) a multiplier associated with the condition that health investment m(t)  0. The
inclusion of the multiplier q(t) is an essential dierence between our formulation and prior
formulations of the Grossman model. It allows us to explicitly impose the constraint that
medical care is positive m(t)  0 at all times. We discuss the implications of this choice
and the arguments for making it in detail in section 3.3.
We proceed as follows. First we solve the optimal control problem conditional on
retirement age R (i.e., for a xed exogenous retirement age R) and specify a functional
form for the utility function. For given exogenous time varying deterioration rate d(t),
prices p(t), eciency (t), base wage rate w0(t), benets b and production benet '(t),
we can then solve for the control variables C(t) and m(t) which in turn provides us with
solutions for the state variables H(t) and A(t). We then maximize the resulting indirect
utility function with respect to retirement age R. Health, savings and retirement thus are
jointly determined in our model.3.3 Exogenous retirement 61
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q(t) (t > R);
where
H(t)  [p(t)=(t)][d(t) +    _ p(t)=p(t) + _ (t)=(t)] (3.8)
is the the user cost of health capital at the margin (the interest rate  represents an
opportunity cost).
Equations (3.6) and (3.7) are similar to those by Case and Deaton (2005; their equa-
tions 5 and 6) for q(t) = 0, i.e., m(t) > 0. Equation (3.6) requires the marginal benet of
consumption to equal pA(0) (the shadow price of wealth) times a time varying exponent
that either grows or decays with time, depending on the sign of     (the dierence
between the time preference rate  and the interest rate ). The marginal benet of
health investment (equation 3.7) equals the product of the marginal benet of consump-
tion (equation 3.6) and the user cost of health capital at the margin H(t) (equation 3.8)
minus the marginal production benets of health '(t) if the individual is working.2
2We impose that the user cost of health capital at the margin exceeds the marginal production ben-
et of health H(t)  [p(t)=(t)][d(t) +    _ p(t)=(p(t) + _ (t)=(t)] > '(t). Without this condition, the
investment in health would nance itself by increasing wages by more than the user cost of health. As
a result of this, consumers would choose innite health investment paid for by innite wage increases to
reach innite health.62 Chapter 3
We can make a number of observations with respect to the rst order conditions
for consumption and health investment (equations 3.6 and 3.7). For now we discuss
the case where q(t) = 0, i.e., m(t) > 0. As we will discuss in more detail later, this
represents a special case in which the evolution of an individual's health follows the
solution for the \optimal" health stock. First, increasing life time resources will lower
pA(0) and hence increase health investment and consequently health. Second, while health
continous to provide a consumption benet (utility) health does not provide a production
benet (greater income) after retirement (last equation of 3.2) and retired individuals will
reallocate away from health expenditures in the direction of more consumption. Third,
a lower price of health investment increases health. This is pertinent in a cross-country
comparison, but also when comparing across the life-cycle, for instance if health care is
subsidized for certain age groups (like Medicare in the U.S.). Finally, more ecient health
investment will lead to more health. Eciency can explain variations within a country
(if for instance individuals with a higher education level are more ecient in their health
investment, Goldman and Smith, 2002) or across countries (if health care is more ecient
in one country than in another).
In order to derive analytical solutions for consumption, health, health investment and






; Ur(C;H) = kUw(C;H); (3.9)
where  (0    1) is the relative \share" of consumption C(t) versus health H(t) and
 ( > 0) the coecient of relative risk aversion.
The factor k is the ratio of utility when retired and when working. A simple way to
motivate the introduction of the multiplicative factor k is to include leisure in the utility
function as follows: U(C;H;L) =

CH1 L1 , where L is leisure and where we have
omitted the multiplicative constant 1=(1   ). Assume that during the working years
leisure is equal to L0 while during retirement leisure is equal to krL0 with kr > 1. This
implies that the ratio of utility before and after retirement is equal to k  k
(1 )
r . This
specication is consistent with the Stock and Wise (1990) specication in which the utility
of consumption in retirement is a multiple of the utility of consumption when working. If
 < 1 (i.e., utility is less concave than logarithmic) the ratio is greater than one. That is,
at the same consumption level, utility is higher when retired. For  > 1 we have k < 1.
In the latter case it is still the case that for a given consumption level, utility is higher in
retirement, since utility is negative for  > 1.3.3 Exogenous retirement 63
This formulation can reproduce the drop in consumption observed at retirement (Banks,
Blundell and Tanner, 1998; Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg, 2001). For k < 1 and  > 1
(or for k > 1 and  < 1), and for a given consumption level the marginal utility of con-
sumption is lower in retirement than while working and hence it is optimal to spend more
money on consumption before retirement than after retirement.
Hurd and Rohwedder (2003, 2006) review some of the explanations put forward to
explain the drop in consumption. The rst of these is the occurrence of unanticipated
shocks at the time of retirement, where, e.g., retirees are surprised to nd that their
economic resources are fewer than anticipated and adjust consumption accordingly. This
would suggest that agents are insuciently forward looking and would complicate em-
ployment of life-cycle models (used in this paper). However, Hurd and Rohwedder present
evidence that the reductions are fully anticipated. In addition there are alternative expla-
nations that are consistent with a life-cycle approach. For example, a second explanation
involves uncertainty in the timing of retirement, where, e.g., workers retire because of a
health event or unemployment resulting in a reduction in resources. Hurd and Rohwedder
(2006) nd that an unanticipated decline in lifetime resources caused by early retirement
could explain a spending decline for part of the population. But the authors conclude
that the empirical importance of health shocks is not great enough to explain fully the
recollected declines in consumption. In line with this result, Blau (2008) suggests that
a simple life cycle model in which individuals choose when to retire but are subject to
shocks can account qualitatively for these stylized facts. However, Blau nds that the
magnitude of the drop in consumption among households that experience a decline is too
small in a calibrated model compared to the data. Blau concludes that other proposed
explanations for the decline in consumption at retirement should continue to be explored
in future research based on the life cycle framework. A third explanation is the increase
in leisure at retirement, which would be consistent with k < 1. The increase in leisure
can decrease consumption, e.g., because housekeeping, home repairs etc. are performed
by the consumer after retirement and no longer purchased. Hurd and Rohwedder (2006)
report that a transition into retirement is associated with approximately a 5.5 hrs increase
per week in time spent on home production. Hurd and Rohwedder (2006) conclude that
this supports the view that the increased ability to engage in home production or thriftier
shopping during retirement is an important reason for the observed spending declines.
In our stylized formulation we employ a life-cycle model (e.g., we assume agents are
to a large extent rational, rejecting the rst explanation), specify a utility function that
allows for a drop in consumption due to increased leisure at retirement (incorporating the64 Chapter 3
third explanation), but do not incorporate uncertainty (i.e., we do not model the eect
of the second explanation).
3.3.1 Model solutions: the \optimal" health stock
We begin analyzing the case where q(t) = 0, i.e. m(t) > 0. This case is associated with
the \optimal" health stock, as utilized in the literature spawned by Grossman. We will
denote the solutions for consumption, health investment and health with C(t), m(t),
and H(t) for this special case to distinguish from the more general solutions C(t), m(t),
and H(t). Solving the rst order conditions (3.6) and (3.7) and using the Cobb-Douglas
utility specication (3.9), we nd the following solutions for the control functions C(t)
and m(t) (for details see the Appendix):

























































(t > R); (3.13)
where we have used the following denitions:
 














The constant  [and hence pA(0)] can be determined by substituting the solutions
for health H(t), consumption C(t) and health investment m(t) into the life-time budget
constraint (3.3). The result can be written as a fraction   n=d, where the numerator
n is similar to the expression for life-time resources (right hand side of 3.3). Hence
increasing initial assets A(0), base wages w0(t), retirement benets b, production benets
of health '(t) or initial health H(0) increases the constant  and thereby consumption3.3 Exogenous retirement 65
C(t), health investment m(t), and health H(t). The denominator d is a complicated
function of the time paths of d(t), p(t), (t), '(t) and various model parameters:
d = d[d(t);p(t);(t);'(t);;;R;T;k;;]: (3.16)
The full solutions for  are provided in the Appendix for each of six scenarios (equations
3.73, 3.74, 3.75, 3.77, 3.78, 3.79, 3.91, 3.92, 3.93, 3.100, 3.101, and 3.102; for more details
on the scenarios see section 3.3.2).
Consumption and health investment (equations 3.10 through 3.13) are functions of
various combinations of the user cost of health capital at the margin H(t) (see equation
3.8), minus the marginal production benet of health '(t), to the power 1  (consump-
tion) or   (health investment).3
For constant time paths of d(t) = d0, p(t) = p0, (t) = 0, '(t) = '0, consumption
and health investment decrease (increase) exponentially with time if the time preference
rate  is larger (smaller) than the interest rate . For  =  we have constant time paths
for consumption and for health investment except for jumps at retirement t = R (due
to the absence of a health production benet '(t) = 0 during retirement and due to the
factor k associated with greater leisure time during retirement).
Consumption increases with the user cost of health capital at the margin H(t) and
decreases with the marginal production benet of health '(t) for 0 <  < 1 (i.e. if  > 1
and  < 1). The opposite pattern is found for  > 1 (i.e. if 0 <  < 1 and  < 1). For
 = 1 (i.e.  = 1 or  = 1) consumption is constant (for  = ), independent of the user
cost of health capital at the margin and independent of the marginal production benet of
health.4 Health investment shows a more complex dependence on the user cost of health
capital at the margin and the marginal production benet of health than consumption
does (see equations 3.12 and 3.13).
For the \optimal" health stock H(t) we nd the following solutions:
3Notice that minf1;1=g    maxf1;1=g, given that  > 0; 0  &  1.
4This can be understood as follows. The cost of holding the health stock increases with the user cost
of health capital at the margin H(t) and decreases with the marginal production benet of health '(t)
(see equation 3.7; q(t) = 0). Higher cost of holding the health stock would thus result in lower health
levels H(t). The marginal cost of consumption on the other hand does not change with changes in the
user cost of health capital at the margin or with the marginal production benet of health (see equation
3.6). In other words, the marginal benet of consumption is also unchanged. The marginal benet of
consumption @U(t)=@C(t) / H(t)( 1)C(t)  (where we have used 3.6 and 3.9 and  = ) increases
with health for  > 1 and decreases with health for  < 1. In other words, higher costs of holding
the health stock result in lower health levels and therefore lower (higher) consumption levels for  < 1
( > 1). For  = 1 the marginal benet of consumption is independent of health and hence there is no
eect of health changes on the level of consumption.66 Chapter 3











 )t (t > R): (3.18)
The trajectory described by equation (3.17) is the path that individuals would follow
if initial health H(0) would be exactly on this trajectory and is what is referred to in
the literature as the \optimal" health stock (e.g., Grossman, 1972a, 2000). Similarly,
equation (3.18) describes the trajectory that health would follow if health at retirement
were exactly equal to H(R+).
As many authors have found (e.g., Case and Deaton, 2005), the \optimal" health stock
H(t) is constant for constant time paths of d(t) = d0, p(t) = p0, (t) = 0, '(t) = '0 (i.e.,
for a constant user cost of health capital) and for  = , and decreases for an increasing
deterioration rate with age _ d(t) > 0.
At the age of retirement the solutions (q(t) = 0) for the \optimal" level of consumption
(equations 3.10, 3.11), \optimal" level of health investment (equations 3.12, 3.13) and
\optimal" level of health (equations 3.17, 3.18) are discontinuous. These jumps represent
the change in consumption and health investment as a result of dierences in utility from
more leisure time during retirement (depending on the value of k, leisure is a substitute
or a complement of consumption and health) and because health has no eect on income
after retirement ('(t) = 0).
3.3.2 Model solutions: general case
The literature generally assumes that individuals are capable of ensuring that their health
is at the \optimal" level H(t) (e.g., Grossman, 1972a, 1972b, 2000; Case and Deaton,
2005; Muurinen, 1982; Wagsta, 1986a; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997; Ried, 1998). In other
words, the literature assumes that either the initial health endowment H(0) is at or very
close to the \optimal" health stock H(0) or that individuals nd this health level desirable
and are capable of rapidly dissipating or repairing any \excess" or \decit" in health.
Unlike most discussion in the literature we argue that initial conditions are likely of
importance and that health will in many circumstances not follow the \optimal" health
stock. An essential characteristic of the model is that health cannot deteriorate faster
than the natural deterioration rate d(t). As equation (3.4) shows, any surplus in health
above the equilibrium health path can at most dissipate at the natural rate of health
deterioration d(t) (this would correspond to individuals not investing in their health;
m(t) = 0). As a result initial conditions cannot be dissipated rapidly (and what use3.3 Exogenous retirement 67
would it be to shed any excess in health which provides utility and increases earnings?).
Nor is there any reason to expect the endowment of health to exactly equal the \optimal"
health stock (see also Wolfe, 1985).
We allow health to have an initial value H(0) that is dierent from the \optimal"
health stock (see also Wolfe, 1985). To take into account that any \excess" in health
cannot dissipate faster than the natural deterioration rate d(t) we explicitly demand
that medical care is a positive quantity m(t)  0 by introducing the multiplier q(t)
in the Lagrangean (equation 3.5). We thus allow for the existence of corner solutions
where individuals do not invest in medical care m(t) = 0 for certain periods of time.
As a result, given initial health H(0), the \optimal" health stock is not the optimal
solution.5 Any situation with \excessive" initial health (initial health H(0) above H(0))
is preferable: individuals with excess initial health have higher levels of life-time health
and consumption and therefore greater life-time utility. In other words, if individuals
could choose they would always prefer \excessive" initial health H(0) over the \optimal"
health stock H(0) (if H(0) > H(0)). In our formulation individuals use their \excess"
health for the consumption and production benet this \excess" in health provides.
The solution for the \optimal" health stock H(t) is instead the minimum level in-
dividuals \demand" for the productivity benet and utility that good health provides.
Individuals with health endowments H(0) below the \optimal" health stock H(0) will
invest in medical care (an adjustment cost) to reach the \optimal" health level (see for
details section 3.8.7 in the Appendix). For this reason we term the \optimal" health stock
H(t) the \minimally economically productive" or \minimally productive" health stock.
Individuals only invest in health when they are \unhealthy" (health levels below or at
the minimally productive level) and not when they are \healthy" (health levels above the
minimally productive level). In other words, the minimally productive health level oper-
ates as a health threshold. In the following we will refer to what is traditionally called the
\optimal" solution for health, as the \health threshold" or as the \minimally productive"
level of health.
While the literature spawned by Grossman does not provide a convincing theoreti-
cal argument that health should be at or close to the \optimal" health stock H(t), the
ultimate test of our proposition that this assumption is invalid is to contrast its predic-
tions with data. In separate work (Galama and Kapteyn, 2009 [Chapter 2]) we propose
structural and reduced form equations to test our proposition. We also contrast the pre-
dictions of our interpretation of the Grossman model (in which solutions where individuals
do not invest in health m(t) = 0 for certain periods of time are allowed) with the \tradi-
5Hence, our use of quotation marks.68 Chapter 3
tional" interpretation (in which health always follows the \optimal" health stock H(t))
and with the empirical literature. In a review of the empirical literature we nd that
the interpretation advocated here provides a better explanation for the observed evolu-
tion of health and of medical consumption. Importantly, our interpretation can explain
the observation that measures of medical care are negatively correlated with measures
of health6 while the traditional interpretation cannot (the Grossman model has received
signicant criticism regarding its inability to correctly predict this crucial relationship;
see, e.g., Grossman 2000; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997). For more details see Galama and
Kapteyn (2009) (Chapter 2).
Figure 3.1: Six scenarios for the evolution of health.
Notes: t1 and t2 denote the ages at which health (solid line) has evolved towards the health threshold
(dotted line), and R denotes the age of retirement. The health threshold drops at the age of retirement
R as a result of dierences in utility due to increased leisure time during retirement (depending on the
value of k, leisure is a substitute or a complement of consumption and health) and because health has
no eect on income after retirement ('(t) = 0).
We distinguish six scenarios as shown in Figure 3.1. The health threshold H(t)
(dotted line) drops at the age of retirement R as a result of the dierence in utility due
to increased leisure time during retirement (for our choice of parameters k < 1 leisure is
a substitute of consumption and health) and because health has no eect on income after
6Healthy individuals (above the threshold) do not invest in health while unhealthy individuals (at or
below the threshold) do.3.4 Treatment of benets 69
retirement ('(t) = 0). We show the simplest case in which the health threshold H(t)
is constant with time (e.g., for constant time paths of d(t) = d0, p(t) = p0, (t) = 0,
'(t) = '0 and for  = ) but the scenarios are valid for more general cases. Scenarios A,
B, C and D begin with initial health H(0) greater than the initial health threshold H(0)
and scenarios E and F begin with initial health H(0) below the initial health threshold
H(0). In scenarios A and B health H(t) reaches the health threshold H(t) before the age
of retirement R (at age t1). In scenario A the health threshold H(t) is once more reached
at age t2 before total life time T, but this is not the case in scenario B. In scenario C health
H(t) reaches the threshold H(t) after the age of retirement R (at age t2), and in scenario
D health H(t) never reaches the threshold H(t) during the life of the individual. In
scenarios E and F individuals begin working life with health levels H(0) below the initial
health threshold H(0). Individuals will substitute initial assets A(0) for improved initial
health H(0) such that initial health equals the initial health threshold H(0) = H(0) (see
section 3.8.7 in the Appendix for a more detailed discussion).
The detailed solutions for health H(t), consumption C(t) and health investment m(t)
for each of the six scenarios are provided in the Appendix. Assets A(t) can be derived by































(t R) (t > R): (3.20)
As a last note, each of the solutions are fully determined, that is by substituting the
solutions for health H(t), consumption C(t), health investment m(t) and assets A(t) in the
life-time budget constraint (equation 3.3) we can derive the constant  (or equivalently
the constant pA(0)). For more details see the Appendix.
3.4 Treatment of benets
We introduce one further level of complexity to the model. In the set-up so far, benets
are independent of work history. Typically benets are related to how long one has worked
and the wages earned during working life. As a stylized representation of this we assume70 Chapter 3
that a fraction of wages w(t) are saved for retirement. Benets accumulate with time
and are invested with a return on investment of  (the interest rate) as follows:





where the pension accumulation function f(R) describes how benets accumulate as a
function of retirement age R and b0 represents a base pension benet.
The base pension benet b0 is provided regardless of years worked, e.g., it could rep-
resent a rst-tier basic pension (OECD, 2005) or a statutory poverty line. The remaining
term in (3.21) represents the part of the pension that accumulates with years of work.
This could represent a dened contribution (DC) plan or a dened benet plan (DB) or
it could represent an individual's portfolio of DB and DC plans. Pension wealth in retire-
ment thus consists of a base pension b0 (typically provided by the state), an individual
private pension (either DB and/or DC) and accumulated assets A(R) that can be drawn
down during retirement.
A particular pension accumulation functional form of interest is f(R) = =[1  
e (T R)], which is actuarially fair (accumulated pension wealth is paid out over the
number of years in retirement T   R). Such a functional form is an approximation of
a DC plan where the beneciary can use his or her accumulated pension investment to
purchase a life-time annuity.7 The function f(R) for a DB plan, on the other hand, would
typically consist of an annual contribution rate per year worked and a conversion factor
which would depend on R in a way which is not necessarily actuarially fair. As Lazear
(1986) nds, the actuarial value of private pensions rst rises but then declines as workers
continue to work beyond a certain age. Lazear argues that sharp decreases in the actuarial
value of retirement with continued work are used as a device by employers to induce earlier
retirement of workers. Such a function could be represented by f(R) = =[1   e (T R)]
up to a retirement age R after which the function attens to a constant or even slightly
declining function of retirement age.
Replacing the assumed at retirement benets by (3.21) the previously derived equa-
tions remain valid with the following transformation
w0(t) ! (1   )w0(t)












7In this example, the annuity is assumed to be actuarially fair. In a world with asymmetric information
this assumption clearly needs to be modied.3.5 Endogenous retirement 71
Thus, even for constant time paths of d(t) = d0, p(t) = p0, (t) = 0, '(t) = '0 and
for  = , consumption and health investment are not constant as the transformation
for the marginal production benet of health '(t) is a function of time. A derivation of
transformation (3.22) is provided in the Appendix.
3.5 Endogenous retirement
Now let us nally return to the issue of the inuence of health on the decision to retire.
In our formulation, the decision to retire is determined by three factors. Individuals
nd retirement increasingly attractive as they age because of: (1) wage declines w(t) =
w0(t) + '(t)H(t) as a result of gradual health deterioration reducing income from work
with age, (2) increased leisure time during retirement (factor k boost in utility) and (3)
an increasing level of pension benets b(R) with years in the workforce.
Now consider the case where the age of retirement R can be chosen freely. The optimal
R can be determined by inserting the solutions for C(t), H(t) into the \indirect utility










Unfortunately the resulting expression for V (R) turns out to be unwieldy for most of the
scenarios A through F shown in Figure 3.1 (see the various solutions for C(t) and H(t)
in the Appendix; note that we do not show the solution for V (R) given its complexity).
After dierentiation of V (R) with respect to R we do not nd a simple solution for the
optimal age of retirement R and therefore have to resort to numerically solving for the
optimal retirement age R.
3.6 Simulations
In this section we begin by making some plausible assumptions about the model pa-
rameters and initial and terminal conditions. This will provide us with a starting point
(our baseline model; section 3.6.1) from which we will subsequently deviate in order to
investigate the impact of the various model levers on the decision to retire. For illustra-
tive purposes we graph the solutions for consumption, health investment, health, assets,
etc. and contrast the model with some stylized observations from the literature. We
then briey explore model simulations of health inequality (section 3.6.2) and the eect72 Chapter 3
of health insurance on health and retirement (section 3.6.3). We discuss in detail the
sensitivity of retirement age to model parameters (section 3.6.4) and discuss briey the
sensitivity of other model outcomes, such as, life-time consumption, life-time health in-
vestment, life-time health, and life-time assets, to changes in model parameters (section
3.6.5).
3.6.1 Calibration baseline model: white collar worker
Individuals begin work at age 20 (corresponding to t = 0), and, depending on the solution
for the optimal retirement age, retire some 45 years later at an age of about 65 years (cor-
responding to R  45). Individuals die with certainty at 85 years of age (corresponding
to T = 65).
For simplicity we assume constant time paths of d(t) = d0, p(t) = p0, (t) = 0,
'(t) = '0, w0(t) = w0
8 and take  = . We further assume an annual income of w(t) 
$45,000 for healthy \white collar" workers9 and that healthy workers have a health stock
of about 1.5 times that of unhealthy workers (we will discuss \blue collar" workers later).
We can then obtain 25% higher earnings for healthy workers10 for constant marginal
production benets of health '(t) = '0  1:5w0=HH (where HH is health for a healthy
worker), and a constant base wage rate w0(t) = w0  $20,000 per year. A roughly 50%
decline in wage between rst employment (t = 0) and retirement (t = R)6 requires that by
the age of retirement health has fallen to one-fourth the level of health at rst employment
8It is straightforward to use a more realistic wage prole, for example the commonly used earnings
function by Mincer (1974) where the log of earnings is a quadratic function of age and linear in years
of schooling. However, this would introduce additonal complexity into the model. The overal shape, i.e.
height at peak, age at peak and curvature of the earnings function with age would inuence the optimal
age of retirement. In order to not complicate the interpretation of the eect on the retirement age of
parameters that are of greater interest (than the parameters of the wage prole) we have chosen a simple
constant base-wage rate w0(t) = w0.
9Median annual earnings for males were $40,798 and for females $31,223 in 2004, according to the US
Census Bureau.
10French (2005) provides hourly wage and annual hours worked proles for males by age and self-
reported health status from the panel study of income dynamics (PSID). French nds that the eect of
health on wages is relatively small: the hourly wage is about 10% higher and the annual hours worked
are some 10% higher for healthy compared with unhealthy individuals. In our formulation we use annual
wages, i.e. the product of hourly wages times the annual hours worked. Thus annual wages would be
about 20-25% higher for healthy individuals. The hourly wage proles show a wide hump (relatively at
between the ages of 40 and 60) for both healthy and unhealthy males with wages peaking near age 55
and a fairly rapid decline after age 60. The annual hours worked proles show a relatively smooth decline
with age, dropping by about 20% from age 30 to age 60 after which the decline accelerates and drops to
50% by age 70 (again compared with age 30).3.6 Simulations 73
H(0). We can simulate such results with an initial health H(0) of $30,000,11 a constant
health deterioration rate d(t) = d0 of 5%, a contribution rate for retirement  of 15% of
wages, zero basic benets b0 = 0, a coecient of relative risk aversion  = 1:32, a constant
health investment eciency (t) = 0 = 0:7% and time preference rate and interest rate
 =  of 3%. We interpret prices p(t) as the co-pay rates, which we take to be constant at
p(t) = p0 = 20%, and m(t) as the total annual medical expenditures { though this could
include the cost of other health promoting activities such as exercise, diet, etc.
Hurd and Rohwedder (2003, 2006) nd that \on average" consumption drops between
15 and 20% after retirement. We use this observation to determine the value for k by re-
quiring that consumption C(t) drops at retirement to 85% of its value before retirement.12
Hence we demand that (see for details the Appendix):
k
1
 = 0:85: (3.24)
For the values chosen, we have k = 0:81.
To ensure that health investment is not too far from the observed mean out-of-pocket
medical expenditures of around $3000 per year (corresponding to total medical expendi-
tures of $15,000) we assume & = 0:85, i.e. that an individual's preferences are signicantly
skewed towards consumption and away from health. We assume an actuarially fair ben-
ets accumulation function f(R) = =[1   e (T R)], i.e. as approximately in a DC
plan. Lastly, we assume that individuals leave no bequests and receive no bequests, i.e.
A(0) = A(T) = 0. There are likely many other plausible scenarios and parameter values.
The current values are only for illustrative purposes.
For this set of parameters and assumptions (see Table 3.1 for a quick overview) we nd
ourselves in scenario A and determine an optimal age of retirement of 63.52 (corresponding
to R = 43:52). Figures 3.2.a-3.2.e describe the evolution of income, consumption, assets,
health and health investment for the optimal retirement age of 63.52 years.
11The dimension of health (dollars) can be understood as follows. Denoting the dimension of health by
[H] we have according to the rst equation of 3.2 that [ _ H] = [H]=[t] = [m][] (where [t] is the dimension
of time [e.g., days, seconds etc], [m] is the dimension of medical care [e.g., dollars per unit of time] and
[] is the dimension of the eciency of medical care (t)). We then have [H] = $[]. For simplicity we
assume the eciency function is dimensionless and hence health is expressed in dollars.
12Hurd and Rohwedder (2006) argue that a number of explanations operate together to explain the
magnitude of the observed drop in consumption at retirement. The substitution between leisure and
consumption is only one such factor. In addition, there are individuals who do not experience a drop in
consumption and there are those who experience more substantial drops in consumption. The assumed
drop of magnitude 15% is for illustrative purposes only.74 Chapter 3
Figure 3.2: Income, consumption, assets, health and health investment versus age for a
white collar worker.











































Notes: Income (Y [H(t)]; $ thousands), consumption (C(t); $ thousands), assets (A(t) $ thousands),
health (H(t); $ thousands; total health [solid line], health threshold [dashed line]) and health investment
(m(t); $ thousands per year) versus age for a \white" collar worker.
As Figure 3.2.a shows, earnings Y [H(t)] during working life fall with declining health
until the age of retirement when earnings are replaced by an annuity.13 Consumption C(t)
13As discussed earlier (see footnote 8) it is relatively easy to introduce more realistic wage age proles.
Because the shape of the wage age prole inuences retirement and because we are primarily interested
in the eect of health on the optimal retirement age we have chosen an simple wage prole where the3.6 Simulations 75
(Figure 3.2.b) is relatively constant over time as individuals smooth life-time consumption
through the use of savings A(t)14 (Figure 3.2.c). Consumption shows a sudden drop at
retirement to 85% of its level before retirement (this is the direct result of our choice for
the value of leisure k; see equation 3.24) as individuals substitute leisure for consumption.
For the parameters chosen, individuals build up assets A(R) of  $198,700 at the age
of retirement (Figure 3.2.c) and a pension b of $18,800 per year (representing a present
discounted value (b=)[1   e (T R)] of $222,800). Health H(t) (the solid line in Figure
3.2.d) declines fairly rapidly from a value of $30,000 to about $4,800 by age 56.6 (t1 =
36:6) after which the individual starts investing in health (see Figure 3.2.e). Health
reaches $5,800 by the age of retirement R and declines further to about $2,000 by the
end of life T. The dashed line in Figure 3.2.d shows the health threshold. The health
threshold increases over time up to the retirement age15 after which it suddenly drops
due to the substitution of health for leisure and the disappearance of production benet
of health ' during retirement. In our formulation and for the parameters chosen, the
eect of retirement on an individual's health is negative { retirement is bad for health {
as individuals lower their investment in health due to substitution of health for leisure
and because health loses its relevance as a means to increase an individual's income.
Because the marginal production benet of health '(t) is the only term in the trans-
formation (3.22) that is time dependent, and because the model solutions after retirement
are not functions of '(t), we see that the health threshold (Figure 3.2.d) is constant over
time during retirement (given our choice of constant health deterioration d(t), prices p(t),
eciency (t) and interest rate ).
3.6.2 Health inequality
Case and Deaton (2005) show that \white collar" workers are in better health and have
lower health deterioration rates than \blue collar" workers (based on self-reported health
assessments). They, as well as Muurinen and Le Grand (1985), suggest this observation
could be explained by the need for blue collar workers to perform more physically de-
manding work than non-manual occupations, which may not be open to lower educated
workers. As a result blue collar workers \wear" their bodies out more quickly. An addi-
tional (or alternative) explanation could be that \blue collar" workers have lower health
base wage w0(t) is constant. Thus we can isolate the direct eect of parameter changes from any indirect
eect that operates through the wage age prole.
14Note that individuals are also allowed to borrow at interest rate 
15This is the result of the time dependence of the marginal benet of health '(t) as a result of the
benet transformation (equation 3.22).76 Chapter 3
thresholds (lower levels of minimally productive health) H(t) (but essentially the same
\natural" health deterioration rate d(t) as \white collar" workers) as a result of access to
lower life-time resources. The lower value of H(t) induces them to invest less in health.
Figure 3.3.a shows the evolution of health for \blue collar" workers with a base wage
rate of w0=$10,000 (half that of \white collar" workers; everything else held constant).
The lower earnings of \blue collar" workers reduce their life-time income, their health
threshold, and induce earlier retirement at age 53.16 (R = 33:16). As Figure 3.3.b
shows, health investment is lower over the life-time for \blue collar" workers. For these
specic values workers do not invest in health during working life but only near retire-
ment (scenario C). As a result health declines to about $5,700 by the age of retirement
53.16 (R = 33:16) and to $1,400 by age 81.62 when individuals start investing in health
(t2 = 81:62). Also, earlier retirement extends the retirement phase of life for \blue col-
lar" workers which is characterized by a lower health threshold (lower level of minimally
productive health) and therefore associated with lower levels of health investment and
consequently lower health. As a result, at age 82 (t = 62), white collar workers are more
than 40 percent healthier than blue collar workers.
Figure 3.3: Blue collar health and blue collar health investment versus age.

















Notes: Blue collar health (3.3.a left-hand side; health [solid line] and health threshold [dashed]; $ thou-
sands) and blue collar health investment (3.3.b right-hand side; $ thousands) versus age.
3.6.3 Health insurrance
We now explore the role of health insurance on health, health investment and retirement.
Figure 3.4 shows the impact of being uninsured. We use the same parameters as before for
a white collar worker (our baseline model) but assume p(t) = 1:0 (i.e., health investment
is paid for one hundred percent out-of-pocket) before the age of Medicare eligibility.3.6 Simulations 77
Afterwards p(t) = 0:2 (i.e., we assume that after age 65 the uninsured are covered by
a universal health insurance program, such as Medicare). Figures 3.4.a, 3.4.b and 3.4.c
show how uninsured individuals invest much less in health (health investment begins at
age 73.88 [t2 = 53:88]), therefore have higher eective health deterioration rates and
are unhealthier (compare with Figure 3.2). Interestingly, consumption is not signicantly
aected while the age of retirement now coincides with the age of Medicare eligibility (age
65). Note the signicantly lower level of the health threshold (the minimally productive
health level) before the Medicare eligibility age of 65, during which health investment is
paid one hundred percent out-of-pocket.
Figure 3.4: Health, health investment and consumption for the uninsured versus age.



























Notes: Health (3.4.a left-hand side; $ thousands), health investment (3.4.b center; $ thousands) and
consumption (3.4.c right-hand side; $ thousands) versus age.
3.6.4 Retirement
We are further interested in the eect of assets, wages, benets, health, health deterio-
ration rates, and other variables and parameters on the decision to retire. Figures 3.5.a
through 3.5.l show the eect of various model parameters on the decision to retire. The78 Chapter 3
solid, dotted and dashed lines in each of the graphs show how, respectively, optimal re-
tirement age R, t1 and t2 change in response to variation in a number of variables and
parameters. As variables and parameters are varied, the solutions cycle through the sce-
narios A through F (see Figure 3.1). For example, Figure 3.5.b shows that as we increase
the base wage rate w0, we transition from scenario D (t1 > R and t2 > T) for values of w0
below  $6,000 to scenario C (t1 > R and t2 < T) for values of w0 between  $6,000 and
 $20,000. For values of w0 between  $14,000 and  $20,000 the age of retirement R
falls slightly as the optimal age of retirement tracks the evolution of t1, i.e. the solution
remains on the boundary between scenarios A and C (t1 = R and t2 < T). Around w0 
$20,000 we observe a jump in the age of retirement R as we move to scenario B for the
remainder of the graph. Initially the solution remains on the boundary between scenarios
B and D (t2 = T) explaining the \at" initial portion of the retirement graph for $20,000
< w0 < $24,000. For values w0 > $24,000 we have t2 > T and retirement R continues its
upward trend with increasing base wage rate w0 (scenario B). Similar explanations hold
for the other graphs in Figure 3.5.
We now concentrate on the variation of the optimal retirement age R with the various
variables and parameters (solid line in Figures 3.5.a through 3.5.l). Figure 3.5.a shows how
greater initial assets A(0) reduce the retirement age. Wealthy people have less incentive to
work as they can fulll all or part of their consumption needs through inherited wealth.
Figure 3.5.b shows that higher wages w0 increase the age at which individuals retire.
Unlike a one-o contribution to life-time resources (such as initial assets A(0)), higher
wages provide additional resources for as long as the individual works, thereby increasing
the age of retirement. Indeed Mitchell and Fields (1984) nd that higher earnings result
in later retirement.
Figure 3.5.c shows how increasing levels of basic benets b0 reduce the retirement
age.16 Indeed, we expect earlier retirement in countries with more generous benets,
as was shown in the cross-country comparison project of Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004,
2010).
Figure 3.5.d shows that the higher the portion  of wages set aside for retirement
the earlier an individual retires. Given that retirement in our formulation is completely
the result of individual choice (benets are approximately actuarially fair and the timing
of retirement is not constrained) the role of pension wealth and that of regular savings
is essentially the same. Lower pension savings will almost exactly be oset by larger
accumulated savings (total life-time resources remain the same). In case retirement is
16Very early retirement in our model should probably be interpreted as the result of generous unem-
ployment benets rather than retirement bene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not a choice variable (or at least restricted in various ways) lower benets will decrease
life time resources, which will lower consumption and thereby also generate more asset
accumulation. Indeed Kapteyn and Panis (2003) nd a strong negative relation between
wealth at retirement and replacement rates when comparing Italy, the Netherlands, and
the U.S.
Figure 3.5.e shows how increasing initial health H(0) reduces the retirement age.
Health provides \health capital" as can be seen from the equation for total life-time
resources (right-hand side of 3.3). Initial health H(0) thus operates qualitatively similar
to assets and we observe a decrease in the age of retirement with increasing initial health.
The age of retirement increases with increasing rates of health deterioration d(t) = d0
(Figure 3.5.f). For one, higher health deterioration over one's life-time reduces the amount
of additional life-time earnings resulting from an individual's inherited health H(0) (see
the last term in Equation 3.3). This would increase the retirement age as it reduces the
\eective" initial health endowment. In addition, the user cost of health capital at the
margin [p0=0][d0 + ]   '0 is higher, which also leads to delayed retirement.
Similarly increasing prices of health care p(t) = p0 (Figure 3.5.g), decreasing health
investment eciency (t) = 0 (Figure 3.5.h) and decreasing marginal productivity ben-
ets of health '(t) = '0 (Figure 3.5.i) increase the cost of health capital at the margin
and raise the retirement age.
The relationships between prices p(t), health investment eciency (t), the marginal
production benets of health '(t), the coecient of relative risk aversion  (Figure 3.5.k),
and the factor k (Figure 3.5.l; describing the increased utility from leisure during retire-
ment) and retirement are particularly strong in that individuals never work (R = 0) or
never retire (R = T) for certain parameter values. The relative utility weight & given to
consumption versus health has very little impact on the age of retirement (Figure 3.5.j)
except near the extreme of &  1 (pure consumption model). Model simulations as well
as observations of analytical solutions from simplied versions of our model (a &  1 pure
consumption model as in our simulation and  =  = 0) show that the parameters 
(Figure 3.5.k), k (Figure 3.5.l) and retirement R are strongly related.
3.6.5 Sensitivity analysis
In addition to the eect of the various parameters on retirement it is of interest to un-
derstand more generally the sensitivity of the model to the model parameters. Table 3.1
displays the baseline model parameter values P0 and the sensitivity to changes in each
of the model parameters of life-time consumption, life-time health investment, life-time80 Chapter 3
Figure 3.5: The eect of various variables and parameters on the decision to retire.












































































































Notes: Initial assets A(0), base wage rate w0, benets b0 are shown in $ thousands, and initial health
H(0) in $ thousands. Values for health deterioration d(t) < 0:005, prices p(t) < 0:088, health investment
eciency  > 0:016, and marginal production benets of health ' > 2:29 are not shown as they correspond
to a user cost of health capital at the margin [p0=0][d0 + ]   '0 that is negative. Values of  < 1 and
k > 1 are not shown as these require a change in specication; for  = 1 the utility function switches from
being negative ( > 1) to positive ( < 1) values. For positive utility, values of k < 1 imply disutility
from increased leisure, i.e. we need to also switch to values of k > 1.
health, life-time assets and the age of retirement (endogenous in the model). The sensitiv-
ities were estimated by calculating the relative change in the quantity X of interest (e.g.,
life-time consumption) in response to a one percent change in model parameter values
P0(e.g., @ lnX=@ lnP0). For example, a one percent increase in co-payment p0 increases3.7 Discussion 81
the age of retirement by 0.51 percent and life-time consumption by 0.28 percent (see Ta-
ble 3.1). In other words, retirement and life-time consumption are not very sensitive to
co-payment. On the other hand life-time health investment and life-time assets are more
responsive to changes in co-payment, showing decreases by 1.12 percent and 1.44 percent,
respectively.
















































p0 0.20 +0.28 -1.12 +0.07 -1.44 +0.51
0 0.7% -0.25 +2.19 +0.10 +0.96 -0.52
' 1.0 +0.20 +1.70 +0.06 +1.78 -0.52
d0 5% -0.05 +3.07 -0.54 -1.27 +0.68
 3% +0.04 -2.63 -0.01 -0.08 -0.17
 3% +0.03 +0.01 +0.01 -0.16 +0.09
 1.32 +0.01 -0.32 +0.01 +0.04 +0.06
& 0.85 +0.42 -17.66 -0.42 -0.92 +0.00
k 0.81 +0.06 +0.81 +0.02 +0.23 +0.26
w0 20k$ +0.55 +0.83 +0.04 +0.19 +0.00
 15% -0.10 -0.07 +0.01 -0.31 -0.15
H0 30k$[] +0.45 -1.27 +0.96 +0.81 +0.00
Elasticities greater than one indicate that the model is very sensitive to the particular
parameter. Most noticeable is the parameter & describing the relative \share" of consump-
tion versus health in the utility function. A one percent change in & decreases life-time
health investment by nearly 18 percent. It should be noted though that the results in
Table 3.1 are only valid for the particular parameter region close to the model calibration
and that sensitivities will be dierent for dierent model calibrations.
3.7 Discussion
We have formulated a stylized structural model of consumption, leisure, health, health
investment, wealth accumulation and retirement decisions using the human capital frame-
work of health. Specication of a functional form for the utility function and of initial
conditions allows us to derive analytic solutions for consumption, health, health invest-
ment and wealth, conditional on a given retirement age.
We nd that initial conditions are likely of importance and that health will under most
circumstances not evolve as the \optimal" health stock H(t). An essential characteristic82 Chapter 3
of the model is that health cannot deteriorate faster than the natural deterioration rate
d(t). As a result initial health cannot dissipate rapidly, nor is there any reason to expect
the endowment of health H(0) to exactly equal the \optimal" health stock H(0) (see also
Wolfe, 1985). Wolfe (1985) assumes an initial surplus of health on the grounds that \...
the human species, with its goal of self-preservation, confronts a dierent problem than
the individual who seeks to maximize utility. The evolutionary solution to the former
may entail an excessive health endowment in the sense that an individual might prefer
to have less health and to be compensated with wealth in a more liquid form ..." As
Wolfe more or less suggests, humans may have been endowed with \excessive" health
as a result of our evolutionary history which required good physical condition to hunt
and gather food, defend ourselves, survive periods of hunger, etc. Today's demands on
human's physical condition are essentially based on the utility of good health and on
economic productivity, which in an increasingly knowledge-intensive environment may be
signicantly smaller than in pre-historic times.
While Wolfe (1985) provides a convincing argument that high initial health endow-
ments are plausible, we simply assume that initial health H(0) can take any positive value
(including values below the \optimal" health stock H(0)). Exploring corner solutions,
in which individuals do not invest in medical care (m(t) = 0) for periods of time, we nd
that what is referred to in the literature as the \optimal" health stock (e.g., Grossman,
1972, 2000) should, given initial condition H(0), not be interpreted as an optimal solution
but rather as a health threshold (given by the \minimally productive" level of health).
Healthy individuals (whose health is above the threshold) do not invest in health, while
unhealthy individuals (whose health is at or below the threshold) do. The threshold is
the minimum health level individuals \demand" for the productivity benets and utility
that good health provides.17
In a review of the empirical literature Galama and Kapteyn (2009; see Chapter 2) nd
that the interpretation advocated here provides a better explanation for the observed evo-
lution of health and of medical consumption. Importantly, our interpretation can explain
the observation that measures of medical care are negatively correlated with measures of
17Wolfe (1985), to the best of our knowledge, is the only researcher who has attempted to explore the
consequences of corner solutions in some detail. His model and interpretation is however substantially
dierent from ours. Wolfe employs a simplied Grossman model where health does not provide utility.
Further, Wolfe interprets the onset of \ ...a discontinuous mid-life increase in health investment ..."
with retirement. We however do not associate the discontinuous increase in health investment with
retirement but with becoming unhealthy (health levels at or below the health threshold leading to health
investment). Retirement in our model is the result of life-time utility maximization.3.7 Discussion 83
health while the traditional interpretation cannot (see, e.g., Zweifel and Breyer, 1997, and
references therein).
We employ the model to investigate the optimal age of retirement by maximizing
the implied indirect utility function with respect to the retirement age. In the model
individuals nd retirement increasingly attractive as they age as a result of three eects:
(1) wage declines as a result of gradual health deterioration reducing income from work
with age, (2) increased leisure time during retirement and (3) accumulation of pension
wealth (which can only be consumed after retirement) with years in the workforce.
Our model of health and retirement is an improvement over the model presented by
Wolfe (1985) in which retirement is dened as the time when an individual begins to
invest in health (i.e., when health has deteriorated to the level of the health threshold).
We, however, allow the retirement decision to not only be determined by the timing of
health investment, but also by wage declines as a result of gradual health deterioration
(reducing income from work with age), increased leisure time during retirement and the
accumulation of pension wealth with years in the workforce (including the detailed pension
structure).
The model can reproduce the observation that the retirement age has continued to
fall while retirees point to deteriorating health as an important reason for early retire-
ment at the same time that population health and mortality have continued to improve
in the developed world. If advances in population health are largely the result of bet-
ter nutrition, preventative medicine (through, e.g., vaccination and other means), and
better (less taxing) living, working and schooling environments then the overall health
endowment H(0) of the population increases and/or the health deterioration rate d(t)
decreases. Both eects result in earlier retirement.18;19 Workers with higher earnings (say
white collar workers) invest more in health and because they stay healthier retire later
than those with lower earnings (say blue collar workers) whose health deteriorates faster.
In other words, health is an important determinant of early retirement. Indeed Dwyer
and Mitchell (1999) nd that men in poor overall health are expected to retire one to two
years earlier, an eect that persists after the authors correct for potential endogeneity of
self-rated health problems.
We nd that higher income (base wage rate w0(t)) increases the retirement age, while
greater wealth (initial assets A(0)) and greater pension wealth (base pension benet b0 and
18If on the other hand advances in medical care or other advances increase the eciency or lower the
cost of health investment then retirement will be postponed.
19This prediction crucially depends on the assumption that a signicant share of the population has
health levels above the health threshold, i.e., that corner solutions are fairly common.84 Chapter 3
a higher fraction  of wages saved for retirement) decreases the retirement age. Advances
in population wealth levels, but not income, could provide an alternative explanation for
decreasing retirement ages.
Further, we can explain dierences in the observed health deterioration rates between
blue and white collar workers by dierences in their health thresholds (their minimally
productive level of health) and their resulting dierences in health investment. We do not
need to resort to physical eort or work-type related health eects (e.g., as in Case and
Deaton, 2005). Even though we do not nd it unreasonable to assume that certain types
of jobs result in higher health deterioration rates, we do oer that poorer individuals also
invest less in health as their health thresholds (minimally productive levels of health) are
lower than for richer individuals.
Our model is nevertheless not without problems. A number of problematic features
can be attributed to the standard assumption in the literature spawned by Grossman
of constant returns to scale in health investment (an exception is Ehrlich and Chuma,
1990). This leads to a \bang-bang" solution in which the level of health investment
is undetermined (e.g., Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Wolfe, 1985). And it requires one
to assume that individuals are capable of adjusting their health to the \optimal" level
instantaneously and without adjustment costs. Grossman (2000) is \...willing to assume
that consumers reach their desired stocks instantaneously in order to get sharp predictions
that are subject to empirical testing ..." . But, because of the degenerate nature of the
solutions, the resulting model predictions seem caricatures of real life. For example, in the
corner solutions that we have introduced in this work, healthy individuals do not invest
in health at all m(t) = 0 for periods of time, while in reality most people see the doctor at
least once per year. Further, the solution for the \optimal" health stock in the literature
spawned by Grossman, is a function of current prices, wages etc (myopic). This is in direct
contradiction with the relation (3.4) which suggests that health depends on the initial
health stock H(0) and on the subsequent history of health investments (and hence prices,
wages etc) made. In keeping with the literature and to allow for comparison with prior
work we have assumed constant returns to scale in health investment. Nevertheless there
seems to be room for further theoretical extensions in the demand for health literature.
Introducing diminishing returns to scale in health investment may be one potential avenue
to pursue. Another may be the introduction of some form of adjustment costs.3.8 Appendix 85
3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 First-order conditions
The objective function (3.1) is maximized subject to the constraints (3.2). Health can be
solved as in (3.4).
We have
_ pA(t) =   @=
@A(t) =  pA(t); (3.25)
the solution of which is
pA(t) = pA(0)e t; (3.26)
further q(t)  0 and q(t) = 0 for m(t) > 0.
We now introduce   L, the integral over time of the Lagrangian = (equation 3.5).



































0 > R; (3.29)
where we have used
@C(t)
@C(t0)
= (t   t
0); (3.30)
where (t t0) is the Dirac delta function. The Dirac delta function is the continuous equiv-
alent of the discrete Kronecker delta function. It has the property
R

 f(t)(t   t0)dt =
f(t0)(t0 2 
) and can informally be thought of as a function (x) that has the value of
innity for x = 0, the value zero elsewhere and has an area of 1 (normalized).86 Chapter 3
Using the functional form (3.9) of the utility function allows us to write the rst order




















0 > R: (3.32)
Before we continue with the rst order conditions with respect to health investment












0 > t; (3.34)
where once more we have used that
@m(t)
@m(t0)
= (t   t
0): (3.35)








































































0 > R; (3.37)
where the lower integration limit t0 reects the fact that the stock of health (which utility
and wages are functions of) is a function of past but not future health investment.3.8 Appendix 87
Using once more the functional form (3.9) of the utility function, using the Leibniz
Integral Rule to dierentiate equations (3.36) and (3.37) with respect to t0 and substituting
the result back into equations (3.36) and (3.37) we nd:
@Uw(t0)
@H(t0)


























0  R) (3.38)
@Ur(t0)
@H(t0)


























0 > R); (3.39)
where H(t0) is the user cost of health capital at the margin (equation 3.8) and the
denitions for A, B, and A0 follow directly from equations (3.38) and (3.39).
3.8.2 Solutions for health, consumption and health investment





















t > R; (3.41)


























 )t t > R (3.43)

























 )t t > R; (3.45)88 Chapter 3
where once more we have used the denitions for  (equation 3.14) and for  (equation
3.15).
























































t > R: (3.47)
With solutions for the control functions consumption C(t) and health investment m(t),
and for the state variable health H(t) we can nd the solution for the state variable assets
A(t) using equations (3.20) and (3.20).
For positive health investment m(t) > 0 we have q(t) = 0 and H(t) = H(t) and
therefore B = 0. These are the solutions for the health threshold (see equations 3.10,
3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17 and 3.18). On the other hand, for initial conditions H(0) and
H(R+) that are above the health threshold (the minimally productive health level) H(0)
and H(R+) (see Figure 3.1 scenarios A through F) we have a situation of \excessive"
initial health, i.e., the individual is endowed with an initial stock of health that is greater
than the level required to be economically productive. In such cases individuals would
want to \sell" their health, i.e., chose negative health investment m(t) < 0. Since this is
not possible (health investment is a positive quantity) we have a corner solution where
m(t) = 0. We can derive the solutions for consumption C(t) and health H(t) by imposing




































































(s)+d(s)]ds: (t > R) (3.49)
Substituting the above solutions for q(t) into those for consumption C(t) (equations
3.42 and 3.43), health H(t) (equations 3.44 and 3.45) and health investment m(t) (equa-





































 )t (t > R) (3.53)
m(t) = 0: (3.54)
A perhaps more intuitive way of arriving at the same result is by simply substituting
m(t) = (t)2 and solving the optimization problem for the control variables (t) (instead of
m(t)) and consumption C(t) (i.e., one then does not have to resort to using the multiplier
q(t) associated with the condition that health investment m(t)  0 in the Lagrangian
3.5). One then nds the same rst order conditions for maximization with respect to
consumption (equations 3.28 and 3.29). For the rst order conditions for maximization
with respect to (t) one nds that either (t) = 0 (and hence m(t) = 0) or that the rst
order conditions conditions equations (3.36 and 3.37) are valid for q(t) = 0 (B = 0).
We now have the material to solve the solutions for each of the scenarios A through
F (see Figure 3.1) in detail.
3.8.3 Scenario A
Scenario A: 0  t  t1
Figure 3.1 shows how in scenario A initial health H(0) is above the initial health threshold
H(0) and individuals do not invest in health m(t) = 0. As a result health deteriorates
with rate d(t) untill age t1 when health reaches the health threshold H(t1). We have the


















































m(t) = 0: (3.60)
Scenario A: t1 < t  R
Between the age t1 and retirement R individuals invest in health m(t) > 0 and follow the
health threshold (the minimally productive health path): H(t), C(t), and m(t).






























Scenario A: R < t  t2
At retirement the health threshold drops to H(R+) and once more individuals do not
invest in health (m(t) = 0) till age t2 when health reaches the health threshold H(t2).
We have the following condition [H(t2) = H(R )e 
R t2
R d(s)ds = H(t2)]:

























































m(t) = 0: (3.69)
Scenario A: t2 < t  T
Between the age t2 and the end of life T individuals invest once again in health (m(t) > 0)
and follow the health threshold (the minimally productive health path): H(t), C(t), and
m(t).
H(t) = k































Scenario A: determination of A
Using the life-time budget constraint (3.3) and substituting the solutions for health H(t),





where An is the numerator and Ad is the denominator of A. We nd:92 Chapter 3
























































































where we have used the following denition:
 




Scenario B: 0  t  t1
Figure 3.1 shows how similar to scenario A initial health H(0) is above the health threshold
H(0) and individuals do not invest in health m(t) = 0. As a result health deteriorates
with rate d(t) untill age t1 when health reaches the health threshold H(t1). The same
condition [H(t1) = H(t1)] holds as in scenario A (equation 3.55; replace A with B).
Also the solutions for consumption C(t), health H(t) and health investment m(t) are the
same as in scenario A (3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, and 3.60; replace A with B).
Scenario B: t1 < t  R
As in scenario A, between the age t1 and retirement R individuals invest in health m(t) > 0
and follow the health threshold (the minimally productive health path): H(t), C(t), and
m(t) (see equations 3.61, 3.62, and 3.63; replace A with B).
Scenario A: R < t  T
As in scenario A, at retirement the health threshold drops to H(R+) and once more
individuals do not invest in health (m(t) = 0). In scenario B (unlike in scenario A)3.8 Appendix 93
health, after the retirement age R, does not deteriorate to the health threshold level
H(t) before the end of life T. The solutions for consumption C(t), health H(t) and
health investment m(t) are given by equations 3.65, 3.66, 3.67, 3.68, and 3.69 (replace A
with B) and are valid for R < t  T.






where Bn is the numerator and Bd is the denominator of B, we nd:









































































Scenario C: 0  t  R
Figure 3.1 shows how similar to scenarios A and B initial health H(0) is above the initial
health threshold H(0) and individuals do not invest in health m(t) = 0. But unlike
scenarios A and B, health reaches the health threshold H(t2) only at age t2, after the
retirement age R. Individuals thus only invest in health during retirement and not during





0 d(s)ds = k




 )t2; (3.80)94 Chapter 3













































m(t) = 0: (3.85)
Scenario C: R < t  t2












































m(t) = 0: (3.90)
Scenario C: t2 < t  T
Between the age t2 and the end of life T individuals invest once again in health (m(t) > 0)
and follow the health threshold: H(t), C(t), and m(t). The equations are the same as
in scenario A (equations 3.70, 3.71, and 3.72; replace A with C).






where Cn is the numerator and Cd is the denominator of C, we nd:3.8 Appendix 95













































































Scenario D: 0  t  R
Figure 3.1 shows how similar to scenarios A, B and C initial health H(0) is above the
initial health threshold H(0) and individuals do not invest in health m(t) = 0. But unlike
scenarios A, B and C health never reaches the health threshold H(t) at any point during
the individual's life time. Individuals are suciently endowed with initial health capital
that they never need to invest in health during working life nor during retirement.




















m(t) = 0: (3.96)
Scenario D: R < t  T





















m(t) = 0: (3.99)96 Chapter 3






where Dn is the numerator and Dd is the denominator of D, we nd:

1=























































3.8.7 Scenarios E and F
Figure 3.1 shows scenarios E and F. In these scenarios initial health H(0) is below the
initial health threshold H(0). The simplied Grossman model that we employ here allows
for complete repair. Case and Deaton (2005) point out that employing such technology
is not realistic. Indeed wealthy individuals may have high health threshold levels and the
ability to aord any kind of health investment, but they may not necessary be able to
repair all types of poor health (e.g., cancer, aids, various disabilities such as blindness
etc). Simply stated, not every illness has a cure. Further, while health in the formulation
cannot deteriorate faster than the deterioration rate d(t) there is no intrinsic constraint
on the rate at which health can be repaired. As such, in scenarios E and F individuals
will seek to repair their health instantaneously when they enter the workforce at age 20
(t = 0), eectively substituting initial assets A(0) for improved initial health H(0) such
that initial health equals the initial health threshold (the initial minimally productive
level of health) H(0) = H(0). An alternative interpretation is that individuals invest
in health m(t) well before they enter the workforce at age 20 (t = 0) to ensure their
health is at the initial health threshold H(0) at t = 0. Before they enter the workforce
individuals don't consume yet (or at least consumption is paid for by their parents /
caretakers) and have no assets A(t) yet. In this case the end result is the same as if health
investment were made in an innitesimally small period of time at t = 0. We assume
that individuals pay for the health investment themselves, i.e. they start with lower initial
assets A(0) = A(0) p(0)m(0), where m(0) is the quantity of health investment needed3.8 Appendix 97
to arrive from initial health H(0) to the initial health threshold H(0). Approximating this
initial health investment by a delta function, m(t) = m(0)(t   0) (i.e., mathematically
investment takes place at t = 0 during an innitesimally small period of time) we nd:
H(0) = H(0) + (0)m(0); (3.103)
and













where E;F denotes either E for scenario E or F for scenario F.
The solution for scenarios E and F can be derived from solutions A and B, respectively,
by setting t1 = 0 and replacing initial assets A(0) and initial health H(0) with the above
expressions for A(0) and H(0). We leave this excercise to the reader.
3.8.8 Benets transformation
Assuming that pension benets accumulate over time as a fraction  of wages is invested



























in the new formulation becomes
Z T
0











































 tdt: (3.106)98 Chapter 3
Comparing (3.105) with (3.106) leads to the identications made in (3.22). Note
further that the transformations in (3.22) also preserve the form of the Lagrangean (3.5
and 3.27) and that the transformations are independent of the control variables C(t) and
m(t). Thus the original solutions remain valid with the transformations as long as one
includes the derivative of ' when calculating health investment (equations 3.12, 3.13, 3.46
and 3.47),







A Contribution to Health Capital
Theory
I present a theory of the demand for health, health investment and longevity, build-
ing on the human capital framework for health and addressing limitations of existing
models. I predict a negative correlation between health investment and health, that
the health of wealthy and educated individuals declines more slowly and that they live
longer, that current health status is a function of the initial level of health and the
histories of prior health investments made, that health investment rapidly increases
near the end of life and that length of life is nite as a result of limited life-time
resources (the budget constraint). I derive a structural relation between health and
health investment (e.g., medical care) that is suitable for empirical testing.
|||||||||||||{
This chapter is based upon:
Galama, T.J. (2011) \A Contribution To Health Capital Theory", RAND Working
Paper, WR-831.100 Chapter 4
4.1 Introduction
The demand for health is one of the most central topics in Health Economics. The canon-
ical model of the demand for health and health investment (e.g., medical care) arises from
Grossman (1972a, 1972b, 2000) and theoretical extensions and competing economic mod-
els are still relatively few. In Grossman's human capital framework individuals demand
medical care (e.g., invest time and consume medical goods and services) for the consump-
tion benets (health provides utility) as well as production benets (healthy individu-
als have greater earnings) that good health provides. The model provides a conceptual
framework for interpretation of the demand for health and medical care in relation to an
individual's resource constraints, preferences and consumption needs over the life cycle.
Arguably the model has been one of the most important contributions of Economics to
the study of health behavior. It has provided insight into a variety of phenomena related
to health, medical care, inequality in health, the relationship between health and socioe-
conomic status, occupational choice, etc (e.g., Cropper, 1977; Muurinen and Le Grand,
1985; Case and Deaton, 2005) and has become the standard (textbook) framework for
the economics of the derived demand for medical care.
Yet several authors have identied limitations to the literature spawned by Grossman's
seminal 1972 papers1 (see Grossman, 2000, for a review and rebuttal of some of these
limitations). A standard framework for the demand for health, health investment (e.g.,
medical care) and longevity has to meet the signicant challenge of providing insight
into a variety of complex phenomena. Ideally it would explain the signicant dierences
observed in the health of socioeconomic status (SES) groups - often called the \SES-
health gradient". In the United States, a 60-year-old top-income-quartile male reports
to be in similar health as a 20-year-old bottom-income-quartile male (Case and Deaton
2005) and similar patterns hold for other measures of SES, such as education and wealth,
and other indicators of health, such as disability and mortality (e.g., Cutler et al. 2011;
van Doorslaer et al. 2008). Initially diverging, the disparity in health between low- and
high-SES groups appears to narrow after ages 50-60. Yet, Case and Deaton (2005) have
argued that health production models are unable to explain dierences in the health
deterioration rate (not just the level) between socioeconomic groups.
Another stylized fact of the demand for medical care is that healthy individuals do
not go to the doctor much: a strong negative correlation is observed between measures
of health and measures of health investment. However, Wagsta (1986a) and Zweifel and
1Throughout this paper I refer to this literature as the health production literature.4.1 Introduction 101
Breyer (1997) have pointed to the inability of health production models to predict the
observed negative relation between health and the demand for medical care.
Introspection and casual observation further suggests that healthy individuals are
those that began life healthy and that have invested in health over the life course. Thus one
would expect that health depends on initial conditions (e.g., initial health) and the history
of health investments, prices, wages, medical technology and environmental conditions.
Yet, Usher (1975) has pointed to the lack of \memory" in model solutions. For example
the solution for health typically does not depend on its initial value or the histories of
health investment and biological aging.
Further, Case and Deaton (2005) note that \...If the rate of biological deterioration
is constant, which is perhaps implausible but hardly impossible, ...people will \choose"
an innite life ...". This suggests that complete health repair is possible, regardless of
the speed of the process (the rate itself does not matter in causing health to decline) and
regardless of the budget constraint, and as a result declines in health status are driven, not
by the rate of deterioration of the health stock, but by the rate of increase of the rate of
deterioration (Case and Deaton, 2005). Thus a necessary condition in health production
models is that the biological aging rate increases with age to ensure that life is nite and
health declines and to reproduce the observed rapid increase in medical care near the end
of life. Case and Deaton (2005) argue, however, that a technology that can eect such
complete health repair is implausible.
Last, Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) have pointed out that under the constant returns to
scale (CRTS) health production process assumed in the health production literature, the
marginal cost of investment is constant, and no interior equilibrium for health investment
exists. Ehrlich and Chuma argue that this is a serious limitation that introduces a type
of indeterminacy (\bang-bang") problem with respect to optimal investment and health
maintenance choices. The importance of this observation appears to have gone relatively
unnoticed: contributions to the literature that followed the publication of Ehrlich and
Chuma's work in 1990 have continued to assume a health production function with CRTS
in health investment.2 This may have been as a consequence of the following factors:
First, Ehrlich and Chuma's nding that health investment is undetermined (under the
2E.g., Bolin et al. (2001, 2003); Case and Deaton (2005); Erbsland, Ried and Ulrich (2002); Jacobsen
(2000); Leu and Gern (1992); Liljas (1998); Nocera and Zweifel (1998); Wagsta (1986a); Ried (1996,
1998). To the best of my knowledge the only exception is an unpublished working paper by Dustmann and
Windmeijer (2000) who take the model by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) as their point of departure. Bolin
et al. (2002a, 2002b) assume that the health investment function is a decreasing function of health. Thus
they impose a relationship between health and health investment to ensure that the level of investment
in health decreases with the health stock rather than deriving this result from rst principles.102 Chapter 4
usual assumption of a CRTS health production process) was incidental to their main
contribution of introducing the demand for longevity (or \quantity of life") and the au-
thors did not explore the full implications of a DRTS health production process. Second,
Ehrlich and Chuma's argument is brief and technical.3 This has led Reid (1998) to argue
that \...the authors [Ehrlich and Chuma] fail to substantiate either claim [bang-bang and
indeterminacy] ...", suggesting there is room for further research into the argument made
by Ehrlich and Chuma. Third, there was the incorrect notion that Ehrlich and Chuma
had changed the structure of the model substantially and that the alleged indeterminacy
of health investment did not apply to the original formulation in discrete time (e.g., Reid,
1998). Last, because of the increased complexity of a health production model that in-
cludes endogenous length of life (demand for longevity) Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) had
to resort to a particular sensitivity analysis, suitable to optimal control problems (Oniki,
1973), in which the directional eect of a parameter change can be investigated. Ehrlich
and Chuma's (1990) insightful work is therefore limited to generating directional predic-
tions. This suggested that obtaining insight into the characteristics of a DRTS health
production model would require numerical analysis or the kind of sensitivity analysis
performed by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) { while it would not substantially change the
nature of the theory. For example, it was thought that introducing DRTS would result in
individuals reaching the desired health stock gradually rather than instantaneously (e.g.,
Grossman, 2000, p. 364) { perhaps not a suciently important improvement to warrant
the increased level of complexity.
What then is needed to address the above mentioned limitations? I argue that the an-
swer is two-fold: 1) a reinterpretation is needed of the health stock equilibrium condition,
one of the most central relations in the health production literature, as determining the
optimal level of health investment and not the \optimal" level of the health stock, and
2) one needs to assume DRTS in the health production process as Ehrlich and Chuma
(1990) have argued.
In this paper I present a theory of the demand for health, health investment and
longevity based on Grossman (1972a, 1972b) and the extended version of this model by
Ehrlich and Chuma (1990). In particular, this paper explores in detail the implications
of a DRTS health production process. The theory I develop is capable of reproducing the
phenomena discussed above and of addressing the above mentioned ve limitations.
3It involves a reference to a graph with health investment on one axis and the ratio of two Lagrange
multipliers on the other. The authors note that the same results hold in a discrete time setting, using a
proof based on the last period preceeding death (see their footnote 4).4.1 Introduction 103
This paper contributes to this literature as follows. First, I reduce the complexity of
a theory with a DRTS health production process (as in Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990) by
arguing for a dierent interpretation of the health stock equilibrium condition, one of
the most central relations in the health production literature: this relation determines
the optimal level of health investment (not the health stock), conditional on the level
of the health stock. The health production literature has thus far not employed the
alternative interpretation of the health equilibrium condition and consistently utilizing it
allows me to develop the health production literature further than was previously possible.
This is because the equilibrium condition for the health stock is of a much simpler form
than the condition which is typically utilized to determine the optimal level of health
investment. Many of the subsequent contributions this paper makes follow from the
alternative interpretation advocated here.
Second, I show that the alternative interpretation allows for an intuitive understanding
as to why the assumption of DRTS in the health production function is necessary, or no
solution to the optimization problem exists. Essentially, the CRTS process as utilized
in the health production literature represents a degenerate case. This is no new result
(Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990), but this paper provides more intuitive, less technical and
additional arguments as to why health investment is not determined under the assumption
of a CRTS health production process. This is important because the implications of the
indeterminacy are substantial (e.g., Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990), yet the debate does not
appear to have been settled in favor of a DRTS health production process as illustrated
by its lack of use in the health production literature.
Third, the alternative interpretation allows for explorations of a stylized representation
of the rst-order condition which enable an intuitive understanding of the optimal solution
for health investment. I nd that a unique optimal solution for health investment exists
(thus addressing the indeterminacy as Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990, have also shown). Given
an optimal level for health investment, and because in this interpretation the health stock
is determined by the dynamic equation for health, the stock is found to be a function of
the histories of past health investments and past biological aging rates, addressing the
criticism of Usher (1975). Further, I nd that the optimal level of health investment
decreases with the user cost of health capital and increases with wealth and with the
consumption and production benet of health. Thus I show that one does not need to
resort to numerical analyses to gain insight into the characteristics of the solution. This
is important because, arguably, the Grossman model has been successful, in part, because
of its ability to guide empirical analyses through the intuition that simple representations
provide (e.g., Wagsta, 1986b; Muurinen and Le Grand, 1985).104 Chapter 4
Fourth, the alternative interpretation allows developing relations for the eects of
variations in SES (wealth, education) and in health on the optimal level of health invest-
ment.4 These relations complement explorations of stylized representations by allowing
one to distinguish rst- from second- and third-order eects and to explore the mecha-
nisms (pathways) that combine to produce the nal directional outcome, again, without
the need to resort to numerical analyses. Under plausible assumptions the theory predicts
a negative correlation between health and health investment (in cross-section). This is
an important new result that addresses the criticism by Wagsta (1986a) and Zweifel
and Breyer (1997). Further, greater wealth, higher earnings over the life cycle and more
education and experience are associated with slower health deterioration, addressing the
criticism by Case and Deaton (2005).5
Fifth, empirical tests of the health production literature have thus far been based on
structural and reduced form equations derived under the assumption of a CRTS health
production process. Arguably, health capital theory has not yet been properly tested
because these structural and reduced form relations suer from the issue of the indeter-
minacy of health investment (and essentially represent a degenerate case). Absent an
equivalent relation for a DRTS health production process I once more employ the alter-
native interpretation to derive a structural relation between health and health investment
(e.g., medical care) that is suitable for empirical testing. The structural relation contains
the CRTS health production process as a special case, thereby allowing empirical tests to
verify or reject this common assumption in the health production literature.
Last, I perform numerical simulations to illustrate the properties of the theory. These
simulations show that the model is capable of reproducing the rapid increase in health
investment near the end of life and that the optimal solution for length of life is nite for
a constant biological aging rate, addressing the criticism by Case and Deaton (2005) that
health production models are characterized by complete health repair. In sum, I nd that
the theory can address each of the ve limitations discussed above.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model in discrete time
and discusses the characteristics of the rst-order conditions. In particular this section
oers an alternative interpretation of the rst-order conditions. Section 4.3 explores
the properties of a DRTS health production process, in several ways, by: a) exploring
a stylized representation of the rst-order condition for health investment to gain an
4Employing Oniki's (1973) method as in Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) is somewhat comparable to the
analysis performed here. Unfortunately, due to space limitations, the detailed analysis underlying the
directional predictions by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) has not been published, but is available on request
from the authors.
5These results are also obtained by exploring a stylized representation of the rst-order condition.4.2 The demand for health, health investment and longevity 105
intuitive understanding of its properties, b) analyzing the eect of dierences in health and
socioeconomic status (wealth and education) on the optimal level of health investment and
consumption, c) developing structural-form relations for empirical testing of the model and
d) presenting numerical simulations of health, health investment, assets and consumption
proles and length of life. Section 4.4 summarizes and concludes. The Appendix provides
detailed derivations and mathematical proofs.
4.2 The demand for health, health investment and
longevity
I start with Grossman's basic formulation (Grossman, 1972a, 1972b, 2000) for the demand
for health and health investment (e.g., medical care) in discrete time (see also Wagsta,
1986a; Wolfe, 1985; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990).6 Health is
treated as a form of human capital (health capital) and individuals derive both consump-
tion (health provides utility) and production benets (health increases earnings) from it.
The demand for medical care is a derived demand: individuals demand \good health",
not the consumption of medical care.
Using discrete time optimal control (e.g., Sydsaeter, Strom and Berck, 2005) the prob-







where individuals live for T (endogenous) periods, k is a subjective discount factor and
individuals derive utility U(Ct;Ht) from consumption Ct and from health Ht. Time t is
measured from the time individuals begin employment. Utility increases with consump-
tion @Ut=@Ct > 0 and with health @Ut=@Ht > 0.
The objective function (4.1) is maximized subject to the dynamic constraints:
Ht+1 = f(It) + (1   dt)Ht; (4.2)
At+1 = (1 + t)At + Y (Ht)   pXtXt   pmtmt; (4.3)
the total time budget 
t

t = wt + It + Ct + s(Ht); (4.4)
6In line with Grossman (1972a; 1972b) and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) I do not incorporate uncertainty
in the health production process. This would unnecessarily complicate the optimization problem and
require numerical methods, while it is not needed to explain the stylized facts regarding health behavior
discussed in this paper. For a detailed treatment of uncertainty within the Grossman model the reader
is referred to Ehrlich (2000), Liljas (1998), and Ehrlich and Yin (2005).106 Chapter 4
and initial and end conditions: H0, HT, A0 and AT are given. Individuals live for T
periods and die at the end of period T   1. Length of life T (Grossman, 1972a, 1972b)
is determined by a minimum health level Hmin. If health falls below this level Ht  Hmin
an individual dies (HT  Hmin).
Health (equation 4.2) can be improved through investment in health It and deteriorates
at the biological aging rate dt. The relation between the input, health investment It, and
the output, health improvement f(It), is governed by the health production function
f(). The health production function f() is assumed to obey the law of diminishing





where 0 <  < 1 (DRTS).7;8
Assets At (equation 4.3) provide a return t (the rate of return on capital), increase
with income Y (Ht) and decrease with purchases in the market of consumption goods and
services Xt and medical goods and services mt at prices pXt and pmt, respectively. Income
Y (Ht) is assumed to be increasing in health Ht as healthy individuals are more productive
and earn higher wages (Currie and Madrian, 1999; Contoyannis and Rice, 2001).
Goods and services Xt purchased in the market and own time inputs Ct are used in
the production of consumption Ct. Similarly medical goods and services mt and own time
inputs It are used in the production of health investment It. The eciencies of production
are assumed to be a function of the consumer's stock of knowledge E (an individual's
human capital exclusive of health capital [e.g., education]) as the more educated may be
more ecient at investing in health (see, e.g., Grossman 2000):
It = I[mt;It;E]; (4.6)
Ct = C[Xt;Ct;E]: (4.7)
7For  = 1 we have Grossman's original formulation of a linear health production process.
8Mathematically, equation (4.5) is equivalent to the assumption made by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) of
a dual cost-of-investment function with decreasing returns to scale (their equation 5) and a linear health
production process ( = 1 in equation 4.5 in this paper). Conceptually, however, there is an important
distinction. In principle one could imagine a scenario where the investment function It has constant or
even increasing returns to scale in its inputs of health investment goods / services mt and own time It,
but where the ultimate health improvement (through the health production process) has diminishing
returns to scale in its inputs mt and It as assumed in equation (4.5; this paper). Arguably, it is not the
process of health investment but the process of health production (the ultimate eect on health) that is
expected to exhibit decreasing returns to scale.4.2 The demand for health, health investment and longevity 107
The total time available in any period 
t (equation 4.4) is the sum of all possible uses
wt (work), It (health investment), Ct (consumption) and s(Ht) (sick time; a decreasing
function of health). In this formulation one can interpret Ct, the own-time input into
consumption Ct as representing leisure.9
Income Y (Ht) is taken to be a function of the wage rate wt times the amount of time
spent working wt,
Y (Ht) = wt [
t   It   Ct   s(Ht)]: (4.8)
Thus, we have the following optimal control problem: the objective function (4.1) is
maximized with respect to the control functions Xt, Ct, mt and It and subject to the







t Ht+1 + q
A
t At+1; t = 0;:::T   1 (4.9)
where qH
t is the adjoint variable associated with the dynamic equation (4.2) for the state
variable health Ht and qA
t is the adjoint variable associated with the dynamic equation
(4.3) for the state variable assets At.10
The optimal control problem presented so far is formulated for a xed length of life
T (see, e.g., Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1977, 1987; Kirk, 1970; see also section 4.3.4).
To allow for dierential mortality one needs to introduce an additional condition to the
optimal control problem to optimize over all possible lengths of life T (Ehrlich and Chuma,
1990). One way to achieve this is by rst solving the optimal control problem conditional
on length of life T (i.e., for a xed exogenous T), inserting the optimal solutions for
consumption C
t and health H










and maximizing VT with respect to T.11
9Because consumption consists of time inputs and purchases of goods/services in the market one can
conceive leisure as a form of consumption consisting entirely or mostly of time inputs. Leisure, similar
to consumption, provides utility and its cost consists of the price of goods/services utilized and the
opportunity cost of time.
10For a CRTS health production function (f(It) / It) as employed in the health production literature
we have to explicitly impose that health investment is non negative, It  0 (see Galama and Kapteyn
2009). This can be done by introducing an additional multiplier qI
t in the Hamiltonian (equation 4.9)
associated with the condition that health investment is non negative, It  0. This is not necessary for a
DRTS health production function, where diminishing marginal benets and choice of suitable functional
forms ensure that the optimal solution for health investment It is non negative.
11This is mathematically equivalent to the condition utilized by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) (in contin-
uous time) that the Hamiltonian equal zero at the end of life =T = 0 (transversality condition).108 Chapter 4
4.2.1 First-order conditions
Maximization of (4.9) with respect to the control functions mt and It leads to the rst-



































and the Lagrange multiplier qA
0 is the shadow price of wealth (see, e.g, Case and Deaton,
2005).



























Using either the expression (4.11) or (4.13) for the rst-order condition for health
investment and taking the dierence between period t and t   1 we obtain the following
expression

























where Ht is the user cost of health capital at the margin
Ht  It

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and It  It   It 1.
Maximization of (4.9) with respect to the control functions Xt and Ct leads to the



















The rst-order condition (4.11) (or the alternative forms 4.13 and 4.15) determines the
optimal solution for the control function health investment It. The rst-order condition
(4.18) determines the optimal solution for the control function consumption Ct.12 The
solutions for the state functions health Ht and assets At then follow from the dynamic
equations (4.2) and (4.3). Length of life T is determined by maximizing the indirect utility
function VT (see 4.10) with respect to T.
4.2.2 An alternative interpretation of the rst-order condition
One of the most central relations in the health production literature is the rst-order con-
dition (4.15). This relation equates the marginal consumption benet of health @Ut=@Ht
to the user cost of health capital Ht and the marginal production benet of health 'Ht,
and is interpreted as an equilibrium condition for the health stock Ht. It is equivalent to,
e.g., equation (11) in Grossman (2000) and equation (13) in Ehrlich and Chuma (1990).13
An alternative interpretation of relation (4.15) is, however, that it determines the optimal
level of health investment It. My argument is as follows.
First, the rst-order condition (4.15) is the result of maximization of the optimal
control problem with respect to investment in health and hence, rst and foremost, it
12Because the rst-order condition for health investment goods / services mt and the rst-order con-
dition for own time inputs It are identical (see Appendix section 4.5.1) one can consider a single control
function It (health investment) instead of two control functions mt and It. The same is true for con-
sumption Ct. Because of this property, the optimization problem is reduced to two control functions It
and Ct (instead of four) and two state functions Ht and At.
13Notational dierences with respect to Grossman (2000) are: qA
0 ! , It ! t, @Ut=@Ht !
[@U=@ht][@ht=@Ht] = UhtGt (where ht is healthy time, a function of health Ht), 'Ht ! WtGt,
t ! r, dt ! t, t ! 0, and T ! n. Notational dierences with respect to Ehrlich and
Chuma (1990), apart from using discrete rather than continuous time, are: qA
0 ! A(0), It ! g(t),
@Ut=@Ht ! [@U(t)=@h(t)][@h(t)=@H(t)] = Uh(t)'
0
(H(t)) (where h(t) is healthy time), 'Ht ! w'
0
(H(t)),
t ! r, dt ! (t) and t ! .110 Chapter 4
determines the optimal level of health investment It. Optimal control theory distinguishes
between control functions and state functions. Control functions are determined by the
rst-order conditions and state functions by the dynamic equations (e.g., Seierstad and
Sydsaeter, 1977, 1987; Kirk, 1970). The rst-order condition (4.15) is thus naturally
associated with the control function health investment It and the state function health
Ht is determined by the dynamic equation (4.2).14
Second, in the health production literature the optimal solution for health investment
It is assumed to be determined by the rst-order condition (4.11) (or the alternative form
4.13). It is equivalent to, e.g., equation (9) in Grossman (2000) and equation (8) in Ehrlich
and Chuma (1990).15 However, it can be shown that the rst-order conditions (4.11) and
(4.15) are mathematically equivalent
(4:11) , (4:15); (4.20)
proof of which is provided in the Appendix (section 4.5.2). Thus if equation (4.11) is the
rst-order condition for health investment It (the interpretation in the health production
literature) then equation (4.15) is too (and vice versa).
From a purely mathematical standpoint one could conceive the condition (4.15) as
determining the level of the health stock because a direct relation exists between health Ht
and health investment It, namely the dynamic equation (4.2). Optimizing with respect to
health investment entails optimizing with respect to health. Thus, in principle, one ought
to be able to reconcile both interpretations. However, the health production literature
assumes CRTS in the health production process.16 In section 4.3.1 I show that under
this particular assumption the level of health investment is not determined, i.e. that it
represents a special degenerate case. As a result, both approaches cannot be reconciled
in this particular case.
14Analogously, the rst-order condition (4.18) is associated with the control variable consumption Ct
and the dynamic equation (4.3) is associated with the state function assets At.
15One important dierence between the results derived by Grossman (equation 9 in Grossman, 2000)
and those derived here is the absense in Grossman's derivations of the reference point I0 in equation
(4.11) or the reference point IT 1 in equation (4.13). Using optimal control techniques I nd these
reference points to be required in a discrete time formulation (see equations 4.11 and 4.13). This is also
true for a continuous time formulation. To the best of my knowledge this observation has not been made
before. It has important implications for the model's interpretation as the begin or end point references
allows one to ensure that the solution is consistent with the begin and end conditions for health and
assets: H0, HT, A0 and AT.
16I.e., f(It) = I
t with  = 1 (equations 4.2 and 4.5) and a Cobb-Douglas (CRTS) relation between
investment in medical care It and its inputs own time and goods/services purchased in the market.4.3 A DRTS health production process 111
In the remainder of this paper I will use relations (4.11) and (4.15) as being equivalent.
Both conditions determine the optimal level of health investment It, conditional on the
level of the health stock Ht.
4.3 A DRTS health production process
In this section I explore the properties of a health production process in several ways.
In section 4.3.1 I discuss a stylized representation of the rst-order condition for health
investment to gain an intuitive understanding of its properties. In particular I contrast
the characteristics of the solution for health investment under a DRTS health production
process with that of a CRTS process. In this section I also provide additional arguments for
the claim made by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) that DRTS in the health production process
are necessary to guarantee the existence of a solution to the optimization problem.17 In
section 4.3.2 I explore the eect of dierences in health and socioeconomic status (wealth
and education) on the optimal level of health investment and consumption. In section 4.3.3
I derive structural form relations for empirical testing of the model. Last, in section 4.3.4
I perform numerical simulations of health, health investment, assets and consumption
proles and length of life.
In the following I assume diminishing marginal utilities of consumption @2Ut=@C2
t < 0
and of health @2Ut=@Ht < 0, and diminishing marginal production benet of health
@'Ht=@Ht = @2Yt=@H2
t < 0. In addition I make the usual assumption of a Cobb-Douglas
CRTS relation between the inputs goods/services purchased in the market and own-time
and the outputs investment in curative care It and consumption Ct. As a result we have
It / I
1 
t and @Ct=@Ct = 0 (see equations 4.81 and 4.84 in Appendix section 4.5.4).
4.3.1 Stylized representation
In this section I contrast the properties of a DRTS health production process18 (section
4.3.1) with those of a CRTS health production process19 (section 4.3.1).
17Providing further corroboration of their claim is important because the implications are substantial
and the debate does not appear to have been settled in favor of a DRTS health production process as
illustrated by its lack of use in the health production literature.
180 <  < 1 and a Cobb-Douglas health investment process It.
19 = 1 and a Cobb-Douglas health investment process It.112 Chapter 4
Decreasing returns to scale
Figure 4.1 provides a stylized representation of the rst-order condition for health invest-
ment It (4.15): it graphs the marginal benet and marginal cost of health as a function
of health investment It (left-hand side) and as a function of health Ht (right-hand side).20
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Consider the left-hand gure rst. The optimal level of health investment It is deter-
mined by equating the consumption benet of health @Ut=@Ht with the cost of maintaining
the health stock qA
0 (Ht  'Ht) (here and in the remainder of the discussion in this section





Utility is derived from health Ht and consumption Ct but not from health investment
It (the demand for medical care is a derived demand). Further, the evolution of the health












(1   di): (4.21)
In other words, health Ht is a function of past health investment Is but not of current
health investment It (s < t). Thus the consumption benet of health @Ut=@Ht is indepen-
dent of the level of health investment It: this is shown as the horizontal solid line labeled
@Ut=@Ht.
20While in principle one can derive predictions for the level of health investment It from the left-hand
gure without the need to resort to the right-hand gure, it is useful to consider the right-hand gure in
order to illustrate the eect of dierences in the health stock Ht on the optimal level of health investment
(see section 4.3.2) and to make comparisons with the usual interpretation of this relation as determining
the \optimal" health stock (rather than optimal investment; see section 4.3.1).4.3 A DRTS health production process 113
The cost of maintaining the health stock is a function of the shadow price of wealth
qA
0 ,21 the user cost of health capital Ht, the production benet of health 'Ht, and an
exponential factor that varies with age t depending on the dierence between the time
preference rate t and the rate of return on capital t. The marginal cost of health
investment It and hence the user cost of health capital Ht is increasing in the level
of investment in health It (It / I
1 
t ; see equation 4.81 in Appendix section 4.5.4).
The marginal production benet of health 'Ht is not a function of the level of health
investment It. As a result, the cost of maintaining the health stock is upward sloping in
the level of health investment (labeled qA
0 (Ht  'Ht)). The intersection of the two curves
determines the optimal level of health investment (dotted vertical line labeled It).
Now consider the right-hand side of Figure 4.1. The marginal consumption benet
of health @Ut=@Ht is downward sloping (convex) in health (curve labeled @Ut=@Ht) and
the cost of maintaining the health stock qA
0 (Ht   'Ht) is upward sloping (concave) in
health (curve labeled qA
0 (Ht   'Ht)) due to the diminishing marginal production benet
of health 'Ht. Since health is a stock its level is given (dotted vertical line labeled Ht) and
provides a constraint: the two curves have to intersect at this level Ht. It is possible for the
two curves to intersect at Ht through endogenous health investment It. A higher(/lower)
level of health investment It increases(/decreases) (ceteris paribus) the marginal cost of
health investment and hence the user cost of health capital. As a result the cost of
maintaining the health stock (curve labeled qA
0 (Ht   'Ht)) shifts upward(/downward)
while the marginal benet of health (curve labeled @Ut=@Ht) remains stationary (it is not
a function of the level of health investment).
The level of the marginal consumption benet of health (labeled @Ut=@Ht on the left-
hand side of Figure 4.1) for which the health stock is at Ht (draw a horizontal line from
the left-hand to the right-hand side of Figure 4.1) determines the optimal solution for
health investment It. The optimal level of health investment It decreases with the user
cost of health capital Ht and increases with wealth (lower qA
0 ) and with the consumption
@Ut=@Ht and production 'Ht benet of health. Further, the optimal level of health
investment It is a direct function of the level of health stock Ht as can be seen from the
rst-order condition (4.15) and from its stylized representation in Figure 4.1 (more on
this in the next sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). Hence, for a DRTS health production process a
unique solution for health investment It exists for every level of the health stock Ht. This
addresses the issue of the indeterminacy of health investment (e.g., Ehrlich and Chuma,
1990).
21qA
0 is decreasing in initial assets and life-time earnings. See, e.g., Wagsta (1986a).114 Chapter 4
Constant returns to scale
Figure 4.2 provides a stylized representation of the rst-order condition (4.15) for health
investment for a CRTS health production process, as typically assumed in the health
production literature: it graphs the marginal benet and marginal cost of health as a
function of health investment It (left-hand side) and as a function of the health stock Ht
(right-hand side). In the following I follow the discussion in the previous section 4.3.1
and emphasize the dierences with respect to a DRTS health production process.
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Consider the left-hand side rst. Unlike the DRTS process, for a CRTS process the
marginal cost of health investment It, and hence the user cost of health capital Ht, is
independent of the level of health investment It (It / I
1 
t = constant for  = 1; see
equation 4.81 in Appendix section 4.5.4). Thus, not only the marginal utility of health
@Ut=@Ht but also the net marginal cost is independent of the level of health investment
It: this is shown as the horizontal solid lines labeled qA
0 (Ht   'Ht) and @Ut=@Ht.
Because individuals cannot adjust their health instantaneously, the level of the health
stock Ht at age t is given and provides a constraint for the optimization problem at age
t. Generally the constraint provided by Ht will result in dierent values for the marginal
benet and marginal cost of health: this is depicted by the two horizontal lines having
distinct levels (they do not overlap). The intersection of the two solid curves would
determine the optimal level of health investment It but only in the peculiar case that
both lines exactly overlap does such an optimal solution exist. Thus for most values of
the health stock no solution for health investment It exists.4.3 A DRTS health production process 115
Now consider the right-hand side of Figure 4.2. The consumption benet of health
@Ut=@Ht is downward sloping to represent diminishing marginal utility in health. The cost
of maintaining the health stock qA
0 (Ht  'Ht) is upward sloping to represent diminishing
marginal production benets of health 'Ht. As the graph shows, a unique level of health
H
t exists (dashed vertical line) for which the consumption benet of health equals the cost
of maintaining the health stock. The health production literature assumes this unique
solution H
t describes the \optimal" health path. Turning again to the left-hand side of
Figure 4.2, note that for this particular value of the health stock H
t the consumption
benet of health @Ut=@Ht and the cost of maintaining the health stock qA
0 (Ht   'Ht)
overlap (they both lie on the dashed horizontal line). Thus a solution for the level of
investment in health It exists, but any non negative value can be allowed: once more the
optimal level of investment in health It is not determined.
In order to illustrate that this result does not depend on the equivalence of the rst-
order conditions (4.11) and (4.15) I show next that this result also holds for (4.11), the
relation that is utilized in the health production literature as determining the optimal
level of health investment. The rst-order condition for health investment (4.11) equates
the current marginal monetary cost of investment in health It (left-hand side; LHS) with
a function of the current and all past values of the marginal utility of health @Us=@Hs
and the marginal production benet of health 'Hs (0  s  t) (right-hand side; RHS).
The LHS of (4.11) is not a function of health investment as the marginal monetary cost
of health investment It is independent of the level of investment for a CRTS health
production process. The RHS of (4.11) is also not a function of current investment It
because the marginal utility of health @Us=@Hs and the marginal production benet of
health 'Hs are functions of the health stock Hs (0  s  t) which in turn is a function of
past but not current health investment Is (s < t; see equation 4.21). Thus the rst-order
condition for health investment (4.11) is not a function of health investment It and the
level of health investment is not determined.
Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) have reached the same conclusion on the basis of a technical
argument. From equation (4.59) or (4.60) it follows that the marginal monetary cost of






: (4.22)116 Chapter 4
The right-hand side of (4.22) is not a function of health investment It by denition.22;23
For a CRTS health production proces It is also not a function of health investment It
and hence the level of health investment is not determined by the rst-order conditon for
health investment.
4.3.2 Variation in health and socioeconomic status
In this section I explore the eects of dierences in health and socioeconomic status. I
employ the rst-order condition (4.15) to explore the eects of dierences in initial assets
(section 4.3.2) and in initial health (section 4.3.2) on the level of health investment It.
Variation in initial assets
Consider two optimal life time trajectories, dierent only (ceteris paribus) in their initial
level of assets, A0, and, A0 + A0, and the resulting dierence in the two optimal life
22As Isaac Ehrlich pointed out to me in a private communication, the co-state variables (Lagrangian
multipliers) cannot be a function of the ow of investment because they measure the value of the stocks
of health capital and monetary wealth, which are not aected by the ows of investment in health and
earnings, respectively, although they shift with time in current values. The mathematical proof is part
of Pontryagin optimal control theory and the maximum principle.
23Grossman (2000) has questioned the argument by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) noting (in a discrete
time setting) that the rst-order condition for health investment (4.13) equates the current marginal
monetary cost of investment in health It (LHS) with a function of all future values of the marginal
utility of health @Us=@Hs and the marginal production benet of health 'Hs (t < s  T   1) (RHS).
These in turn are functions of health and health is a function of all past values of health investment Is
(0  s < t; see equation 4.21). Thus the RHS of the rst-order condition for health investment (4.13)
is a function of current health investment It (and, in fact, all future and all past values as well) and
hence a solution for health investment It ought to exist. This apparent discrepancy can be reconciled by
noting that implicit in the rst-order condition for health investment (4.13) is the use of the nal period
t = T   1 as the point of reference, while the relation (4.21) for the health stock uses the initial period
t = 0 as the point of reference. Consistently using the initial period t = 0 as the point of reference, i.e.,
using the form (4.11) instead of (4.13) for the rst-order condition for health investment, one nds that
the RHS of (4.11) is not a function of current investment as the health stock is a function of past but not
current health investment Is (s < t). Likewise, consistently using the nal period t = T as the point of
reference, i.e., using the alternative expression Ht = HT=[
QT 1





i=t(1   di)] and
comparing this with the rst-order condition (4.13) one nds that the rst-order condition is independent









Ct ! Ct + Ct;A
It ! It + It;A
Ht ! Ht + Ht;A; (4.23)
where qA
0;A, Ct;A, It;A and Ht;A denote associated shifts in the shadow price of
wealth qA
0 and in the optimal solutions for consumption Ct, health investment It and health
Ht at each age t. A higher capital endowment lowers the shadow price of wealth (i.e.,
negative qA
0;A). This in turn aects the level of consumption Ct and health investment
It over the life cycle. Gradually dierences in health investment It lead to dierences in
health Ht.
Using a rst-order Taylor expansion of the rst-order conditions for health investment
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The relation (4.24) describes the change in the level of health investment at age t
of a trajectory with initial assets A0 + A0 compared to a trajectory with initial assets
A0. On the RHS the coecient of the relative change in the shadow price of wealth
qA
0;A=qA
0 consists of a rst-order (direct) eect of a change in wealth (the factor 1) and a
second-order (indirect) eect operating through the eect that a corresponding change in
consumption has on the level of health investment (the remaining term). Assuming the
rst-order eect dominates, the term on the RHS is positive because an increase in assets
(positive A0) decreases the shadow price of wealth (negative qA
0;A).24
24The second-order term on the RHS equals the relative change in the marginal utility of health
@U=@HjCt;Ht resulting from variation in consumption Ct (numerator) divided by the relative change in the
marginal cost of consumption CjCt;Ht minus the marginal benet (utility) of consumption @U=@CjCt;Ht,118 Chapter 4
On the LHS we have a term in It;A and one in Ht;A. The coecient of the term in
It;A equals the relative change in the cost of maintaining the health stock HjIt;Ht 'HjHt
resulting from variation in the level of health investment It.25 The marginal cost of health
investment It increases with the level of health investment for a DRTS health production
process. As a result the coecient of the term in It;A is positive.
Consider the initial period t = 0. Because health at t = 0 is given by the initial
condition H0 we have H0;A = 0 (dierences in health between the trajectories with
initial assets A0 +A0 and with A0 occur at later ages). Because H0;A = 0 an increase
in assets (which lowers the shadow price of wealth, i.e., negative qA
0;A) increases the level
of initial health investment, i.e. positive I0;A (see equation 4.24).
A simple graph helps to illustrate this result. Figure 4.3 shows a stylized representa-
tion of the rst-order condition for inital health investment I0 (4.15) as a function of I0.
A higher initial endowment of capital (positive A0) lowers the shadow price of wealth
(negative qA
0;A), thus shifting the net cost of maintaining the health stock downward
(curve labeled (q0
A+qA
0;A)(H  'H)jI0+I0;A;H0; rst-order eect). A lower shadow price
of wealth also increases the initial level of consumption C0,26 potentially aecting the
marginal utility of health (second-order eect). If consumption and health are comple-
ments @2U=@C@HjCt;Ht > 0 in utility, the marginal utility of health shifts upward (curve
labeled @U=@HjC0+C0;A;H0). The net result is a higher level of initial health investment
I0 + I0;A.
A higher initial endowment of capital (positive A0) initially induces individuals to
invest more in health. As a result their health deteriorates slower. This addresses the crit-
icism of Case and Deaton (2005) that health production models do not predict dierences
in the eective health deterioration rate with wealth.
Now consider the next period (t = 1). Because of higher health investment I0;A in
the initial period (t = 0) health will be higher in the next period H1;A > 0 (t = 1). If the
resulting from variation in consumption Ct (denominator). For the usual assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas
consumption process and diminishing marginal utility of consumption we have @C=@CjCt;Ht = 0 and
@2U=@C2jCt;Ht < 0. In this case the sign of the second-order term on the RHS depends on whether
consumption and health are complements @2U=@C@HjCt;Ht > 0 or substitutes @2U=@C@HjCt;Ht < 0 in
utility. Research by Finkelstein, Luttmer and Notowidigdo (2008) suggests that the marginal utility of
consumption declines as health deteriorates, i.e. that @2U=@C@HjCt;Ht > 0, in which case the second-
order term is also positive.
25Note that @H=@IjIt;Ht   @'H=@IjHt = @I=@IjIt;Ht(dt + t)   @I=@IjIt;Ht(1 + t) 
@I=@IjIt;Ht(dt + t).
26See equation (4.77) and note once more that for the usual assumptions of a Cobb-Douglas con-
sumption process and diminishing marginal utility of consumption we have @C=@CjCt;Ht = 0 and
@2U=@C2jCt;Ht < 0. Further, @U=@CjCt;Ht > 0 and, for t = 0, H0;A = 0.4.3 A DRTS health production process 119
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Notes: Marginal consumption @U=@H and marginal production benet 'H of health versus the user cost
of health capital at the margin H as a function of initial health investment I0.
level of health investment remains higher in subsequent periods, both health trajectories
will start to deviate, i.e. Ht;A would grow over time. How would this aect the level of
health investment?
The coecient of Ht;A consists of a rst-order eect (the rst and second terms)
and a second-order eect (the third term). The rst term is equal to the relative change
in the cost of maintaining the health stock HjIt;Ht   'HjHt resulting from variation in
health Ht. The marginal cost of health investment IjIt;Ht increases with the wage rate
(opportunity cost of investing in health and not working) which potentially increases with
health (healthy individuals are more productive), i.e. @I=@HjIt;Ht > 0. Diminishing
marginal benets of health imply @'H=@HjHt < 0. Thus the rst term is positive. The
second term equals the relative change in the marginal consumption benet (utility) of
health @U=@HjCt;Ht resulting from variation in health Ht. The second term is also positive
for the usual assumption of diminishing marginal utility of health @2U=@H2jCt;Ht < 0.
Thus both rst-order terms are positive.27 As a result, the dierence in the demand for
27The third term, describing a second-order eect, contains the same expression as the second-order
term in the coecient of the relative change in the shadow price of wealth qA
0;A=qA
0 (which, follow-
ing the earlier discussion in section 4.3.2, is plausible positive) multiplied by the relative change in the
marginal utility of health minus the relative change in the marginal cost of consumption in response to a
variation in health: (@2U=@C@HjCt;Ht=(@U=@H)jCt;Ht   (@C=@H)jCt;Ht=CjCt;Ht. The marginal cost
of consumption CjCt;Ht increases with the wage rate (opportunity cost of devoting own time to con-120 Chapter 4
health investment becomes smaller (smaller It;A) as the deviation in health between
the trajectories with initial assets A0 + A0 and with A0 grows (growing Ht;A; see
equation 4.24). Greater health reduces the demand for health investment (see also the
discussions in sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). At some age the dierence between the level of
health investment could vanish (It;A  0) and the eective health deterioration rate
Ht+1   Ht converge between the trajectory with initial assets A0 + A0 and with A0.28
Despite this convergence, given similar initial endowed health H0 and an initial period
of higher levels of health investment, individuals with greater endowed wealth remain
healthier.
Other indicators of socioeconomic status such as life-time earnings and education
behave qualitatively similar to endowed wealth (initial assets). The exploration of the
eect of variations in these measures on health investment and health is outside the scope
of this paper (but see section 4.3.3 and Galama and van Kippersluis [2010] for a discussion
of the role of life-time earnings and education). The eect of greater earnings over the
life cycle on health diers from the eect of greater endowed wealth in that the \wealth"
eect is moderated by the higher opportunity cost of time. The eect of education on
health is similar to that of greater earnings over the life cycle, but with the additional
eect of increasing the eciency of health investment.
Variation in initial health
Consider two optimal life time trajectories, dierent only (ceteris paribus) in their initial
level of health, H0, and, H0 + H0, and the resulting dierence in initial (t = 0) health
investment I0
I0 ! I0 + I0;H








sumption and not working) which potentially increases with health (healthy individuals are more produc-
tive). If consumption and health are strong complements in utility (@2U=@C@H)jCt;Ht=(@U=@H)jCt;Ht >
(@C=@HjCt;Ht)=CjCt;Ht the third term is positive and results in an elevated level of health investment
(compared to a situation where there is weak complementarity or substitutability in utility) in response
to a higher health stock (positive Ht;A).
28Note that if at some age the dierence in health investment It;A becomes negative, i.e., an individual
with greater endowed wealth (A0 > 0) would spend less on health (It;A < 0), the health dierence in
the next period t+1 is reduced (smaller Ht+1;A), which leads to a less negative or positive dierence in
the level of health investment It+1;A, suggesting a process of gradual convergence in the eective rate
of health deterioration Ht+1   Ht (where we have a relatively constant Ht;A and small It;A).4.3 A DRTS health production process 121
where I0;H, C0;H and qA
0;H denote associated shifts in the optimal solution for initial
health investment I0, initial consumption C0 and in the shadow price of wealth qA
0 .
Using a rst-order Taylor expansion of the rst-order conditions for health invest-
ment (4.15) and for consumption (4.18), eliminating C0;H, and (in order to simplify the

































(this relation can be obtained by considering 4.24 for t = 0 and labeling the variations with
H instead of A).29 The relation (4.26) describes the change in the initial level of health
investment I0 of a trajectory with initial health H0 +H0 compared to a trajectory with
initial health H0. Under the usual assumptions the rst-order relation between health
and health investment is negative.30
A simple graph helps to illustrate this result. Figure 4.4 shows a stylized repre-
sentation of the rst-order condition for the inital level of health investment I0 (4.15)
as a function of I0. A higher initial endowment of health (positive H0) lowers the
marginal production benet of health 'Ht thus shifting the net cost of maintaining the
health stock upward (curve labeled (q0
A +qA
0;H)(H  'H)jI0+I0;H;H0+H0; rst-order ef-
fect). Further, the marginal utility of health is lower for higher health (the curve labeled
@U=@HjC0+C0;H;H0+H0 shifts downward) as a result of the diminishing marginal utility
of health (rst-order eect). The net result is a lower level of health investment (negative
I0;H).
Greater initial health (positive H0) reduces the initial demand for health investment
(negative I0;H). Because one can start the optimization problem at any age by redening
the initial conditions H0 and A0 for that age, this result holds for any age. Thus the theory
29A higher level of initial health (positive H0) enables a higher level of earnings (the production
benet of health), thereby raising life-time earnings and lowering the shadow price of wealth (negative
qA
0;H). A higher level of health would thus increase the level of health investment through its eect on
wealth. This wealth eect is however a second order-eect in the sense that it operates through the eect
of health on wealth, and therefore omitted from (4.26).
30The marginal cost of health investment increases with health investment for a DRTS health produc-
tion process (i.e., (@I=@I)jI0;H0 > 0) and with the wage rate (opportunity cost of investing in health
and not working) which potentially increases with health (healthy individuals are more productive; i.e.,
(@I=@H)jI0;H0 > 0). Diminishing marginal production benet of health implies (@'H=@H)jH0 < 0 and
diminishing marginal consumption benet (utility) of health implies @2U=@H2jC0;H0 < 0.122 Chapter 4
Figure 4.4: Dierences in initial health.
 
 
0 I 0 I →















HH IH q σϕ −
( )( )
0 0, 0 0
0 0, , H
AA
HHH IIHH qqσϕ
+∆ +∆ +∆ −
Notes: Marginal consumption @U=@H and marginal production benet 'H of health versus the user cost
of health capital at the margin H as a function of initial health investment I0.
predicts a negative relation between health and health investment in cross-section (see for
more details section 4.3.3). This addresses the criticism by Zweifel and Breyer (1997).
4.3.3 Structural equations
Empirical tests of health production models have thus far been based on structural and
reduced form equations derived under the assumption of a CRTS health production pro-
cess.31 Because these structural and reduced form relations suer from the issue of the
indeterminacy of health investment (see section 4.3.1), I derive in this section structural
relations for the DRTS health production process presented in this paper.
Simple functional forms
In order to obtain expressions suitable for empirical testing we have to assume functional
forms for model functions and parameters that cannot be observed directly, such as the
health investment production process It and the biological aging rate dt.












31E.g., Grossman (1972a), Wagsta (1986a), van Doorslaer (1987), Leu and Gern (1992), Nocera and
Zweifel (1998), Erbsland, Ried and Ulrich (2002).4.3 A DRTS health production process 123
where  (0    1) is the relative \share" of consumption versus health and  ( > 0) the
coecient of relative risk aversion. This functional form can account for the observation
that the marginal utility of consumption declines as health deteriorates (e.g., Finkelstein,
Luttmer and Notowidigdo, 2008) which would rule out strongly separable functional forms
for the utility function, where the marginal utility of consumption is independent of health.








where  > 0 so that sick time decreases with health. This choice of functional form has
the properties limHt!1 st = 0 and limHt#Hmin st = 
, where 
 is the total time budget as
in (4.4).












Investment in medical care It is assumed to be produced by combining own time and
goods/services purchased in the market according to a Cobb-Douglas CRTS production






where It is an eciency factor and 1   kI and kI are the elasticities of investment in
health It with respect to goods and services mt purchased in the market (e.g., medical
care) and with respect to own-time It, respectively.
Analagously, consumption Ct is assumed to be produced by combining own time and







where Ct is an eciency factor and 1   kC and kC are the elasticities of consumption
Ct with respect to goods and services Xt purchased in the market and with respect to
own-time Ct, respectively.
Following Grossman (1972a, 1972b, 2000) I assume that the more educated are more
ecient consumers and producers of health investment (based on the interpretation of
education as a productivity factor in own time inputs and in identifying and seeking
eective care)
It = I0e
IE; (4.32)124 Chapter 4
where E is the level of education (e.g., years of schooling) and I is a constant.
Further, following Galama and van Kippersluis (2010) I assume a Mincer-type wage





where education E is expressed in years of schooling, xt is years of working experience,
and w, x and x2 are constants, assumed to be positive.
Lastly, following Wagsta (1986a) and Cropper (1981) I assume the biological aging
rate dt to be of the form
dt = de
tt+t; (4.34)
where d  d0e 0 and t is a vector of environmental variables (e.g., working and living
conditions, hazardous environment, etc) that aect the biological aging rate. The vector
t may include other exogenous variables that aect the biological aging rate, such as
education (Muurinen, 1982).
Structural relation between health and medical care
A structural relation for the demand for medical goods and services mt can be obtained
from the rst-order conditions for health investment (4.15) and for consumption (4.18)
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and the following constants
b2
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1 +    

; (4.42)
where the subscript i indexes the ith individual, and where the notation e ft is used to
denote the relative change e ft  1  
ft 1
ft in a function ft. Further, I have assumed small4.3 A DRTS health production process 125
relative changes (much smaller than one) in the price of medical care g pmit, wages f wit and
the eciency of the health investment process f Iit and, for simplicity, assumed a constant
discount factor t =  and constant rate of return to capital t = .
A similar expression for own-time inputs Iit can be obtained using (4.83). Further,
one can substitute the expression (4.33) for the wage rate wit to obtain an expression in
terms of years of schooling Ei and years of experience xit.
Pure investment and pure consumption models
Analytical solutions to the Grossman model are usually based on two sub-models (1) the
\pure investment" model in which the restriction @Ut=@Ht = 0 is imposed and (2) the
\pure consumption" model in which the restriction @Yt=@Ht = 0 is imposed. In this
section I explore the characteristics of these two sub models for the following reasons.
First, the two sub models represent two essential characteristics of health: health as a
means to produce (investment) and health as a means to provide utility (consumption)
and exploring them separately provides insight into these two distinct properties of health.
Second, these restrictions allow one to obtain linearized structural expressions. Last, the
two sub-models are widely used in the health production literature and exploring them
allows for comparisons with previous research.
In the pure investment model health does not provide utility and hence  = 1 (see
equation 4.27) and b2
it = 0, whereas in the pure consumption model health does not pro-
vide a production benet and hence 'Hit = 0 and b3
it = 0. We can obtain a structural
linear relation for the demand for health investment goods / services mit in the pure
investment and pure consumption models as follows.
Pure investment
For small f mit and b2
it = 0 we have (see equation 4.35)
(1   )lnmit  lnb3
it   lnb1
it   (1 + )lnHit;
= lnb3
   (1 + )lnHit + IEi   (1   kI)lnpmit + (1   kI)lnwit




   (1   kI) g pmit   kI f wit
detti+it

: (4.43)126 Chapter 4
Pure consumption
For small f mit and b3
it = 0 we have (see equation 4.35)
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It is customary to assume that the term lnd in equations (4.43) and (4.44) is an error
term with zero mean and constant variance 1(t)   lnd (as in Wagsta, 1986a, and
Grossman, 1972a, 1972b, 2000) and that the term ln[1 + t=dt   f It=dt] (the last term in
equations 4.43 and 4.44) is small or constant (see, e.g., Grossman, 1972a, 2000),32 or that
it is time dependent ln[1 + t=dt   f It=dt] / t (e.g., Wagsta, 1986a).
Reduced form relations
The solution for the health stock Ht follows from the dynamic equation (4.2) and using




















(1   dk); (4.45)
where I have suppressed the index i for the individual.
The health stock Ht is a function of past levels of consumption of medical goods /
services mj (j  t   1) and past biological aging rates dj (j  t   1). In principle one
can obtain reduced form expressions for the health stock Ht
33 and for the demand for
medical goods / services mt.34 This excercise, however, results in complex expressions
with arguably limited value for empirical analyses. The reduced form solutions for the
health stock Ht and the demand for medical goods / services mt are functions of the
32This would require that the rate of return to capital t and changes in the wage rate wt and the
price pmt and eciency It of health investment goods/services in producing health investment are much
smaller than the health deterioration rate dt or that such changes follow the same pattern as changes in
dt (so that the term is approximately constant).
33Substitute the solutions for past consumption of medical goods / services mj (j  t   1) obtained
from (4.35) in (4.45) and recursively substitute the expression for the health stock (4.45) for past values
of the health stock to obtain an expression for the health stock from which past levels of the health stock
Hj (j  t   1) and past values of consumption of medical goods / services mj (j  t   1) are removed
(with the exception of initial health H0).
34Use (4.35) and recursively substitute the expression for the health stock (4.45) to obtain an expression
from which past consumption of medical goods / services mj (j  t   1) and past levels of the health
stock Hj (j  t   1) are removed (again with the exception of initial health H0).4.3 A DRTS health production process 127
initial health stock H0, wealth qA
0 (endowed assets and life-time earnings) and the history
of past prices of medical care pms, past prices of consumption goods / services pXs, past
wage rates ws, past biological aging rates ds and past rates of return to capital s (s < t).
In addition, the demand for medical goods / services is also a function of the current price
of medical care pmt, the current price of consumption goods / services pXt, the current
wage rate wt, the current biological aging rate dt and the current rate of return to capital
t (the health stock does not depend on current values).
Discussion
The structural form (4.35) of the rst order condition for health investment describes a
direct relationship between the demand for health investment goods / services mt (e.g.,
medical care), the relative change in the demand for health investment goods / services f mt
and the health stock Ht. For slow changes in the demand for health investment goods /
services with time (small f mt), the demand for health investment goods / services mt falls
with the level of health Ht. This is further reected in the elasticity of health investment
goods / services with respect to health Ht, which, for small f mt, is negative (and a function



























where I have suppressed the index i for the individual. Similarly, the elasticity of health















are negative, where the labels PI and PC refer to the pure investment and pure consump-
tion model, respectively. In other words, I nd that the less healthy demand more and
the healthy demand less medical goods / services. This prediction from the theoretical
model is in line with what has been observed in numerous empirical studies and addresses
the criticism by Zweifel and Breyer (1997).
Assuming that both medical goods / services mt and time input It increase health
investment suggests 0  kI  1 (see equation 4.30), and if education E increases the128 Chapter 4
eciency of medical care then I > 0 (see equation 4.32). Similarly we have 0  kC  1
(see equation 4.31).
For these assumptions and small changes f mt, the demand for health investment
goods/services mt (see relations 4.35 and 4.36) decreases with the biological aging rate
dt (and hence with environmental factors that are detrimental to health t), the rate
of return to capital t (an opportunity cost { individuals can invest in health or in the
stock market) and increases with price increases f pmt and wage increases e wt (it is better
to invest in health now when prices pmt and the opportunity cost of time wt are higher in
the future). In addition, due to the consumption aspect of health (health provides utility)
the demand for health investment goods/services mt (see relations 4.35 and 4.37 or 4.44)
increases with wealth qA
0
 1 (the shadow price of wealth is a decreasing function of wealth
and life-time earnings),35 education E (through assumed greater eciency of health in-
vestment with the level of education) and decreases with the price of health investment
goods/services pmt. For  < 1 the demand for health investment goods/services mt
decreases with the price of consumption goods/services pXt (for  > 1 it increases) and
with the wage rate wt (opportunity cost of time) (for  > 1 the eect of the wage rate wt
is ambiguous)). And, due to the production aspect of health (health increases earnings)
the demand for health investment goods/services mt (see relations 4.35 and 4.38 or 4.43)
increases with education E (through assumed greater eciency of health investment with
the level of education) and the wage rate wt (a higher wage rate increases the marginal
production benet of health, and this outweighs the opportunity cost of time associated
with health investment) and decreases with the price of health investment goods/services
pmt.
The above discussion masks important eects of earnings and education. In our model
of perfect certainty an evolutionary wage change (along an individual's wage prole) does
not aect the shadow price of wealth qA
0 as the change is fully anticipated by the individual.
Thus comparing panel data for a single individual may reveal a higher wage rate wt to
be associated with a lower demand for medical goods / services mt due to a higher
opportunity cost of time. However, comparing across individuals, those who currently
have a higher wage rate will in most cases also have higher life-time earnings and thus
35In principle, an expression for the shadow price of wealth qA
0 can be obtained by using the life-time
budget constraint (which follows from integrating the dynamic equation 4.3), substituting the solutions
for consumption goods/services Xt, health Ht, and health investment goods/services mt and solving for
qA
0 (see, for example, Galama et al. 2008). In practice, the shadow price of wealth qA
0 cannot be solved
analytically: it is a very complicated function of the shadow price of health qHt, wealth (assets), education
E and earnings, wages wt, prices pmt, pXt, and health deterioration rates (terms d, t and ) over the
life cycle.4.3 A DRTS health production process 129
a lower shadow price of wealth qA
0 . This wealth eect increases the demand for medical
goods / services and competes with the opportunity cost of time eect. Similarly, to
account for the eect of education it is important not only to consider the possible eect
of a higher eciency of health investment (the parameter I), as in the structural relations
(4.35), (4.43) and (4.44), but also the eect that education has on earnings (opportunity
cost of time eect; see equation 4.33) and in turn on wealth (wealth eect). Plausibly,
the wealth eect dominates the opportunity cost eect. For example, Dustmann and
Windmeijer (2000) and Contoyannis et al. (2004) nd a positive eect on health from
a permanent wage increase and a negative eect from a transitory wage increase. We
expect then that the eect of education and earnings is to increase the demand for health
investment goods / services through a wealth eect that may dominate the opportunity
cost of time eect associated with higher earnings.36
Thus, in testing the theory it will be important to account for wealth. This can be done
by employing measures of wealth (endowed assets, life-time earnings) as proxies for the
shadow price of wealth qA
0 or, following Wagsta (1986a), by utilizing an approximation
for qA
0 (his equations 15 and 16).
4.3.4 Numerical simulations
In this section I present simulations of the model with a DRTS health production process
and a simple step process. I rst discuss the step process for xed length of life (section
4.3.4). I then illustrate the properties of the model with numerical simulations accounting
for endogenous length of life (section 4.3.4).
Step process and xed length of life
We start with the initial condition for health H0. Initial consumption C0 then follows
from the rst-order condition for consumption (4.18), which, for the assumed functional
















36Further, one may be tempted to conclude that individuals invest less in health care during middle
and old age because of the high opportunity cost of time associated with high earnings at these ages
(see equation 4.33). However, as health deteriorates with age the demand for curative care increases
(see sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). If the latter eect dominates, the model is capable of reproducing the
observation that young individuals invest little, the middle-aged invest more and the elderly invest most
in curative care.130 Chapter 4
where Ct is given by (4.19). Initial consumption C0 is a function of initial health H0, the
price of goods and services pX0, the wage rate w0 (the opportunity cost of not working) and
the shadow price of wealth qA
0 . Next, the initial level of health investment I0 follows from
the initial marginal cost of curative care I0 (see expression 4.12) which is a function of
the Lagrange multiplier qH
0 and the shadow price of wealth qA
0 (I0 = qA
0 =qH
0 ; see equations
4.59 and 4.60). The initial level of health investment I0 is (through the initial marginal
cost of curative care I0) a function of the price of goods and services pm0, the wage rate
w0, education E, and the multipliers qA
0 and qH
0 . Thus, given exogenous education, prices
and wage rates, the initial level of health investment I0 and the initial level of consumption
C0 are functions of the endogenous Lagrange multipliers qA
0 and qH
0 .
Health in the next period H1 is determined by the dynamic equation (4.2). Assets
in the next period A1 follow from the initial condition for assets A0 and the dynamic
equation for assets (4.3). For the assumed functional forms in section 4.3.3 we have


















Ct are dened in (4.28), (4.82), (4.83), (4.85) and (4.86).
Consumption C1 follows from the rst-order condition for consumption (4.49), health
investment I1 follows from the rst-order condition for health investment (4.11), (4.13),




















Health H2 and assets A2 in the next period are determined by the dynamic equations
(4.2) and (4.50) and so on. The solutions for consumption Ct, health Ht and health
investment It for every period t are functions of the two Lagrange multipliers qA
0 and qH
0 .
In the nal period, the two end conditions for the nal level of health HT = Hmin and the
nal level of assets AT determine the Lagrange multipliers qA
0 and qH
0 .37
Some have argued that length of life is determined in an iterative process by the
condition that health at the end of life HT equal the minimum health stock Hmin (e.g.,
Grossman, 1998; Reid, 1998). These results are however based on a CRTS health pro-
duction process and are the result of the indeterminacy of health investment. The results
do not hold for a DRTS health production process as advocated here. This can be seen
as follows. As the preceding discussion shows, the end conditions HT = Hmin and AT are
37Alternatively one could start with the nal period t = T   1 and use recursive back substitution.
Reaching the initial period, the two initial conditions for health H0 and assets A0 determine the Lagrange
multipliers qA
0 and qH
T 1.4.3 A DRTS health production process 131
met for xed length of life T because the solutions for assets, consumption, health and
health investment (and having used the initial conditions H0 and A0) are functions of the
Lagrange multipliers qA
0 and qH
0 . Applying the end conditions AT and HT determines the
Lagrange multipliers qA
0 and qH
0 for xed T. Thus, in the health production literature,
as pointed out by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990), length of life T is exogenous (xed) in the
absence of the required terminal (transversality) condition.
Simulations with endogenous mortality
In this section I simulate the model for a particular set of parameter values. The purpose
of this exercise is to illustrate some properties of the model. Other parameter choices are
possible and a full exploration of the model's properties would require exploring a wide
range of parameter values. Ultimately one would like to estimate the model with panel
data to test its ability to describe human behavior. This is beyond the scope of this paper.
Figure 4.5 shows the results of model simulations using the step process and equations
presented in the above section 4.3.4. In the simulations I have used a period step size of
one tenth of a year and assumed annual wages of the form
wt = 10e
f1:3138310 3[70(t 20) (t 20)2]g $ (thousands); (4.52)
starting at age t = 20 when the individual begins work life until she retires at a xed
retirement age R = 65. This Mincer-type wage equation starts with annual wages of
$ 10;000 per year at age t = 20 and peaks at $ 50;000 per year at age t = 55 after
which it gradualy declines till the age of retirement R = 65 after which wages wt are
zero. In addition I use the following parameters:  = 0:5,  = 10 (sick time increases
signicantly only upon approaching end of life, i.e., as Ht approaches Hmin),38 H0 = 100,
HT  Hmin = 15, A0 = AT = 0 $ (thousands) (no bequests), 
 = 0:1 year (the total time
available in a period equals the time step size), kI = kC = 0 (health investment It and
consumption Ct consist of purchases in the market, no own time inputs),39 pmt = 0:2 $ per
medical good/service unit, pXt = 0:2 $ per consumption good/service unit, It = 0:01,
Ct = 1,  = 0:8,  = 0:95 (high relative \weight" of consumption versus health in
38Note that this choice of  allows for a \realistic" relation between health and sick time but does not
give rise to large medical expenditures near the end of life. The parameter  aects sick time, not health,
and individuals decide on the level of health investment based on the utility that health provides (note
that after retirement there is no production benet of health).
39This simplication helps avoid corner solutions in which the time budget constraint is not satised.
This is because for this choice healthy time ht = 
   st is always positive after retirement, even as st
approaches 
 as Ht approaches Hmin. After retirement income Yt and time spend working wt are zero.
Further, for kI = kC = 0 no time is devoted to health investment It = 0 or to consumption Ct = 0.132 Chapter 4
Figure 4.5: Simulated proles for health, assets, health investment, consumption, healthy
time and earnings.


















































Notes: Health (H(t); top-left panel), assets (A(t); $ thousands; top-right panel), health investment (I(t);
center-left panel), consumption (C(t); center-right panel), healthy time (h(t); fraction of total time 
;
bottom-left panel), annual earnings (Y (t); $ thousands per year; bottom-right panel).
providing utility), a constant aging rate dt = d0 = 0:06 (per year), a constant return to
capital t = 0 = 0:03 (per year) and a constant subjective discount factor t = 0 = 0:03
(per year).
I start with the initial values for health H0 and assets A0 and employ the Nelder-Mead
method (also called the downhill simplex or amoeba method; Nelder and Mead, 1965) to
iteratively determine the shadow price of wealth qA
0 and of health qH
0 that satisfy the4.3 A DRTS health production process 133
end conditions AT and HT. I use the usual values NM = 1, NM = 2, NM = 0:5 and
NM = 0:5 for the Nelder-Mead reection, expansion, contraction and shrink coecients,
respectively.
Optimal length of life is determined by maximizing the \indirect utility function" VT
(4.10) with respect to length of life T. I nd T = 82:0 years.
Health Ht (top-left panel of Figure 4.5) gradually declines with age t and life ends
at age T = 82:0 years. Health deteriorates somewhat slower during the ages 50 to 65,
coinciding with increased levels of health investment It (center-left panel of Figure 4.5).
The demand for health investment consists of two components. The rst component is
driven by the production benet of health and follows a hump shaped pattern similar to
the earnings prole Yt (bottom-right panel of Figure 4.5). Health investment serves to
maintain health in order to reduce sick time and hence increase earnings Yt. Because of
the parameter choice kI = 0 there is no opportunity cost of time as the individual does
not spend own-time on health investment. As a result, the production benet of health
is roughly proportional to the wage prole (equation 4.52). The second component is
driven by the desire of individuals to be healthy (consumption benet) and to live long
lives (increases life-time utility). This component gradually increases with age. Thus the
simulation suggests that solutions are feasible in which health investment increases near
the end of life.
One possible explanation for the gradual rise in health investment near the end of
life is that the simulations suggest that optimal length of life, at least for this set of
parameters, coincides with the condition that the change in the health stock with age
equal zero at the end of the last period. If the rate of change were positive, health would
be below Hmin some time before it eventually returned to Hmin at the end of the last
period T   1, a condition that is not allowed since length of life is dened by the rst
time an individual's health reaches Hmin.40 If the rate of change were negative, adding
a period extends life and provides additional utility (again, for this set of parameters).
Thus as individuals approach end of life they slow their eective rate of change in health
(Ht+1   Ht approaches zero) through more and more health investment.
At a price pmt = 0:2 $ per medical good/services unit her expenditures on health
investment goods/services pmtmt peak at about $ 1,800 per year at around age 55. The
fact that such humped-shape proles are generally not observed in medical expenditure
data sets, at least not as sizeable as the simulation shows, suggests that the production
40To the best of my knowledge the health production literature has failed to observe that the opti-
mization problem allows for solutions where the health stock falls below Hmin before the end of life. I
explicitly discard such solutions in the numerical simulations.134 Chapter 4
benet of health (compared to the consumption benet of health) may be smaller in real
life than is simulated. Again, the simulations are to illustrate the model's characteristics
and attempts to estimate the model are left to future research.
The individual's assets At (top-right panel in Figure 4.5) initially deplete till about age
50 as she borrows to fund her consumption Ct (center-right panel of Figure 4.5) and health
investment It needs. She builds up savings between ages 50 and the age of retirement (65)
and depletes these savings by end of life. Consumption is relatively constant with age. At
a price pXt = 0:2 $ per consumption good/service unit her expenditures on consumption
goods/services pXtXt are about $ 28,000 per year.
Healthy time ht (bottom-left panel of Figure 4.5) starts to decline rapidly around the
age of retirement. While some of this can be explained by a drop in health investment It
following retirement, this is mostly due to the steep functional relation assumed between
health Ht and sick time st (equation 4.28 for  = 10).
The simulations further show that solutions are feasible for which the biological aging
rate is constant, despite the common perception that the biological aging rate needs to
increase with age in order to ensure that health falls with age and life is nite (e.g.,
Grossman, 1972a, 2000; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Case and Deaton, 2005).
4.4 Discussion and conclusions
I have presented a theory of the demand for health, health investment and longevity,
building on the human capital framework for health, in particular the work by Grossman
(1972a, 1972b) and Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and related literatures.
My contribution to the health production literature is as follows. First, I argue for a
dierent interpretation of the health stock equilibrium condition, one of the most central
relations in the health production literature: this relation determines the optimal level
of health investment (not the health stock), conditional on the level of the health stock.
Consistently employing the alternative interpretation allows me to simplify the theory
and develop the health production literature further than was previously possible. This
is because the equilibrium condition for the health stock (4.15) is of a much simpler form
than the condition (4.11) which is typically utilized to determine the optimal level of
health investment. There are several implications of this interpretation that I discuss in
more detail below.
Second, the alternative interpretation of the rst-order condition necesitates DRTS
in the health production process or no solution for health investment exists. I therefore
revisit the debate on the indeterminacy of health investment under the widely used as-4.4 Discussion and conclusions 135
sumption in the health production literature of a CRTS health production process and
show that under this assumption the rst-order condition for health investment (4.11 or
4.15) is not a function of health investment, and thus health investment is not determined.
This widely used assumption represents a degenerate case with problematic properties.
While this is no new result (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990) I provide intuitive, less technical
and additional arguments in its support. Revisiting this debate is important because the
implications of the indeterminacy are signicant and because the debate does not appear
to have settled in favor of a DRTS health production process as illustrated by its lack of
use in the health production literature. Besides technical reasons that suggest a CRTS
health production process is restrictive, the dierent experiences of developing and de-
veloped countries suggest that the economic principle of eventually diminishing returns
applies to health production. Quite modest increases in expenditures on health input
(food, sanitation) have relatively large impacts on health in the developing world whereas
large increases in resources in the developed world have a relatively modest impact on
health (e.g., Wagsta, 1986b).
Third, I explore in detail the implications of the alternative interpretation of the
rst-order condition and of the properties of a DRTS health production process. In
particular the simpler form (4.15) allows me to utilize a stylized representation of the
rst-order condition for health investment to obtain an intuitive understanding of its
properties. I nd that for a DRTS health production process and the usual assumptions of
diminishing marginal utility and diminishing marginal benets a unique optimal solution
for health investment exists (i.e., the indeterminacy is removed). The optimal level of
health investment decreases with the user cost of health capital (i.e., with the price of
medical goods / services, the wage rate [the opportunity cost of not working], the biological
aging rate and the return to capital [the opportunity cost of investing in, e.g., the stock
market rather than in health]) and increases with wealth (endowed assets and life-time
earnings) and with the marginal consumption and marginal production benet of health
(because both are decreasing in health, the demand for health investment decreases with
health).
Further, I nd that for every level of the health stock a unique optimal level of health
investment exists. Thus I nd no support for the concept of an \optimal" level of the
health stock as utilized in the health production literature, in particular the notion that
individuals may seek to adjust their health to this \optimal" level in case their health
deviates from it. I nd that individuals do not aspire to a certain level of health. Instead,
given any level of their health stock, individuals decide about the optimal level of health
investment. Thus one does not need to assume that any discrepancy between the actual136 Chapter 4
and the \desired" health stock is dissipated instantaneously and on a continual basis.41
Theoretically there is no justication for the assumption of a continual adjustment process
and empirical work by Wagsta (1993) suggests non-instantaneous adjustment better
describes the health production process.
The simpler form of the rst-order condition for health investment (4.15) allows me
to investigate the eect of changes in initial conditions such as initial assets, initial health
and education on the level of health investment and consumption by studying the eect
of variations on the optimal solutions (see section 4.3.2). I nd that the wealthy and
more educated invest more in health and that their health deteriorates at a slower pace.
As a result, given similar initial health endowments, they remain healthier as they age
and live longer. Not only does this conrm the directional predictions made earlier by
Ehrlich and Chuma's (1990) analysis, but the relations I derive in section 4.3.2 also allow
for an understanding of the underlying mechanisms that lead to the predicted outcome.
Calbrated simulations by Ehrlich and Yin (2005) of a related model (Ehrlich, 2000) which
treats length of life as uncertain, and life expectancy as partly the product of individuals'
eorts to self-protect against mortality and morbidity risks also nds that greater endowed
wealth and higher wages over the life cycle increase life expectancy.
Further, I nd a negative relation (in cross-section) between health and the level of
health investment: the healthy demand fewer medical goods / services than the less
healthy. This is an important new result that addresses a signicant critique of health
production models by Zweifel and Breyer (1997; see for more details below).
The simpler form of the rst-order condition for health investment (4.15) also allows
me to derive structural relations between health and health investment (e.g., medical
care) that are suitable for empirical testing. These structural relations contain the CRTS
41For the CRTS health production process the model is characterised by a so-called \bang-bang"
solution as one has to assume that in the rst period individuals adjust their health to its \optimal" level
by investing a large positive or negative (depending on the direction of the adjustment) amount of medical
care (or other forms of health investment; e.g., Wolfe, 1985; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Grossman, 2000).
But even if the health stock is at the \desired" level, health investment (and with it the health stock; see
equation 4.2) is still undetermined as any level of investment is allowed (see discussion in section 4.3.1).
Further, even if at some age t an individual's health stock is at the \desired" level H
t , it is not guaranteed
that the health stock will subsequently evolve along this particular health path H
s (ages s > t) because
for a given level of health both the marginal benet of health @Ut=@Ht and the cost of maintaining the
health stock qA
0 (Ht 'Ht) are determined by exogenous parameters and there is no mechanism to ensure
that the two are equal. Thus in a formulation with a CRTS health production process one has to assume
that any discrepancy between the actual and the \desired" health stock is dissipated not just once but
on a continual basis.4.4 Discussion and conclusions 137
health production process as a special case, thereby allowing empirical tests to verify or
disproof this common assumption in the health production literature.
Finally, I show that for a DRTS health production process length of life is not endoge-
nously determined and that an additional condition for optimal length of life is needed
(see also, Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1987; Kirk, 1970). I nu-
merically solve the model to properly include the role of endogenous length of life. These
simulations show that for plausible parameters health investment increases near the end
of life and that length of life is nite as a result of limited life-time resources (the budget
constraint) and if medical technology cannot fully oset biological aging.
Thus I nd that a DRTS health production process addresses ve consistent criticisms
of the characteristics and predictions of health production models that have been made
in the literature. First, as Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) have also shown, by introducing
DRTS in the health production process the indeterminacy problem of health investment
is addressed.
Second, I have shown that a DRTS health production process is capable of reproducing
the observed negative relation between health and the demand for medical care (sections
4.3.2 and 4.3.3), addressing the criticism by e.g. Wagsta (1986a) and Zweifel and Breyer
(1997). This result follows directly from the rst-order condition for health investment
(as one would expect for such a fundamental feature of the demand for medical care). A
CRTS health production process, on the other hand, predicts that the relation between
health and investment in health is positive. In other words, the healthy are those that
invest more in health (e.g., equation 13 in Wagsta, 1986a; see also Galama and Kapteyn,
2009). Empirical studies strongly reject this prediction: the negative relationship between
health and medical care is found to be the most statistically signicant of any relationship
between medical care and any of the independent variables in several empirical studies
(see, e.g., Grossman, 1972a; Wagsta, 1986a, 1993; Leu and Doppman, 1986; Leu and
Gern, 1992; van Doorslaer, 1987; Van de Ven and van der Gaag, 1982; Erbsland, Ried
and Ulrich, 2002).42
42Grossman (2000; pp. 369-370) shows that the model does not always produce the incorrect sign for
the relationship between health and investment in medical care. For the pure investment model and
assuming that the biological aging rate dt increases with age (a necessary assumption for the health stock
to decline with age in a CRTS formulation), he nds that investment in medical care increases with age
while the health stock falls with age if the elasticity of the marginal production benet of health with
respect to health is less than one (Grossman refers to this as the MEC schedule). The requirement that
the biological aging rate increase with age is another artifact of the indeterminacy of health investment.
I do not have to rely on characteristics of exogenous functions such as the biological aging rate (apart138 Chapter 4
Third, Case and Deaton (2005) argue that while health production models can explain
dierences in the level of health between socioeconomic status (SES) groups they cannot
explain dierences in the rate of health deterioration between SES groups. In other
words, health production models cannot account for the observed widening of disparities
in health by SES with age. In section 4.3.2 I show that for a DRTS health production
process the wealthy and more educated invest more in health and consume more and
that their health deteriorates at a slower pace.43 As a result, given similar initial health
endowments, they remain healthier as they age and live longer. It is plausible that as the
disparity in health widens the deteriorating health of low-SES individuals induces them
to begin to invest more in health than their high-SES peers (e.g., due to the negative
relation between health and investment in health). Thus the model could reproduce both
the observed initial widening and the subsequent narrowing of the SES health gradient.
Fourth, Usher (1975) has pointed to the lack of \memory" in health production model
solutions (e.g., Usher 1975, p. 220).44 Casual observation and introspection suggests
that our health depends on initial and past conditions: healthy individuals are those that
began life healthy and that have invested in health over time. Indeed, in the alternative
interpretation of the rst-order condition presented here, health is not determined by the
condition for \optimal" health (4.15) but by the dynamic equation (4.2), which can be
written (using 4.5) in the form (4.21). Thus, the solution for the health stock Ht is a
function of the initial health stock H0 and the history of past health investments Is and
past biological aging rates ds (s < t). As a result I nd the health stock to be a complex
function of the initial health stock H0, initial assets A0, education E and the entire history
of prices, wages and environmental conditions (see the discussion in section 4.3.3).
from assuming that aging is detrimental to health, i.e. dt > 0) to obtain a negative relation between
health and health investment or to ensure that life is nite (see the criticism by Case and Deaton, 2005).
43For a CRTS health production process, however, the eective health deterioration rate @Ht=@t de-
pends on the rate of the biological aging rate @dt=@t (another artifact of the indeterminacy of health
investment). Thus if low SES individuals have more rapidly increasing aging rates @dt=@t a model with
a CRTS health production process could reproduce the observed widening of health disparities by SES.
It seems plausible that the aging process dt is more rapid for low SES individuals through, e.g., environ-
mental factors such as detrimental living and working conditions, but it is not a priori clear that low SES
individuals also have faster rates of the biological aging rate @dt=@t (e.g., Case and Deaton, 2005).
44The structural- and reduced-form solutions for health Ht and the reduced-form solution for health in-
vestment It and the demand for medical goods / services mt derived and utilized in the health production
literature are functions only of current parameter values (e.g., equations 4-2, 4-6 and 4-7 in Grossman,
1972a; equations 42, 45 and 46 in Grossman, 2000; equations 11, 12 and 14 in Wagsta, 1986a; see also
Galama and Kapteyn, 2009). Initial and past conditions appear to have been \forgotten".4.4 Discussion and conclusions 139
Fifth, Case and Deaton (2005) note that in the health production literature \ ...if the
rate of biological aging is constant, which is perhaps implausible but is hardly impossible,
(and if the interest rate is as least as large as the rate of time preference), people will
\choose" an innite life ..."45 Thus, to ensure that life is nite and health falls with age
it is necessary to assume that the biological aging rate increases with age (@dt=@t > 0).
In the interpretation of the theory presented here, however, it is not required that the
biological aging rate dt increase with age in order for health to decrease with age and in
order for life to be nite. This follows intuitively from the dynamic relation (4.2; or in
alternative form: equation 4.21) for health. If medical technology cannot fully repair the
health of individuals for certain diseases (e.g., low eciency of medical care will result in
small It) then the health stock will decrease with age. Solutions are possible not only for a
biological aging rate that increases with age, but also for constant or decreasing biological
aging rates with age. The numerical simulations in section 4.3.4 provide an illustration
based on a constant biological aging rate with age. This addresses the criticism by Case
and Deaton (2005) that health production models are characterized by complete health
repair.
In sum, I nd health investment to be a decreasing function of health, that the health
of wealthy individuals declines more slowly and that they live longer, that current health
status is a function of the initial level of health and the histories of prior health investments
made, that health investment rapidly increases near the end of life and that length of life
is nite as a result of limited life-time resources (the budget constraint) and if medical
technology cannot fully oset biological aging. I nd no support for the common notion
that individuals aspire to a certain \optimal" level of the health stock. Rather, given any
level of their health stock, individuals decide about the optimal level of health investment.
Empirical estimation of the model is needed to test the assumptions and the theoretical
predictions presented in this work and to contrast these with the predictions of alternative
health production models. To this end I have provided structural form relations in section
4.3.3.
45For a constant biological aging rate health decreases with age only if the time preference rate t
exceeds the return to capital t (and increases if the reverse is true). This follows from the rst-order
condition (4.15) if interpreted as a condition for the \optimal" level of the health stock. See also equation
13 in Grossman, 1972b, equation 11 in Grossman, 2000, or equation 6 in Case and Deaton (2005).140 Chapter 4
4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 First-order conditions




















































































































































































Combining (4.59) or (4.60) with (4.55) we obtain the rst-order condition for health
investment (see equations 4.11 and 4.13). The rst-order condition for consumption Ct is
provided by equation (4.57) or (4.58) (see equation 4.18).
4.5.2 Mathematical equivalency of rst-order conditions
Taking the dierence between period t and t   1 of either expression (4.11) or (4.13) one
arrives at (4.14) and (4.15). In other words
(4:11) ) (4:15); (4.61)
(4:13) ) (4:15): (4.62)
Using recursive backward or forward substitution of relation (4.14) (which is equivalent
to expression 4.15) one arrives at (4.11) or (4.13). Thus we have
(4:11) ( (4:15); (4.63)
(4:13) ( (4:15): (4.64)142 Chapter 4
Naturally, this result is also true in a continuous time formulation. In this case the

























































Dierentiating (4.65) or (4.66) with respect to t one obtains
@U(t)
@H(t)
= qA(0)[H(t)   'H(t)]e
R t
0[(s) (s)]ds: (4.67)
Notation follows the discussion in section 4.2.
Using the Leibniz integral rule to dierentiate (analogous to taking the dierence
between two time periods in discrete time) the rst-order condition for health investment
(4.65) or the alternative expression (4.66) with respect to t one obtains the alternative
expression (4.67). In other words
(4:65) ) (4:67); (4.68)
(4:66) ) (4:67): (4.69)
From (4.67) we obtain a rst-order dierential equation in I(t)
@I(t)
@t






























For t0 = 0 we obtain (4.65) and for t0 = T we obtain (4.66). Thus we have
(4:65) ( (4:67); (4.72)
(4:66) ( (4:67): (4.73)4.5 Appendix 143
4.5.3 Variation in initial assets




































































It;Ht (dt + t)
HjIt;Ht   'HjHt
It;A; (4.75)
where I have omitted second-order terms.46





































































Last, combining (4.75) with (4.77) to eliminate Ct;A we obtain (4.24).
46Such as, e.g., terms in (@I=@I)jIt;Ht It;A and qA
0;A(@I=@H)jIt;Ht Ht;A.144 Chapter 4
4.5.4 Structural relations for empirical testing
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j=1(1 + j) 1= ; (4.80)
where  and  are dened in (4.41) and (4.42).









































t It  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ItIt: (4.83)




































t Ct  

CtCt: (4.86)
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where the notation e ft is used to denote the relative change e ft  1  
ft 1
ft in a function ft
and we have assumed small relative changes in the price of medical care f pmt, wages e wt
and the eciency of the health investment process f It.
Using (4.82) and (4.87) and the functional relations dened in section 4.3.3 we obtain
a structural relation (4.35) between health investment goods and services mt purchased
in the market and the stock of health Ht.Chapter 5
A Theory of Socioeconomic
Disparities in Health
Understanding of the substantial disparity in health between low and high socioeco-
nomic status (SES) groups is hampered by the lack of a suciently comprehensive
theoretical framework to interpret empirical facts and to predict yet untested rela-
tions. We present a life-cycle model that incorporates multiple mechanisms explaining
(jointly) a large part of the observed disparities in health by SES. In our model, lifestyle
factors, working conditions, retirement, living conditions and curative care are mech-
anisms through which SES, health and mortality are related. Our model predicts a
widening and possibly a subsequent narrowing with age of the gradient in health by
SES.
|||||||||||||{
This chapter is based upon:
Galama, T.J. and van Kippersluis, H. (2010), \A Theory of Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Over
the Life Cycle", RAND Working Paper, WR-773.148 Chapter 5
5.1 Introduction
Disparities in health across socioeconomic status (SES) groups { often called the SES
health gradient { are substantial. For example, Case and Deaton (2005) show how in
the United States, a 20 year old low-income (bottom quartile of family income) male,
on average, reports to be in similar health as a 60 year old high-income (top quartile)
male. In Glasgow, U.K., life expectancy of men in the most deprived areas is 54 years,
compared with 82 years in the most auent (Hanlon et al. 2006). In cross sectional data
the disparity in health between low and high SES groups appears to increase over the life
cycle until ages 50-60, after which it narrows. Similar patterns hold for other measures
of SES, such as education and wealth and other indicators of health, such as onset of
chronic diseases, disability and mortality (e.g., Adler et al. 1994; Marmot, 1999; Smith,
1999). This pattern is remarkably similar between countries with relatively low levels of
protection from loss of work and health risks, such as the U.S., and those with stronger
welfare systems, such as the Netherlands (House et al. 1994; Kunst and Mackenbach, 1994;
Preston and Elo, 1995; Smith 1999; 2004; 2007; Case and Deaton, 2005; van Kippersluis
et al. 2010).
Recent signicant contributions to the understanding of socioeconomic disparities in
health have concentrated on the identication of causal eects, but have stopped short
of uncovering the underlying mechanisms that produce the causal relationships. For
example, education is found to have a causal protective eect on health (Lleras-Muney,
2005; Oreopoulos, 2006; Silles, 2009) but it is not known exactly how the more educated
achieve their health advantage.
Understanding of the relative importance of underlying mechanisms responsible for
the observed relationships is hampered by the lack of a suciently comprehensive theory.
Case and Deaton (2005) argue that it is extremely dicult to understand the relationships
between health, education, income, wealth and labor-force status without some guiding
theoretical framework. Integrating the roles of proposed mechanisms and their long-
term eect into a theoretical framework allows researchers to disentangle the dierential
patterns of causality and assess the interaction between mechanisms. Such understanding
is essential in designing eective policies to reduce disparities (Deaton, 2002). It is no
surprise then that several authors (e.g., Case and Deaton, 2005; Cutler et al. 2011)
have pointed to the absence of a theory of SES and health over the life cycle and have
emphasized the importance of developing one.
A suitable framework in which multiple mechanisms and their cumulative long-term
eects can be studied is a structural model of SES and health over the life cycle. Case and5.1 Introduction 149
Deaton (2005) have attempted to develop a model for the role of work and consumption
behavior in explaining the SES-health gradient. Their starting point is the canonical life
cycle model of the demand for health and medical care, due to Grossman (1972a; 1972b).
Case and Deaton (2005) present a simplied Grossman model and extend the model to
include the detrimental eect of hard/risky labor and of unhealthy consumption behavior
on health. However, the authors conclude that the model is not able to explain a number
of the most salient features of the SES health gradient. For example, Case and Deaton
(2005) argue that while the model can explain dierences in the level of health between low
and high SES groups, it cannot explain dierences in the rate of health decline. In other
words, it cannot account for the widening of the SES health gradient with age through
late middle age or early late life, as is observed in empirical studies. Other problems with
some of the predictions and properties of health production models have been pointed
out in the literature (see Grossman, 2000, for a review and rebuttal of these).
The aim of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework for health and socioe-
conomic status over the life cycle. The framework includes simplied representations of
major mechanisms, which allows us to improve our understanding of their operational
roles in explaining the SES health gradient and make predictions. Our starting point is
the health production literature spawned by Grossman (Grossman, 1972a; 1972b) and the
extensions presented by Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and Case and Deaton (2005). Our
contribution is as follows. First, we address a number of issues identied with this strand
of the literature by noting that what is generally interpreted as the equilibrium condition
for health can alternatively be interpreted as the rst-order condition for health invest-
ment (as in Galama, 2011 [Chapter 4]). This interpretation necessitates the assumption
of decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRTS) in the health production function (as in Ehrlich
and Chuma, 1990), and addresses (i) the indeterminacy problem (\bang-bang" solution)
for investment in medical care (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990), (ii) the inability to reproduce
the observed negative relation between health and the demand for medical care (e.g.,
Zweifel and Breyer, 1997),1 (iii) the lack of history in the model solutions (e.g., Usher,
1975) and (iv) the lack of capacity to explain dierences in the rate of health decline
between dierent socioeconomic groups (Case and Deaton, 2005). With these essential
issues addressed our formulation can account for a greater number of observed empirical
1It is not entirely correct to assert that health production models always produce the incorrect sign
for the relationship between health and investment in curative care. For the pure investment model and
assuming that the biological aging rate increases with age, investment in curative care increases with age
while the health stock falls if the elasticity of the marginal production benet of health with respect to
health is less than one (Grossman refers to this as the MEC schedule; Grossman, 2000 [p. 369]). This
produces a negative correlation between health and medical care.150 Chapter 5
patterns and suggests that the Grossman model provides a suitable foundation for the
development of a life-cycle model of the SES-health gradient.
Yet, utilization of medical services and access to care explain only part of the associa-
tion between SES and health (e.g., Adler et al. 1993). Our second contribution is therefore
to incorporate many potential mechanisms in the model that could explain disparities in
health by SES and to include a multitude of potential bi-directional pathways between
health and dimensions of SES. One important concept in our work is \job-related health
stress", which can be interpreted broadly and can range from physical working conditions
(e.g., hard labor) to the psychosocial aspects of work (e.g., low status, limited control,
repetitive work, etc). The notion here is that job-related health stress can include any
aspect of work that is detrimental to health and as such is associated with a wage pre-
mium (a compensating wage dierential). Other important features of the model are
lifestyle factors (preventive care, healthy and unhealthy consumption), curative (medical)
care, labor force withdrawal (retirement) and mortality. The model integrates a life cycle
approach, and the concepts of nancial, education and health capital (Muurinen and Le
Grand, 1985). The focus is on understanding the SES-health gradient as the outcome of
rational (constrained) individual behavior, and the framework applies to individuals who
have completed their education and participate (or have participated) in the labor-force.
We explore the characteristics of the rst-order conditions for a xed retirement age
and a xed age of death. We nd that greater initial wealth, permanently higher earnings
(over the life cycle) and a higher level of education induce individuals to invest more
in curative and in preventive care, shift consumption toward healthy consumption, and
enable individuals to aord healthier working environments (associated with lower levels
of physical and psychosocial health stresses) and living environments. The mechanism
through which initial wealth, permanent income and education operates is by increasing
the demand for curative care and raising the marginal cost of curative care. A higher
marginal cost of curative care, in turn, increases the health benet of (and hence demand
for) preventive care and healthy consumption, and the health cost of (and hence reduced
demand for) unhealthy working and living environments, and unhealthy consumption.
Jointly these behavioral choices gradually lead to growing health advantage with age.
Further, the model predicts an initial widening and potentially a subsequent narrowing
of the SES-health gradient, as low SES individuals increase their health investment and
improve their health-related behavior faster as a result of their worse health. Results from
earlier studies (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Ehrlich, 2000; Galama et al. 2008 [Chapter
3]) suggest that the more rapidly worsening health of low SES individuals could lead to
early withdrawal from the labor force, potentially widening the gradient in early and mid5.2 Components of a model capturing the SES-health gradient 151
age, and shorter life spans, potentially narrowing the gradient in late age. Our model
thus holds promise in explaining empirical health patterns. Such a model has not been
available before and economists have highlighted the signicance of its development (e.g.,
Cutler et al. 2011; Case and Deaton, 2005).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 briey reviews the literature on health
disparities by SES to determine the essential components required in a theoretical frame-
work. The relation between SES and health is complex and developing a theory requires
simplication and a focus on the essential mechanisms relating SES and health. We high-
light potential explanations for the SES health gradient that a) explain a large part of
the gradient and b) are relatively straightforward to include in our theoretical framework.
Based on these ndings we develop our theoretical formulation. Section 5.3 presents and
discusses rst-order conditions and the characteristics of the model solutions for a xed
age of retirement and a xed age of death. The section also highlights potential mecha-
nisms through which SES and health inuence each other. In section 5.4 we summarize
and conclude.
5.2 Components of a model capturing the SES-health
gradient
In this section we review the literature to determine the essential components of a theory
of health disparities by SES. Based on these ndings we extend and rene prior work and
present our theoretical formulation.
5.2.1 Background
A signicant body of research across multiple disciplines (including epidemiology, soci-
ology, demography, psychology, evolutionary biology and economics) has been devoted
to documenting and explaining the substantial disparity in health between low and high
socioeconomic status (SES) groups. Progress has been made in recent years in charac-
terizing the relationships between the various dimensions of SES and health over the life
cycle and in understanding the relative importance and directions of causal pathways.
Epidemiological research has used longitudinal studies to examine the role of behavioral,
material, psychosocial and healthcare related pathways in explaining SES-health associ-
ations (House et al. 1990; 1994; Lynch et al. 1997; Marmot et al. 1997a; Lantz et al.
1998; Yen and Kaplan, 1999; van Oort et al. 2005; Skalicka et al. 2009). Economists have152 Chapter 5
recently re-emphasized the importance of the reverse impact of health on SES through
ability to work (Smith, 1999; 2004; 2007; Case and Deaton, 2005).
These studies suggest that education is the key dimension of SES for which there
appears to be robust evidence of a substantial causal protective eect on health. Secondly,
an important part of the health dierences by nancial indicators of SES can be explained
by the fact that bad health impinges on the ability to work, thereby reducing income.
Further, these studies highlight the importance of health behaviors (such as smoking,
drinking and exercise), curative and preventive care, psychosocial and environmental risk
factors, neighborhood social environment, acute and chronic psychosocial stress, social
relationships and supports, sense of control, fetal and early childhood conditions, and
physical, chemical, biological and psychosocial hazards and stressors at work.
Below we provide more detail on the potential role of the working environment and
lifestyle factors and the role of various potential pathways between health and SES and
vice versa.
Working environment and lifestyle factors:
Low SES individuals more often perform risky, manual labor than high SES individuals,
and their health deteriorates faster as a consequence (Marmot et al. 1997b; Schrijvers et
al. 1998; Borg and Kristensen, 2000). Case and Deaton (2005) nd that those who are
employed in manual occupations have worse health than those who work in professional
occupations and that the health eect of occupation operates at least in part indepen-
dently of the personal characteristics of the workers. Cutler et al. (2011) present similar
results using mortality as an indicator of health. Schrijvers et al. (1998) use Dutch
cross-sectional data to study the impact of working conditions on the association between
occupational class and self-reported health. Hazardous physical working conditions are
more prevalent in lower occupational classes, and this explains a substantial part (for
males up to 83 percent) of the association between health and occupational (social) class.
Extensive research further suggests an important role of lifestyle factors, particularly
smoking, in explaining SES disparities in health (Mackenbach et al. 2004; Khang et al.
2009). Fuchs (1986) even argues that in developed countries, it is personal lifestyles that
cause the greatest variation in health. Using three dierent datasets from the U.K. and
the U.S., Marmot et al. (1997a) nd that features of the psycho-social working environ-
ment, social circumstances outside work, and health behavior jointly account for much of
the social gradient in health (see also House et al. 1994). Some epidemiological studies
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explained by working environment and life style factors alone (Borg and Kristensen, 2000).
A multitude of potential pathways between health and SES and vice versa:
As Cutler et al. (2011) note, the mechanisms linking the various dimensions of SES to
health are diverse. Some cause health, some are caused by health and some are jointly
determined with health.
 Education on health: Education is found to have a causal eect on health and mor-
tality (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006; Smith, 2007; Silles, 2009). However,
Cutler et al. (2011) note that the mechanisms by which education aects health are
not well understood. While consumption behavior and curative and preventive care
can partly explain the eect of education on health, it remains largely unclear why
more educated individuals behave in a healthier manner (Cutler et al. 2011). Ed-
ucation increases earnings (e.g., Mincer, 1974) and thereby enables the purchase of
health investments (though higher earnings may also increase the opportunity cost
of time). Education potentially increases the eciency of curative and preventive
care usage and time inputs into the production of health investment (Grossman,
1972a; 1972b). It appears that the higher educated are better able at managing
their diseases (Goldman and Smith, 2002), and high SES individuals appear to ben-
et more from new knowledge and new technology (Lleras-Muney and Lichtenberg,
2005; Glied and Lleras-Muney, 2008).
 Health on education: The existence of an eect of early childhood health on educa-
tional attainment has been established in studies from developed as well as develop-
ing countries. Studies from the U.S., U.K., and Norway show convincingly that low
birth weight individuals have worse schooling outcomes (Behrman and Rosenzweig,
2004; Case et al. 2005; Black et al. 2007; Royer, 2009). Another piece of evidence
is derived from the 1918 inuenza epidemic in the U.S., and the hookworm erad-
ication from the American South, where adverse conditions in childhood caused
a lower educational attainment of the aected cohorts (Almond, 2006; Bleakley,
2007). From developing countries similar evidence is presented by, e.g., Miguel and
Kremer (2004).
 Income or wealth on health: Income and wealth enable purchases of curative and
preventive care and thereby potentially allow for better health maintenance. The
impact of nancial resources on health is likely to depend on the manner of health
care provision in a country. In the case of market provision, income, wealth and
employment may determine access to health care, whereas in the case of universal154 Chapter 5
health care provision these factors may be less important. On the other hand, higher
wages are associated with greater opportunity costs, which would reduce the amount
of time devoted to health maintenance. Further, more auent workers may choose
safer working (associated with a lower level of job-related health stress) and living
environments since safety is a normal good (Viscusi, 1978; 1993).
Smith (2007) nds no eect of nancial measures of SES (income, wealth and change
in wealth) on changes in health in the U.S. Financial indicators of SES do not seem
to cause the onset of health problems at any age (Smith, 2007). Cutler et al. (2011)
provide an overview of empirical ndings and conclude that the evidence points to
no or a very limited impact of income or wealth on health (see also Michaud and van
Soest, 2008). Yet, this view is not unequivocally accepted. Replication is still needed
and controversy remains on the extent to which these ndings apply uniformly
to dierent population segments. For example, Lynch et al. (1997) suggest that
accumulated exposure to economic hardship causes bad health, and Herd et al.
(2008) argue that there might be causal eects of nancial resources on health at
the bottom of the income or wealth distribution.
 Health on income and wealth: Healthy individuals are more productive, earn higher
wages and are able to accrue greater wealth (Currie and Madrian, 1999; Contoyannis
and Rice, 2001). Studies have shown that perhaps the most dominant causal relation
between health and dimensions of SES is the causal impact that health has on one's
ability to work and hence produce income and wealth (e.g., Smith, 2004; 2007; Case
and Deaton, 2005).
 Joint determination: Fuchs (1982; 1986) (see also Barsky et al. 1997) has argued
that the strong correlation between education and health may be due to dierences
in the time preferences of individuals, which aects investments in both education
and health and helps to explain variations in cigarette smoking, diet, and exercise.
Other third factors of interest that may produce a spurious correlation between
SES and health are intelligence, cognitive ability, and non-cognitive skills (Auld
and Sidhu, 2005; Deary, 2008; Chiteji, 2010). In a review of the literature on the
relationship between education and health, Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2008) argue
that dierences in individual preferences (risk aversion and discount rates) appear to
explain only a small portion of the SES health gradient (see also Elo and Preston,
1996). But the authors also note that few studies have attempted to investigate
the role of individual preferences, that preferences are dicult to measure, and5.2 Components of a model capturing the SES-health gradient 155
that preferences with respect to health may dier from preferences with respect to
nance, measures of which are usually employed in such studies.
5.2.2 Theoretical formulation
In this section we formalize the above discussion on the features of a theoretical framework
for the SES health gradient over the life cycle. The aim is to understand the SES-health
gradient as the outcome of rational constrained individual behavior.
A natural starting point for a theory of the relation between health and SES is a
model of life cycle utility maximization. The model is based on the Grossman model
of the demand for health (Grossman, 1972a; 1972b; 2000) in continuous time (see also
Wolfe, 1985; Wagsta, 1986a; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997) with
seven essential additional features.
First, we assume decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRTS) in the health production function
(as in Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990).
Second, individuals choose their level of undesirable job characteristics which poten-
tially have health consequences, denoted as \job-related health stress". The concept of
job-related health stress can be interpreted broadly and can range from physical work-
ing conditions (e.g., hard or risky labor) to psychosocial aspects of work (e.g., low social
status, lack of control, repetitive work, etc). The decision to engage in unhealthy labor
is governed by the relative benet of a possible wage premium { a compensating wage
dierential (Smith, 1776; Viscusi, 1978; 1979) { versus the cost in terms of a higher health
deterioration rate. Evidence is strong that there is a wage premium for jobs with higher
mortality risk (Smith, 1978), and also for less serious, non-fatal, health risks (e.g. Vis-
cusi, 1978; Olson, 1981; Duncan and Holmlund, 1983). Thus we introduce the notion
that individuals may accept risky and/or unhealthy work environments, in exchange for
higher pay (Muurinen, 1982; Case and Deaton, 2005), and explore solutions in which the
decision to rapidly \wear one's body down" (i.e., to perform \hard" labor or engage in
work with psychosocial health risks) is endogenous.
Third, individuals engage in preventive care (such as check up doctor visits) to slow
the biological aging rate. Hence, we explicitly model health investment as consisting of
two components: (i) curative care (as in Grossman, 1972a; 1972b), and (ii) a new concept
of preventive care. Fourth, consumption may aect the biological aging rate (Case and
Deaton, 2005; see also Forster, 2001). We distinguish healthy consumption (such as the
consumption of healthy foods, sports and exercise) from unhealthy consumption (such156 Chapter 5
as smoking, excessive alcohol consumption).2 Preventive care and healthy consumption
are associated with health benets in that they lower the biological aging rate. Healthy
consumption also provides direct utility whereas preventive care is assumed to solely pro-
vide health benets (similar to curative care, individuals demand preventive care solely
for the health benets it provides).3 We interpret healthy consumption broadly to in-
clude decisions regarding housing and neighborhood.4 Unhealthy consumption provides
consumption benets (utility) but increases the biological rate of aging.
Fifth, we include the decision to withdraw from the labor force (Galama et al. 2008
[Chapter 3]).
Sixth, an essential component of the disparity in health by SES is the observed dif-
ference in mortality between SES groups. Further, length of life might be an important
determinant of the age of retirement and the level of consumption and health investment
over the life-course. Individuals optimize length of life as in Ehrlich and Chuma (1990).5
Last, the causal eect of education on income is included in a straightforward manner
by assuming a Mincer-type wage relation, in which earnings are increasing in the level of
education and the level of experience of workers (e.g., Mincer, 1974).
With the exception of the above seven additional features, the discussion below follows
the usual formulation (e.g., Grossman, 1972a; 1972b; 2000; Wagsta, 1986a; Zweifel
and Breyer, 1997). Health is treated as a form of human capital (health capital) and
individuals derive both consumption (health provides utility) and production benets
(health increases earnings) from it. Health is modeled as a stock that deteriorates over
the life cycle and its deterioration can be counteracted by health investment. The demand
for health investment (broadly interpreted as curative and/or preventive care) is a derived
demand: individuals demand \good health", not the consumption of curative or preventive
care.
2It is useful to interpret the endogenous functions as bundles of goods and services (e.g., various
consumption goods/services) or composite environmental factors (e.g., various physical and psychosocial
health stresses).
3The distinction between healthy consumption and preventive care could in practice be dicult for
some activities and could dier across individuals (e.g., some individuals exercise because they derive
utility from it, whereas others solely exercise because it is healthy).
4Living in an auent neighborhood is an expensive, yet health-promoting and utility-generating choice
of individuals. However, the choice of neighborhood (housing) is a constrained choice: low SES individuals
cannot aord to live in more auent areas.
5However, to allow qualitative exploration of the characteristics of the solutions we treat mortality
and retirement as exogenous (xed) in this work.5.2 Components of a model capturing the SES-health gradient 157





where T denotes the life span,  is a subjective discount factor and individuals derive util-
ity U(t)  U[Ch(t);Cu(t);H(t)] from healthy consumption Ch(t), unhealthy consumption
Cu(t) and from health H(t). Time t is measured from the time an individual has completed
her education and joined the labor force (e.g., around age 25 or so). Utility increases with
healthy consumption @U(t)=@Ch(t)  0, unhealthy consumption @U(t)=@Cu(t)  0 and
with health @U(t)=@H(t)  0.
The objective function (5.1) is maximized subject to the following dynamic equations,
_ H(t) = Im(t)
   d(t)H(t); (5.2)
_ A(t) = A(t) + Y (t)   pXh(t)Xh(t)   pXu(t)Xu(t)   pm(t)mm(t)   pp(t)mp(t); (5.3)
the total time budget 
,

 = w(t) + Im(t) + Ip(t) + Ch(t) + Cu(t) + s[H(t)]; (5.4)
and we have initial and end conditions: H(0), H(T), A(0) and A(T) are given.6
_ H(t) and _ A(t) in equations (5.2) and (5.3) denote time derivatives of health H(t)
and assets A(t). Health (equation 5.2) deteriorates at the biological aging rate d(t) 
d[t;Ch(t);Cu(t);z(t);Ip(t);(t)] and can be improved through investment in curative (med-
ical) care Im(t). The health production function Im(t) is assumed to exhibit DRTS
(0 <  < 1).7 The biological aging rate depends endogenously on healthy consump-
tion Ch(t), unhealthy consumption Cu(t), job-related health stress z(t), and investment
in preventive care Ip(t) and on a vector of exogenous functions (t). Consumption can
be healthy (@d(t)=@Ch(t)  0; e.g., healthy foods, healthy neighborhood) or unhealthy
(@d(t)=@Cu(t) > 0; e.g., smoking). Preventive care is modeled analogous to curative care
as an activity that provides no utility (@U(t)=@Ip(t) = 0) but is demanded for its health
6In Grossman's original formulation (Grossman, 1972a; 1972b) length of life T is determined by a
minimum health level Hmin. If health falls below this level H(t)  Hmin an individual dies, hence
H(T)  Hmin.
7Mathematically, this assumption is equivalent to assuming a linear process ( = 1) and DRTS in
the relation between the inputs of health investment goods / services mm(t) and own time Im(t) (as in
Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990). Conceptually, however, there is an important distinction. In principle, one
could imagine a scenario where the investment function Im(t) has constant or even increasing returns
to scale in its inputs of health investment goods / services mm(t) and own time Im(t), but where the
resulting health improvement (through the health production process) exhibits diminishing returns to
scale in its inputs.158 Chapter 5
benets (@d(t)=@Ip(t) < 0). Greater job-related health stress z(t) accelerates the \aging"
process (@d(t)=@z(t) > 0).
Assets A(t) (equation 5.3) provide a return  (the interest rate), increase with income
Y (t) and decrease with purchases in the market of healthy consumption goods Xh(t),
unhealthy consumption goods Xu(t), curative care mm(t) and preventive care mp(t) at
prices pXh(t), pXu(t), pm(t) and pp(t), respectively. Income Y (t)  Y [H(t);z(t);E;x(t)] is
assumed to be an increasing function of health H(t) (@Y (t)=@H(t) > 0) and an increasing
function of job-related health stress z(t) (@Y (t)=@z(t) > 0; Case and Deaton, 2005). Fur-
ther, income depends exogenously on the consumer's stock of knowledge (an individual's
human capital exclusive of health capital), usually assumed to be a function of years of
schooling E and years of working experience x(t) (e.g., Mincer, 1974). Last, we assume
that individuals face no borrowing constraints.8
Goods and services mm(t) and mp(t) as well as own time inputs Im(t) and Ip(t)
are used in the production of curative care Im(t) and preventive care Ip(t), respectively.
Similarly, goods Xh(t) and Xu(t) purchased in the market and own time inputs Ch(t)
and Cu(t) are used in the production of healthy and unhealthy consumption, Ch(t) and
Cu(t), respectively.9 The eciencies of production Im(t;E), Ip(t;E), Ch(t;E) and
Cu(t;E) are assumed to be a function of the consumer's stock of knowledge E as the
more educated are assumed to be more ecient consumers and producers of curative
(medical) and preventive care (based on the interpretation of education as a productivity
factor in own time inputs and in identifying and seeking eective care; Grossman, 1972a;
1972b),
Im(t)  Im[mm(t);Im(t);Im(t;E)]; (5.5)
Ip(t)  Ip[mp(t);Ip(t);Ip(t;E)]; (5.6)
Ch(t)  Ch[Xh(t);Ch(t);Ch(t;E)]; (5.7)
Cu(t)  Cu[Xu(t);Cu(t);Cu(t;E)]: (5.8)
Further, we implicitly assume that curative care Im(t), preventive care Ip(t) and job-
related health stress z(t) are non negative. We do so by assuming DRTS of the health
production function in investment in curative care (see equation 5.2) and diminishing
8Imperfect capital markets itself could be a cause of socioeconomic disparities in health if low income
individuals face more borrowing constraints than higher income peers, and as such cannot optimally
invest in their health.
9Because consumption consists of time inputs and purchases of goods/services in the market one can
conceive leisure as a form of consumption consisting entirely or mostly of time inputs. Leisure, similar
to consumption, provides utility and its cost consists of the price of goods/services utilized and the
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marginal benets for job-related health stress and for investment in preventive care. The
notion here is that one cannot \sell" ones health through negative curative care (see
Galama and Kapteyn, 2009 [Chapter 2]) or negative preventive care nor can one \buy"
health through negative job-related health stress.
The total time available in any period 
 is the sum of all possible uses w(t) (work),
Im(t) (curative care), Ip(t) (preventive care), Ch(t) (healthy consumption), Cu(t) (un-
healthy consumption) and s[H(t)] (sick time). The resulting time budget constraint is
shown in equation (5.4).
We follow Grossman (1972a; 1972b; 2000) and assume that income Y (t) is equal to
the wage rate w(t) times the amount of time spent working w(t),
Y (t) = w(t)


   Im(t)   Ip(t)   Ch(t)   Cu(t)   s[H(t)]
	
: (5.9)
After the age of retirement R we have w(t) = 0 and Y (t) = b(t), where b(t) is a pension
benet function (potentially accrued over time as in Galama et al. 2008 [Chapter 3]).
The wage rate w(t)  w[t;z(t);E;x(t)] is a function of job-related health stress z(t)
w(t) = w(t)[1 + z(t)]
w; (5.10)
where w  0 and w(t)  w[E;x(t)] represents the \stressless" wage rate, i.e., the wage
rate associated with the least job-related health stress z(t) = 0.10 The stressless wage





where education E is expressed in years of schooling, x(t) is years of working experience,
and E, x and x2 are constants, assumed to be positive.
Thus, we have the following optimal control problem: the objective function (5.1) is
maximized with respect to the control functions Xh(t), Ch(t), Xu(t), Cu(t), mm(t), Im(t),
mp(t), Ip(t) and z(t) and subject to the constraints (5.2, 5.3 and 5.4). The Hamiltonian
(see, e.g., Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1977; 1987) of this problem is:
= = U(t)e
 t + qH(t) _ H(t) + qA(t) _ A(t); (5.12)
where qH(t) is the adjoint variable associated with the dierential equation (5.2) for health
H(t) and qA(t) is the adjoint variable associated with the dierential equation (5.3) for
assets A(t).
10Our model concerns individuals who participate in the labor force. Given that our frame of reference
is the labor force we associate z(t) = 0 with the least amount of job-related health stress possible
in employment, and since there is no obvious scale to job-related health stress we employ the simple
relationship shown in equation (5.10).160 Chapter 5
The conditions for the optimal retirement age R and the optimal length of life T are
for the Hamiltonian = to equal zero at these ages
=(R) = 0; (5.13)
=(T) = 0: (5.14)
5.3 Solutions
In this section we discuss the rst-order conditions for optimization (section 5.3.1), the
characteristics of the solutions (section 5.3.2), the eect of SES on behavior (section 5.3.3),
and the eect of health on behavior (section 5.3.4). Throughout the discussion we assume
that an interior solution to the optimization problem exists.
5.3.1 First-order conditions




= qA(0)[H(t)   'H(t)]e
( )t; (5.15)
where the Lagrange multiplier qA(0) is the shadow price of wealth (see, e.g, Case and
Deaton, 2005), H(t)  H[t;Im(t);Ch(t);Cu(t);z(t);Ip(t);E;x(t);(t)] is the user cost of
health capital at the margin
H(t)  Im(t)[d(t) +    g Im(t)]; (5.16)








and g Im(t) = Im(t) 1 (@Im(t)=@t).11 The marginal monetary cost of curative care (equa-
tion 5.17) is a function of the price of medical goods and services purchased in the market
pm(t) and the opportunity cost of time w(t) (hence monetary). Note that the marginal
monetary cost of investment in curative care Im(t) increases with the level of investment
in curative care Im(t) due to decreasing-returns-to-scale of the health production function
11In the remainder of this paper the symbol  is used to denote the relative time derivative of a
function: g f(t) 
@f(t)
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Im(t) (0 <  < 1; see equation 5.2). Further, 'H(t)  'H[t;H(t);z(t);E;x(t)] is the





reecting the notion that health increases earnings Y (t).




= qA(0)[Ch(t)   'dCh(t)]e
( )t; (5.19)









and 'dCh(t)  'dCh[t;H(t);Im(t);Ch(t);Cu(t);z(t);Ip(t);E;x(t);(t)] is the marginal health





The marginal monetary cost of healthy consumption Ch(t) (equation 5.20) is a function
of the price of healthy consumption goods and services pXh(t) and the opportunity cost of
time w(t), and represents the direct monetary cost of consumption. The marginal health
benet of healthy consumption 'dCh(t) (equation 5.21), is equal to the product of the
marginal monetary cost of investment in curative care Im(t) and the \amount" of health
saved [@d(t)=@Ch(t)]H(t), and represents the marginal monetary value of health saved.12
Similarly, the rst-order condition for maximization of (5.12) with respect to the control
function unhealthy consumption is
@U(t)
@Cu(t)
= qA(0)[Cu(t) + dCu(t)]e
( )t; (5.22)
where Cu(t)  Cu[t;Cu(t);z(t);E;x(t)] is the marginal monetary cost of unhealthy








12The marginal health benet can be understood intuitively as the reduced need for health investment
because of a lower health deterioration rate. While the health benet is expressed in terms of the marginal
cost of curative care, this is essentially arbitrary, as the monetary value of health saved could also be
expressed in terms of the reduced need for other types of health investments such as preventive care or
healthy consumption.162 Chapter 5
and dCu(t)  dCu[t;H(t);Im(t);Ch(t);Cu(t);z(t);Ip(t);E;x(t);(t)] is the marginal health





The rst-order condition for maximization of (5.12) with respect to the control function
job-related health stress is
dz(t) = 'z(t); (5.25)
where dz(t)  dz[t;H(t);Im(t);Ch(t);Cu(t);z(t);Ip(t);E;x(t);(t)] is the marginal health











reecting the notion that job-related health stress is associated with a compensating wage
dierential (greater earnings).
Lastly, the rst-order condition for maximization of (5.12) with respect to the control
function preventive care is
Ip(t) = 'dIp(t); (5.28)









and 'dIp(t)  'dIp[t;H(t);Im(t);Ch(t);Cu(t);z(t);Ip(t);E;x(t);(t)] is the marginal health





The ve rst-order equations (5.15, 5.19, 5.22, 5.25 and 5.28) and the transversality
conditions (5.13) and (5.14) dene the dynamics of the problem we are interested in.
Solving the rst-order equations provides solutions for the time paths of the control func-
tions Im(t), Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t) and Ip(t). The state functions health H(t) and assets A(t)
can subsequently be obtained through the dynamic equations (5.2) and (5.3). Lastly, the5.3 Solutions 163
optimal retirement age R and the optimal length of life T follow from the transversality
conditions (5.13) and (5.14).
We have thus arrived at a life cycle model that incorporates labor force participa-
tion, healthy and unhealthy consumption (including housing, neighborhood social envi-
ronment), health, curative (medical) and preventive care, job-related physical and psy-
chosocial health stresses, wealth and mortality.
The Grossman model (Grossman, 1972a; 1972b) is a special case of our model and is
dened by the rst-order equations (5.15) and (5.19) for an exogenous biological aging rate
d(t). The rst-order conditions (5.19), (5.22) and (5.25) are similar (but not identical) to
those presented by Case and Deaton (2005). Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) have extended
the Grossman model with the transversality condition (5.14) for optimal length of life T.
The inclusion of endogenous retirement follows Galama et al. (2008; see Chapter 3).
5.3.2 Characteristics of the solutions
In the remainder of this paper we qualitatively explore the properties of the solutions for
health H(t), investment in curative care Im(t), investment in preventive care Ip(t), healthy
consumption Ch(t) and unhealthy consumption Cu(t) and job-related health stress z(t).
We do so by assessing the eects of parameter changes on the endogenous functions of
interest, utilizing stylized representations (graphs) of the rst-order conditions. How-
ever, stylized representations are less useful in assessing the nature of the transversality
conditions for retirement R (5.13) and length of life T (5.14); this requires numerical
approaches to solving the model. Thus, in practice, we explore the characteristics of the
model conditional on retirement age R and length of life T (i.e., for xed R and T).13
Assumptions
In the remainder, we assume:
1. Diminishing returns to scale (DRTS) in the health production function Im(t) (0 <
 < 1),
13Treating retirement R and length of life T as exogenous (xed) does not signicantly aect our
qualitative results regarding the formation of the SES health gradient (discussed in this work). Optimizing
the age of retirement R and length of life T aects the overall level of health investment and consumption
over the life cycle, as the transversality conditions (5.13) and (5.14) in combination with the initial and
end conditions (A(0), A(T), H(0) and H(T)), determine the parameters qA(0) and qH(0) in equations
(5.31) and (5.32), but have limited eect on the direction of changes in the level of health investment and
consumption.164 Chapter 5
2. Diminishing marginal utilities of healthy Ch(t) and unhealthy consumption Cu(t)







3. Diminishing marginal production benet of health 'H(t), diminishing marginal pro-
duction benet of job-related health stress 'z(t), diminishing marginal health benet
of healthy consumption 'dCh(t), and diminishing marginal health benet of invest-





















4. Constant returns to scale (CRTS) in the marginal health cost of unhealthy consump-

















5. CRTS in the inputs (goods/services purchased in the market and own-time) for in-
vestment in curative care Im(t), healthy consumption Ch(t), unhealthy consumption
14While it seems plausible that the health benets of investment in curative care, healthy consumption
and investment in preventive care exhibit diminishing returns to scale, it is unclear whether the health
costs of unhealthy consumption and job-related health stress exhibit decreasing or increasing returns
to scale. For example, Forster (2001) assumes decreasing returns to scale for healthy consumption and
increasing returns to scale for unhealthy consumption. In simple terms: escalating risky behavior (e.g.,
illicit drug use) or more hours of dangerous work can lead to rapid health deterioration, whereas after
a certain point more investment in curative or preventive care, more exercise or more consumption of
healthy foods does not prevent eventual aging. Since it is unclear a priori whether the eect of unhealthy
consumption and the eect of job-related health stress on the biological aging rate d(t) exhibits in- or
decreasing returns to scale, we assume CRTS for simplicity.5.3 Solutions 165
























Assumptions 1 through 5 ensure that solutions to the optimal control problem exist.18
The remaining assumptions are made to illustrate the potential of the model to describe
a wide range of behaviors.
Stylized representations
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide stylized representations of the rst-order conditions for health
investment Im(t) (equation 5.15), healthy consumption Ch(t) (equation 5.19), unhealthy
consumption Cu(t) (equation 5.22), job-related health stress z(t) (equation 5.25) and in-
vestment in preventive care Ip(t) (equation 5.28). In Section 5.3.3 we consider individuals
a and b who dier in one particular SES indicator, but are otherwise identical, and in
Section 5.3.4 we consider individuals a and c who dier in their health, but are otherwise
identical. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 therefore show each of the ve rst-order conditions for
15A priori it is not clear whether the relationships between the inputs (good/services and own time) and
investment exhibit decreasing- or increasing-returns-to-scale. Hence we assume CRTS in these relations
for simplicity.
16Indeed, Finkelstein et al. (2008) nd evidence that the marginal utility of consumption declines
as health deteriorates. This would rule out strongly separable functional forms for the utility function
where the marginal utility of consumption is independent of health and forms where the marginal utility
of consumption would decrease in health.
17The substitutability in utility of healthy Ch(t) and unhealthy Cu(t) consumption allows us to model
substitution from unhealthy to healthy consumption (or vice versa).
18Optimal solutions for the state functions A(t), H(t) and the control functions Xh(t), Ch(t), Xu(t),
Cu(t), mm(t), Im(t), mp(t), Ip(t) and z(t) exist if the Hamiltonian = (see equations 5.2, 5.3 and 5.12) is
concave in each of the state and control functions and dierentiable w.r.t. the state and control functions
(see, e.g., Seierstad and Sydsaeter, 1977; 1987).166 Chapter 5
individuals a and b or c. In this section we do not yet vary SES or health indicators and
focus on the curves labeled with a.
Investment in curative care:
The solution for investment in curative care Im(t) is determined by the rst-order condi-
tion for health investment (5.15), conditional on the level of the health stock H(t).19 The
evolution of the health stock H(t) then follows from the initial condition H(0) and the
health investment Im(s) and biological aging d(s) histories (s < t) through the dynamic
equation (5.2).
The rst-order condition for health investment (5.15) equates the consumption ben-
et of health @U(t)=@H(t) with the cost of maintaining the health stock qA(0)[H(t)  
'H(t)]e( )t. Figure 5.2 shows a simple stylized representation of this relation as a func-
tion of health H(t) (top left-hand panel) and as a function of investment in curative care
Im(t) (top right-hand panel).
Consider the top left-hand panel and individual a rst. The marginal utility of health
(labeled @Ua=@H) is diminishing in health (assumption 2). The user cost of health capital
H(t) = Im(t)[d(t) +    g Im(t)] is independent of health and the marginal production
benet of health 'H(t) = @Y (t)=@H(t) (increased earnings) exhibits DRTS in health
(assumption 3). The resulting curve (labeled qA(0)(a
H 'a
H)) is upward sloping in health.
Since health is a state function its level is given and provides a constraint: the two curves
have to intersect at Ha.
Now consider the top right-hand panel of Figure 5.2. The marginal monetary cost of
curative care Im(t) and hence the user cost of health capital H(t) is increasing in the
level of curative care Im(t) (Im(t) / Im(t)1 ; see equations 5.16 and 5.17; assumptions
1 and 5). The marginal production benet of health 'H(t) (see equations 5.9 and 5.18) is
19Note that the rst-order condition (5.15) is interpreted in the health production literature spawned
by Grossman (1972a; 1972b) as the condition for optimal health, and not as the condition for optimal
health investment. However, this condition was derived by optimizing the optimal control problem
with respect to health investment (it follows directly from relations 5.32, 5.37 and 5.38) and hence an
alternative interpretation is that it determines the optimal level of the control function health investment
Im(t). Health H(t) is a state function and is determined by the dynamic relation (5.2). At a given
time t an individual cannot decide about its level (hence conditional). This seemingly subtle dierence in
interpretation of the rst-order condition (together with the assumption of DRTS in the health production
function) addresses a number of issues with the health production literature and allows us to accommodate
a wider range of health behaviors than existing health production models (see Galama, 2011 [Chapter 4]).
Importantly, the rst-order condition (5.15) is of a simpler form than the condition used in the health
production literature, allowing us to develop a better understanding of the characteristics of the optimal
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Notes: Marginal consumption @U=@H and marginal production benet 'H of health versus the user cost
of health capital at the margin H as a function of health (top left) and as a function of health investment
(top right). Marginal utility of healthy consumption @U=@Ch versus the marginal monetary cost Ch
and the health benet 'dCh of healthy consumption Ch(t) (center left); Marginal utility of unhealthy
consumption @U=@Cu versus the marginal monetary cost Cu and the marginal health cost 'dCu of
unhealthy consumption Cu(t) (center right); Marginal health cost dz versus the marginal production
benet 'z of job-related health stress z(t) (bottom-left); Marginal monetary cost Ip versus the marginal
health benet 'dIp of investment in preventive care Ip(t) (bottom-right). In labeling the curves we have
omitted the time varying term with exponent (   )t.168 Chapter 5
independent of the level of investment in curative care Im(t). The resulting curve is upward
sloping (labeled qA(0)(a
H   'a
H)). Further, the marginal utility of health @U(t)=@H(t)
is independent of the level of investment in curative care Im(t) (horizontal line labeled
@Ua=@H). Its level is determined by the level of the health stock Ha (draw a horizontal
line from the top left-hand to the top right-hand panel of Figure 5.2). The intersection
of the two curves determines the optimal level of investment in curative care Ia
m.
The top-right hand panel of Figure 5.2 further illustrates that the level of investment
in curative care Im(t) increases with the consumption benet of health @U(t)=@H(t), the
production benet of health 'H(t), and with wealth (lower qA(0)), and decreases with
the user cost of health capital H(t). Further, the level of health investment Im(t) is a
function of the health stock H(t) (more details are provided in section 5.3.4).
Healthy and unhealthy consumption:
The center-left panel of Figure 5.2 shows the rst-order condition for healthy consump-
tion Ch(t) (equation 5.19) which equates the marginal utility of healthy consumption
(solid line labeled @Ua=@Ch) to the net marginal cost of healthy consumption (solid
line labeled qA(0)(a
Ch   'a
dCh)). The marginal utility of healthy consumption is dimin-
ishing in the level of consumption (assumption 2). The net marginal cost of healthy
consumption increases with the marginal monetary cost of healthy consumption Ch(t)
(equation 5.20; CRTS [assumption 5]) and decreases with the marginal health benet
'dCh(t) =  Im(t)[@d(t)=@Ch(t)]H(t) (DRTS [assumption 3]). Hence, the net marginal
cost of healthy consumption is upward sloping. The point of intersection denes the
optimal solution for healthy consumption Ca
h (vertical dashed line).
The center-right panel of Figure 5.2 shows the rst-order condition for unhealthy
consumption Cu(t) (equation 5.22). The rst-order condition is similar to the con-
dition for healthy consumption described in the preceding paragraph. The dierence
lies in the marginal health cost (rather than health benet) of unhealthy consumption
dCu(t) = Im(t)[@d(t)=@Cu(t)]H(t) (CRTS [assumption 4]) which has to be added rather
than subtracted from the marginal monetary cost of unhealthy consumption Cu(t) (equa-
tion 5.23; CRTS [assumption 5]). The net marginal cost of unhealthy consumption is rep-
resented by the solid horizontal line labeled qA(0)(a
Cu + a
dCu). The point of intersection
denes the optimal solution for unhealthy consumption Ca
u (vertical dashed line).
The level of healthy Ch(t) and unhealthy Cu(t) consumption increases with the marginal
utility of consumption (@U(t)=@Ch(t) and @U(t)=@Cu(t)), increases with wealth (lower
qA(0)), decreases with the marginal monetary costs of consumption (Ch(t) and Cu(t)),
increases with the marginal health benet of healthy consumption 'dCh(t), and decreases5.3 Solutions 169
with the marginal health cost of unhealthy consumption dCu(t).
Job-related health stress:
The bottom-left panel of Figure 5.2 shows the rst-order condition for job-related health
stress z(t) (equation 5.25) which equates the production benet 'z(t) = @Y (t)=@z(t) (in-
creased earnings; DRTS [assumption 3]) to the marginal health cost of job-related health
stress dz(t) = Im(t)[@d(t)=@z(t)]H(t) (CRTS [assumption 4]). The optimal solution for
job-related health stress za is indicated by the vertical dashed line. The optimal level
increases with the marginal production benet 'z(t) and decreases with the marginal
health cost dz(t).
Investment in preventive care:
The bottom-right panel of Figure 5.2 represents the rst-order condition for investment
in preventive care Ip(t) (equation 5.28) which equates the marginal health benet of
investment in preventive care 'dIp(t) =  Im(t)[@d(t)=@Ip(t)]H(t) (DRTS [assumption
3]) to the marginal monetary cost Ip(t) (equation 5.29; CRTS [assumption 5]). The
optimal solution for investment in preventive care Ia
p is indicated by the vertical dashed
line. The optimal level of investment in preventive care Ip(t) increases with the marginal
health benet 'dIp(t) and decreases with the marginal monetary cost Ip(t) of investment
in preventive care.
5.3.3 SES and its eect on behavior
In this section we explore the (cumulative) eect on health over the life cycle of choices
made in curative care, in life style and in working environment. Our emphasis is on ex-
ploring dierences in constraints (e.g., in wealth, skills, experience, education and prices).
Common measures of SES employed in empirical research are wealth, earnings (in-
come) and education. In the following subsections we discuss the relations between wealth
and health, earnings and health and education and health. We consider two individuals
a and b who dier in one particular SES indicator, but are otherwise identical. Both
individuals have the same initial level of health H(t), are of the same age t, face the same
environments (e.g., same interest rate ), and have the same preferences (i.e., same utility
function U[Ch(t);Cu(t);H(t)] and same time preference ).20 We are interested in the
20Part of the SES health gradient may be explained by dierences in individuals preferences. A lower
rate of time preference  operates in a similar manner to wealth, earnings and education. However in
contrast to SES, dierences between low and high discounting individuals grow larger with time (the
discount factor e( )t grows slower with age t for an individual with a low discount rate). A lower rate170 Chapter 5
predictions of our model for the subsequent evolution of health for these two individuals,
given a ceteris paribus change in one SES indicator.
Wealth and health: pure \asset" eect
Consider two individuals a and b who dier in life-time wealth qA(0). Individual b has
greater life-time wealth, i.e., qb
A(0) < qa
A(0), but is otherwise identical. Because of the
similarities between the two individuals the dierence in life-time wealth is to be inter-
preted as due to dierences in endowed physical capital (e.g., assets A(0)).21
Investment in curative care:
Figure 5.1 shows a stylized representation of the rst-order condition for investment in
curative care as a function of health H(t) (top left-hand panel) and as a function of
investment in curative care Im(t) (top right-hand panel). Consider the top right-hand
panel rst. As a result of greater endowed wealth (qb
A(0) < qa
A(0)) the net marginal cost




result, the optimal level of investment in curative care is higher Ib
m > Ia
m.
An indirect eect operates through consumption. Greater endowed wealth allows in-
dividual b to consume more consumption goods and services (see discussion below for
further detail). A higher level of consumption increases (or at a minimum leaves un-
changed) the marginal utility of health @U(t)=@H(t) (assumption 6). Thus the marginal
utility of health shifts upward (or is unchanged) in both the top left-hand panel and in
the top right-hand panel of Figure 5.1 (curves labeled @Ub=@H). This reinforces the eect




Now turn to the top-left panel of Figure 5.1. Because the health stock of individuals
a and b is the same Hb = Ha the curves need to intersect at the same level of health. The




H)), as a result of the upward shift in the marginal utility of health
of time preference may also lead to greater investment in education (not part of our theory) and hence
lead to joint determination of health and education (e.g., Fuchs, 1982; 1986).
21Endowments need not necessarily be available to the individual at age t = 0, but could also be
received at later ages. Conceptually there is no distinction between early and late endowments: an
endowment at later ages also lowers life-time wealth qA(0). Our model is deterministic and the individual
knows with certainty about the timing and amount of physical assets she will receive.5.3 Solutions 171
@U=@H.22;23
Healthy and unhealthy consumption:
The center-left panel of Figure 5.1 shows the shift in the level of healthy consumption
Ch(t). The product qA(0)Ch(t) shifts downward as a result of greater endowed physical
capital (qb
A(0) < qa
A(0)) and because the marginal monetary cost of healthy consumption
Ch(t) (equation 5.20) is unchanged. Essentially, greater endowed assets enable more
purchases of healthy consumption goods. Further, endowed assets increase the health
benet of healthy consumption, 'dCh(t) =  Im(t)[@d(t)=@Ch(t)]H(t) (for Hb = Ha and
b
Im > a
Im [see earlier discussion in \Investment in curative care"]). The resulting net
marginal cost of healthy consumption (solid line labeled qb
A(0)(b
Ch   'b
dCh)) is lower in
level (the \wealth" eect) and steeper in slope (the \savings in care" eect; 'b
dCh > 'a
dCh).
In the example the marginal utility of healthy consumption (curve labeled @Ub=@Ch;
center-left panel of Figure 5.1) is shown as unchanged (i.e., we have assumed the level
of unhealthy consumption Cu(t) has not changed). The optimal solution for healthy
consumption Cc
h (vertical dashed line) of an individual with greater endowed wealth is
higher than that of a poorer individual Cb
h > Ca
h.
The center-right panel of Figure 5.1 shows the shift in the level of unhealthy consump-
tion Cu(t). As with healthy consumption, greater endowed wealth shifts the product of
the shadow price of wealth qA(0) (lowered) and the marginal monetary cost of unhealthy
consumption Cu(t) (unchanged; equation 5.23) downward. Unlike healthy consumption
this shift is countered by an increase in the marginal health cost of unhealthy consumption
dCu(t) = Im(t)[@d(t)=@Cu(t)]H(t) (for Hc = Ha and b
Im > a
Im; see earlier discussion
in \Investment in curative care"). Greater endowed wealth allows purchasing more un-
healthy consumption goods, but also increases the marginal health cost. Further, the
marginal utility of unhealthy consumption @U(t)=@Cu(t) shifts downward as a result of
the higher level of healthy consumption Ch(t) (assumption 7; see previous paragraph).
The optimal level of unhealthy consumption Cb
u (vertical dashed line) is shown as un-
















downward as a result of greater endowed wealth (qb
A(0) < qa
A(0)), it shifts upward due to a higher user cost
of health capital H(t), since a higher optimal level of investment in curative care (Ib
m > Ia
m) increases the





Job-related health stress and investment in preventive care:
The rst-order conditions for job-related health stress z(t) (equation 5.25; bottom-left
corner of Figure 5.1) and for investment in preventive care (equation 5.28; bottom-right
corner of Figure 5.1) do not depend on life-time wealth qA(0). However, there is an indirect
eect of greater endowed wealth. Both the marginal health cost of job-related health stress
dz(t) (equation 5.26) and the marginal health benet of preventive care 'dIp(t) (equation
5.30) are proportional to the marginal monetary cost of investment in curative care Im(t).
Higher endowed wealth (individual b) implies b
Im(t) > a
Im(t) (see earlier discussion in
\Investment in curative care"). Thus wealthier individuals have greater marginal health
cost of job-related health stress dz(t) and greater marginal health benet of preventive
care 'dIp(t). Consequently the optimal level of job-related health stress is lower zb < za
and the optimal level of investment in preventive care is higher Ib
p > Ia
p for individuals
with greater endowed wealth, compared to less-auent peers.
Income and health: pure \wage" eect
Again, consider two individuals a and b but this time the dierence is in their wage rate.
Individual b has a higher \stressless" wage rate than individual a (wb
(t) > wa
(t)) and
hence has a higher level of earnings over the life cycle Y b(t) > Y a(t).25 It is important to
distinguish between an evolutionary wage change (dierences along the wage path of an
individual) and dierences in life-time wage proles (between individuals).
Evolutionary wage change: In our model of perfect certainty a change in wage does
not aect the parameter qA(0) (life-time wealth) as the change is fully anticipated by
the individual. Such a response is referred to as an evolutionary wage change (along
an individual's wage prole). An evolutionary increase in the wage rate w(t) increases
24Note that the marginal utility of healthy consumption @U(t)=@Ch(t) is unchanged if the level of
unhealthy consumption Cu(t) is unchanged (as was assumed).
25Earnings Y (t) are a function of the wage rate w(t) times the amount of time spent working w(t)
(see equation 5.9). A higher wage rate w(t) implies that individual b has higher earnings Y (t) than
individual a because the direct eect of higher wages is to increase earnings (the wage rate multiplied
by the time spent working). A secondary eect operates through time spent working, where individuals
may work more because of the higher opportunity cost of not working (substitution eect). On the other
hand individuals may work fewer hours to spend their increased income on care or consumption (income
eect). Empirical studies suggest that the substitution and income eects are of the same magnitude
(e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 2000) and hence that the direct eect of a wage increase is to increase
earnings.5.3 Solutions 173
the marginal production benet of health 'H(t) = @Y (t)=@H(t) and of job-related health
stress 'z(t) = @Y (t)=@z(t) (see equations 5.9 and 5.10).26 It also increases the opportunity
cost of time.27 As a result, the various marginal costs and benets of the functions of
interest increase, and the net eect on the level of investment in curative care, healthy
consumption, job-related health stress, and preventive care is ambiguous. An exception
is the level of unhealthy consumption, which is lower since both the marginal monetary
cost and the marginal health cost of unhealthy consumption increase with the wage rate.
Thus, an evolutionary wage increase could be either good or bad for health.
However, consider the case where the marginal production benet of health 'H(t)
is small compared to the user cost of health capital H(t).28 Since individuals a and
b possess the same health stock, and H(t)   'H(t)  H(t), it follows from the rst-
order condition for health investment (equation 5.15) that H(t) is unchanged and hence
Im(t) is unchanged. Yet a higher wage rate increases the opportunity cost of time, and
consequently the level of investment in curative care Im(t) is lower.29 Further, the health
benet of healthy consumption 'dCh(t) and of preventive care 'dIp(t) (equations 5.21 and
5.30), and the health cost of unhealthy consumption dCu(t) and of job-related health
stress dz(t) (equations 5.24 and 5.26) are unchanged (because Im(t) is unchanged). The
marginal monetary cost of healthy consumption Ch(t) (equation 5.20) and of unhealthy
consumption Cu(t) (equation 5.23) however increase with the wage rate w(t) (reecting
the higher opportunity cost of time) and the level of healthy Ch(t) and unhealthy Cu(t)
consumption is lower. In addition, the marginal production benet of job-related health
stress 'z(t) increases with the wage rate (equation 5.27) as does the marginal monetary
cost of investment in preventive care Ip(t) (equation 5.29). As a result, the level of
job-related health stress z(t) is higher and the level of investment in preventive care Ip(t)
lower. Thus, on balance, if the production benet of health is small, an evolutionary
26In our formulation the marginal benet of job-related health stress is increasing in the wage rate.
Case and Deaton (2005) in their narrower denition of z(t) as manual, risky labor (i.e., not including
the psychosocial aspects of work), assume that the marginal benet of additional manual labor is lower
among those with higher wages.
27The wage rate might not be the most appropriate measure of the opportunity cost of time since time
is not always mutually exclusive. Sick time is usually used in the production of curative care, and often
institutional arrangements make it possible to continue earning wages while seeking curative care (De
Serpa, 1971; Muurinen, 1982).
28Note that it is always true that H(t) > 'H(t), otherwise the investment in curative care would
nance itself through negative net marginal costs of maintaining the health stock and individuals would
achieve innite health.
29This can be seen from equation (5.17): if w(t) increases, Im(t) has to decrease to maintain Im(t) at
the same level.174 Chapter 5
wage change is bad for health. An exception to this pattern is the level of unhealthy
consumption, which is lower.
Dierences in life-time wage proles: Now consider again two individuals a and b.
Individual b earns higher wages over the life cycle, i.e., person b has greater life-time
wealth (and hence qb
A(0) < qa
A(0)). Thus the net result of higher earnings over the life
cycle would be similar to the \pure" asset eect described in section 5.3.3, except that
apart from the life-time wealth eect (qb
A(0) < qa
A(0)) there is also a competing eect of
the greater opportunity cost of time (see discussion above).
Education and health: the additional \eciency" eect
Consider two individuals a and b who dier in their level of education E. Individual b has
obtained more education but is otherwise identical. As a result, individual b has a higher
wage rate w(t) (equation 5.11). Thus the eect of education is similar to the eect of
higher earnings over the life cycle and the discussion presented in section 5.3.3 applies
here as well.
But education potentially also improves the eciencies (t;E) of investment in cu-
rative and preventive care, and to a lesser extent healthy and unhealthy consumption
(equations 5.5 to 5.8).30 The marginal cost of investment in curative care Im(t) is deter-
mined by the rst-order condition for health investment (equation 5.15) and is unchanged.
Since the marginal cost of investment in curative care Im(t) increases in the level Im(t)
and decreases in the eciency Im(t;E) of investment in curative care (see equation 5.17),
a higher eciency due to education implies a higher level of investment in curative care
compared to the pure \wage" eect described in section 5.3.3.
A higher eciency of investment in preventive care Ip(t;E) lowers the marginal mon-
etary cost of preventive care Ip(t) (equation 5.29) while the marginal benet 'dIp(t) /
Im(t) (equation 5.30) is unchanged. Thus the optimal level of investment in preventive
care is higher compared with the pure \wage" eect.
If the eciencies of healthy and unhealthy consumption do not (or only moderately)
respond to education then the levels of healthy and unhealthy consumption are unchanged
compared to the pure \wage" eect.
30Grossman (1972a; 1972b) assumes that the higher educated are more ecient producers and con-
sumers of curative care. We extend his denition to preventive care. However, it is less clear whether the
higher educated are more ecient producers and consumers of consumption goods and services.5.3 Solutions 175









Notes: The eect of greater endowed wealth qb
A(0) < qa
A(0) (left column) and of an evolutionary wage
increase (right column) on behavior. The results for greater endowed wealth (left column) are also valid
for the eect of greater earnings over the life cycle and for the eect of a higher level of education.
Summary and discussion { the eect of SES on behavior
The left column of Table 5.1 provides a brief overview of the eect of greater endowed
wealth on behavior. The direct eect of endowed wealth (through qA(0)) is to enable
a higher level of investment in curative care Im(t), healthy consumption Ch(t) and un-
healthy consumption Cu(t). In addition, associated with a higher level of investment is
a higher marginal monetary cost of curative care Im(t) (assumption 1). As a result,
individuals derive greater marginal health benet from healthy consumption 'dCh(t) and
from preventive care 'dIp(t) because of the greater monetary value represented by the
amount of health saved. Similarly, the marginal health cost of unhealthy consumption
dCu(t) and of job-related health stress dz(t) are greater because of the greater monetary
value represented by the amount of health lost.
Wealthier individuals invest more in curative Im(t) and preventive care Ip(t) and their
level of healthy consumption Ch(t) is higher. Wealthy individuals also engage in work that
is more conducive to health: jobs associated with lower levels of job-related health stress
z(t). Wealth protects health by encouraging healthy life styles and enabling individuals
to work and live in healthy environments. The net eect is ambiguous only for the level of
unhealthy consumption as the direct eect of endowed wealth is to enable a higher level
of unhealthy consumption Cu(t), whereas the indirect eect is an increase in the marginal
health cost of unhealthy consumption dCu(t).
With regards to consumption, consider a situation where the severity of the health
detriment @d(t)=@Cu(t) resulting from unhealthy consumption is greater than in the exam-
ple shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 5.1. In this case greater marginal health cost of176 Chapter 5




dCu); center-right panel of Figure 5.1) upward. This lowers
the level of unhealthy consumption Cb
u.31 Because the marginal health cost of unhealthy
consumption increases in the severity of the health detriment (dCu(t) / @d(t)=@Cu(t)) we
expect to observe a pattern in which wealthy individuals consume more of moderately un-
healthy consumption goods (e.g., moderate alcohol consumption) and less of more severe
unhealthy consumption goods (e.g., cigarettes, high alcohol consumption, illicit drugs)
when compared to less wealthy individuals.
Dierences between individuals in life-time earnings (comparing dierent individuals
with dierent life cycle wage proles) operate similar to an increase in endowed wealth.
Our model suggests that the health benet of a \pure" asset endowment would be larger
than the eect of a \comparable" change in life-time earnings (similar change in the
shadow-price of wealth qA(0)) due to the competing eect of the increased opportunity
cost of time. There are reasons to believe that the wealth eect may dominate the eect
of the opportunity cost of time (higher current wages). First, this is consistent with
the result by Dustmann and Windmeijer (2000) and Contoyannis et al. (2004) that a
transitory wage increase aects health negatively while a permanent wage change aects
health positively. Second, it is consistent with the rich literature on SES and health that
consistently nds that high income individuals are generally in better health than low
income individuals.
A higher level of education operates similar to greater earnings over the life cycle.
But education has an independent eect on health, over and above generating greater
life-time earnings and wealth, through enhancing the eciency of curative and preventive
care. This leads to a higher demand for both curative and preventive care.
The right-hand column of Table 5.1 summarizes the eect of an evolutionary increase
in the wage rate if the marginal production benet of health 'H(t) is small compared to
the user cost of health capital H(t). On average, as a result of the increased opportunity
cost of time and the greater marginal production benet of job-related health stress, an
evolutionary increase in the wage rate is bad for health.
If there is no complementarity in utility of consumption and health (assumption 6)
the predictions would remain the same. If the relation were instead one of substitutability
(worse health improves the utility of consumption), solutions are possible in which greater
31This shift is exacerbated due to substitutability in utility of healthy Ch(t) and unhealthy Cu(t)
consumption (assumption 7), as the marginal utility of healthy consumption @U(t)=@Ch(t) increases
for a lower level of unhealthy consumption Cu(t) and the marginal utility of unhealthy consumption
@U(t)=@Cu(t) decreases for a higher level of healthy consumption Ch(t).5.3 Solutions 177
SES leads to less investment in curative care. This is generally not observed. If there
were no substitutability in utility of healthy and unhealthy consumption (assumption 7)
higher SES would generally not lead to a reduction in unhealthy consumption, except for
extremely unhealthy consumption goods, but would still be associated with a shift toward
healthy consumption (i.e., a smaller fraction of a larger budget is devoted to unhealthy
consumption).
5.3.4 Health and its eect on behavior
In this section we consider two identical individuals a and c that dier only in their health.
Individual c is in better health than individual a (Hc > Ha), but is otherwise identical
to individual a, i.e., all exogenous variables and functions are assumed to be the same as
for person a.
Investment in curative care:
Consider the top right-hand panel of Figure 5.2 rst. There is no direct eect of a higher
level of health on the user cost of health capital at the margin H(t) = Im(t)[d(t) +   
g Im(t)].32 However, the production benet of health 'H(t) = @Y (t)=@H(t) is lower (DRTS
[assumption 3]), and the resulting curve shifts upward (labeled qA(0)(c
H  'c
H)). Further,
the marginal utility of health is lower (curve labeled @Uc=@H; diminishing marginal utility
[assumption 2]). An indirect eect operates through consumption, is assumed to be
smaller than the direct eects, and is discussed below. These shifts are associated with a
lower optimal level of investment in curative care Ic
m < Ia
m.
Now turn to the top left-hand panel of Figure 5.2 which shows the associated shifts as
a function of health. Assuming a lower level of investment in curative care Im(t), the user
cost of health capital H(t) is smaller (assumption 5) and the net marginal user cost of
health capital shifts downward (labeled qA(0)(c
H 'c
H)). Further, an indirect eect on the
marginal utility of health @U(t)=@H(t) operates through consumption. Higher health in-
creases the marginal utility of consumption and hence increases the level of healthy Ch(t)
and unhealthy Cu(t) consumption (assumption 6). This in turn increases the marginal
utility of health and the curve shifts upward (labeled @Uc=@H). Thus higher health is
32There is however an indirect eect on the biological aging rate d(t) because health aects choices made
in working environment and in life style (operating through Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t) and Ip(t)). This secondary
eect is assumed to be small, which would be the case if @d(t)=@Ch(t), @d(t)=@Cu(t), @d(t)=@z(t) and
@d(t)=@Ip(t) are small. However, as we will see, even under this assumption, as time passes lower levels
of healthy consumption, curative and preventive care and higher levels of unhealthy consumption and
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Notes: Marginal consumption @U=@H and marginal production benet 'H of health versus the user
cost of health capital at the margin H as a function of health (top left) and as a function of health
investment (top right). Marginal utility of healthy consumption @U=@Ch versus the marginal monetary
cost Ch and the marginal health benet 'dCh of healthy consumption Ch(t) (center left); Marginal
utility of unhealthy consumption @U=@Cu versus the marginal monetary cost Cu and the marginal
health cost dCu of unhealthy consumption Cu(t) (center right); Marginal health cost dz versus the
marginal production benet 'z of job-related health stress z(t) (bottom-left); Marginal monetary cost
Ip versus the marginal health benet 'dIp of investment in preventive care Ip(t) (bottom-right). In
labeling the curves we have omitted the time varying term with exponent (   )t.5.3 Solutions 179
associated with two competing shifts: (i) a shift of the curve through higher consump-
tion, and (ii) a shift along the curve because of diminishing marginal utility (assumption
2). Again, health provides a constraint and both curves have to intersect at Hc. The
marginal utility at the point of intersection @Uc=@H determines the marginal utility of
health in the top right-hand panel of Figure 5.2 (draw a horizontal line from the top
left-hand to the top right-hand panel in Figure 5.2). There, the intersection of the two
curves determines the optimal level of health investment, and Ic
m < Ia
m (consistent with
our assumption).33 Hence, a larger health stock Hc > Ha reduces the marginal monetary
cost of curative care c
Im < a
Im (see equation 5.16).
Healthy and unhealthy consumption:
Changes in health and in the marginal monetary cost of curative care have no direct
eect on the marginal monetary cost of healthy consumption Ch(t) (equation 5.20) and
of unhealthy consumption Cu(t) (equation 5.23), hence both are shown as unchanged in
the center-left and center-right panels of Figure 5.2. A higher level of health increases
the health benet of healthy consumption 'dCh(t) (and the health cost of unhealthy
consumption dCu(t)), yet at the same time the health benet (cost) is reduced through a
lower marginal monetary cost of curative care as healthy individuals demand less curative
care ('dCh(t) / Im(t)H(t) and dCu(t) / Im(t)H(t); see equations 5.21 and 5.24). The
net eect is ambiguous. To reect this, we show both the net marginal cost of healthy
consumption (solid line labeled qA(0)(c
Ch   'c
dCh); center-left panel of Figure 5.2) and
the net marginal cost of unhealthy consumption (solid line labeled qA(0)(c
Cu + c
dCu);
center-right panel of Figure 5.2) as being unchanged (i.e., c
ImHc ' a
ImHa; we will return
to this point later).
Now turn to the marginal utility of healthy consumption @U(t)=@Ch(t) and of un-
healthy consumption @U(t)=@Cu(t). The direct eect of higher health Hc > Ha, due to
complementarity in utility of consumption and health (assumption 6) is to shift both the
marginal utility of healthy consumption @U(t)=@Ch(t) (curve labeled @Uc=@Ch, center-left
panel of Figure 5.2) and of unhealthy consumption @U(t)=@Cu(t) (curve labeled @Uc=@Cu,
33Note that solutions are possible in which higher health leads to greater investment in health, i.e. a
positive correlation between health and curative care (which is generally not observed). This requires
the indirect eect on the marginal utility of health, operating through a higher level of consumption (as
a result of greater health), to be quite substantial. Such solutions cannot be ruled out but appear less
plausible.180 Chapter 5
center-right panel of Figure 5.2) upward.34 The optimal solution for healthy consumption





In the scenario discussed above it was assumed that the net marginal cost of healthy
and of unhealthy consumption remain unchanged. Now consider two alternative sce-
narios. In scenario 1, the direct eect of higher health Hc > Ha exceeds the indirect
eect of changes in the marginal cost of curative care (as a result of higher health), i.e.,
c
ImHc > a
ImHa, and in scenario 2 we explore the opposite, i.e., c
ImHc < a
ImHa.35 In sce-
nario 1 both the marginal health benet of healthy consumption 'dCh(t) and the marginal
health cost of unhealthy consumption dCu(t) are higher for individual c.36 This further
increases the level of healthy consumption Cc
h, but lowers the level of unhealthy consump-
tion Cc
u (compared with the example shown in the center-left hand panel of Figure 5.2).37
In scenario 2 we expect to observe the opposite pattern: higher health Hc > Ha decreases
the level of healthy consumption Cc
h, and further increases the level of unhealthy con-
sumption Cc
u (compared with the example shown in the center-right hand panel of Figure
5.2).
Job-related health stress and investment in preventive care:
Greater health is potentially associated with a greater marginal production benet of job-
related health stress 'z(t) = @Y (t)=@z(t) (curve labeled 'c
z; bottom-left panel of Figure
5.2) as healthy individuals have higher earnings Y (t) (see equation 5.9). The marginal
monetary cost of preventive care Ip(t) is independent of the level of health (equation
34An indirect eect operates through consumption. Because of substitutability in utility of healthy
Ch(t) and unhealthy Cu(t) consumption (assumption 7), both the marginal utility of healthy consump-
tion @U(t)=@Ch(t) and the marginal utility of unhealthy consumption @U(t)=@Cu(t) shift downward.
Assuming that the direct eect dominates the indirect eect the net result is nevertheless an upward
shift.
35Scenario 1 corresponds to a small elasticity of health investment with respect to health and scenario
2 corresponds to a high elasticity. Assume Im(t) / H , where  is the elasticity of health investment
with respect to health. Scenario 1 (c
ImHc > a
ImHa) then implies  < 1=(1 ) while scenario 2 implies
 > 1=(1   ).
36Although these shifts are not depicted it is useful to use Figure 5.2 for reference. Scenario 1 implies
a downward shift in the net marginal costs of healthy consumption with respect to the curve shown
qA(0)(c
Ch   'c
dCh) in the center-left panel through increased 'dCh. Scenario 1 also implies an upward
shift in the net marginal cost of unhealthy consumption with respect to the curve shown qA(0)(c
Cu+c
dCu)
in the center-right panel through increased dCu.
37These shifts are exacerbated due to substitutability in utility of healthy Ch(t) and unhealthy Cu(t)
consumption (assumption 7), as the marginal utility of healthy consumption @U(t)=@Ch(t) increases
for a lower level of unhealthy consumption Cu(t) and the marginal utility of unhealthy consumption
@U(t)=@Cu(t) decreases for a higher level of healthy consumption Ch(t).5.3 Solutions 181







5.29). The eect on the marginal health cost of job-related health stress and the marginal
health benet of investment in preventive care is once more ambiguous (see equations
5.26 and 5.30) and both are shown as unchanged (i.e., c
ImHc ' a
ImHa). The resulting
optimal level of job-related health stress is higher zc > za (bottom-left panel of Figure
5.2) and the level of investment in preventive care is unchanged Ic
p  Ia
p (bottomright
panel of Figure 5.2).
In scenario 1 (scenario 2) the marginal health cost of job-related health stress dz and
the marginal health benet of investment in preventive care 'Ip are higher (lower), and
the level of job-related health stress decreases (increases) and the level of investment in
preventive care increases (decreases) with respect to the case shown in the bottom-left
and bottom-right panels of Figure 5.2.
Summary and discussion { the eect of health on behavior:
Table 5.2 provides a brief overview of the eect of greater health on behavior. Regardless
of the scenario, individuals in better health invest less in curative care Im(t). In scenario
1 individuals consume more healthy consumption Ch(t) and invest more in preventive
care Ip(t), while the eect on unhealthy consumption Cu(t) and job-related health stress
is ambiguous. In scenario 2 individuals consume more unhealthy consumption Cu(t),
engage more in job-related health stress z(t), and invest less in preventive care Ip(t),
while the eect on healthy consumption Ch(t) is ambiguous.
If there is no complementarity in utility of consumption and health (assumption 6) the
predictions would remain the same, except that the eect of greater health on healthy con-
sumption is negative in scenario 2 and the eect of greater health on unhealthy consump-
tion is positive in scenario 1 (i.e., not ambiguous as shown in Table 5.2). If the relation
were instead one of substitutability (worse health improves the utility of consumption),
solutions are possible in which greater health leads to lower levels of consumption and
more investment in curative care. This is generally not observed.182 Chapter 5
5.4 Discussion and conclusions
The aim of this paper is to provide a contribution toward a theory of the relation between
health and socioeconomic status (SES) over the lifecycle. Our life-cycle model incor-
porates multiple mechanisms that could explain (jointly) a large part of the observed
disparities in health by SES. In our model, lifestyle factors (preventive care, healthy and
unhealthy consumption), working conditions (physical and psychosocial health stresses),
living conditions (housing, neighborhood social environment), curative care and the con-
straining eect of health on work are mechanisms through which SES (endowed wealth,
life-time earnings and education) and health are related.
The main mechanism through which SES translates into health is by increasing the
marginal cost of and the demand for curative care. This in turn increases the health
benet of (and hence demand for) preventive care and healthy consumption, and the
health cost of (and hence reduced demand for) unhealthy working and living environments,
and unhealthy consumption.
Even without the inclusion of additional potential mechanisms responsible for the
SES health gradient (beside utilization of curative care), the theory predicts dierences in
the \eective" rate of health decline _ H(t) between high- and low-SES individuals due to
dierences in the level of investment in curative care Im(t). This addresses the criticism
leveled by Case and Deaton (2005). But greater SES also induces healthy lifestyles,
encourages investment in preventive care and protects individuals from the health risks of
physical working conditions (e.g., hard labor) and/or psychosocial aspects of work (e.g.,
low status, limited control, repetitive work, etc) that are detrimental to health.
Endowed wealth, life time earnings and education each operate in distinct ways. The
eect of greater earnings over the life cycle on health diers from the eect of greater
endowed wealth in that the \wealth" eect is moderated by the higher opportunity cost
of time. Plausibly, however, the eect of greater earnings over the life cycle dominates the
opportunity cost eect. For example, Dustmann and Windmeijer (2000) and Contoyannis
et al. (2004) nd a positive eect on health from a permanent wage increase and a negative
eect from a transitory wage increase. The eect of education on health is similar to that
of greater earnings over the life cycle, but with the additional eect of increasing the
eciency of the production and consumption of curative and preventive care.
Irrespective of the SES indicator, for individuals who are initially equally healthy, the
health trajectories of high and low SES individuals will begin to diverge. In addition,
the higher the health stock, the greater the earnings (e.g., see equation 5.9) such that
reverse causality (from health to SES) could further reinforce the SES health gradient.5.4 Discussion and conclusions 183
Results from earlier studies (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; Ehrlich, 2000; Galama et al. 2008
[Chapter 3]) suggest that the more rapidly worsening health of low SES individuals could
lead to early withdrawal from the labor force and shorter life spans. Early withdrawal
from the labor force may contribute to further increasing disadvantage (widening of the
SES health gradient) as the associated loss of income disproportionally aects low SES
individuals. Mortality selection, i.e. lower SES people are more likely to die early, may
result in an apparently healthier surviving disadvantaged population, partially explaining
the narrowing of the gradient in late age.
Further, depending on the elasticity of investment in curative care with respect to
health, the predicted divergence in health trajectories between low and high SES individ-
uals could be further reinforced (scenario 1; small elasticity) or mitigated (scenario 2; large
elasticity). In scenario 2 (see Table 5.2 [opposite signs for lower health] in section 5.3.4),
over time the rate of divergence slows as subsequent lower levels of health encourages low
SES individuals to invest more in health and engage in healthier behavior. Thus the the-
ory predicts an initial widening and potentially a subsequent narrowing of the SES-health
gradient. In scenario 1 less healthy individuals engage in less healthy behavior (with the
exception of investment in curative care), and the theory predicts a continued widening
of the gradient with age (or a weaker narrowing process).
Scenario 1 thus predicts a process of cumulative advantage for high SES individu-
als. The cumulative advantage hypothesis states that health inequalities emerge by early
adulthood and subsequently widen as economic and health advantages of higher SES indi-
viduals accumulate (House et al. 1994; Ross and Wu, 1996; Lynch, 2003). Any apparent
narrowing of SES inequalities in late life is largely attributed to mortality selection. In
contrast, scenario 2 predicts an economic variant of the age-as-leveller hypothesis (House
et al. 1994; Elo and Preston, 1996; Beckett, 2000). The age-as-leveler hypothesis main-
tains that deterioration in health is an inevitable part of aging irrespective of SES with
the result that the SES-health gradient narrows at later ages. Relative to the disadvan-
taged, economically advantaged people may be better able to postpone, but not prevent,
declining health status.
Our theory can explain additional stylized empirical facts. The model predicts that
individuals in better health invest less in curative care Im(t). This nding is supported
by casual observation (the healthy do not go to the doctor) and by numerous empirical
studies that nd a strong negative correlation between measures of health and measures of
curative (medical) care usage (see Galama and Kapteyn, 2009 [Chapter 2], for an overview
of the empirical literature). Further, as our health declines with age, the demand for
curative care increases. If the eect of deteriorating health on investment in curative care184 Chapter 5
dominates the eect of the opportunity cost of time,38 the model is capable of reproducing
the observation that young individuals invest little in curative care, the middle-aged more
and the elderly the most.
Another prediction of the theory is a pattern in which high SES individuals consume
more of moderately unhealthy consumption goods (e.g., moderate alcohol consumption)
and less of severely unhealthy consumption goods (e.g., cigarettes, high alcohol consump-
tion, illicit drugs) when compared to lower SES individuals. Greater wealth permits more
consumption but also increases the marginal monetary value of health lost. This could
provide a plausible explanation for the observation that high SES individuals are less
likely to smoke cigarettes (bad for health) but are more likely to be moderate drinkers
(moderately bad for health) than low SES individuals (e.g., Cutler and Lleras-Muney,
2008; Stringhini et al. 2010).
Our theory suggests that the SES health gradient could be strong in countries with
universal health care coverage and low deductions, where the price of curative care is low
and health care is aordable for everyone, as well as in countries with large uninsured
populations. The marginal cost of curative care is largely determined by life-time wealth
(qA(0), i.e., SES) and by the health stock H(t) (see the rst-order condition 5.15). Thus, a
low price of curative care pm(t) does not inuence the marginal monetary cost of curative
care but increases the demand for curative care Im(t) (see equation 5.17 and keeping
Im(t) unchanged). Further, because the marginal cost of curative care is not sensitive
to price, the marginal health benet of healthy consumption and preventive care and the
health cost of unhealthy consumption and job-related health stress are unchanged. Thus
the price of curative care does not aect choices in consumption, preventive care and
in living and working environments directly, and also in countries with universal health
care coverage and low deductibles there will be a signicant SES health gradient. This
is particularly true if medical care is not a large determinant of the SES health gradient
(e.g., Adler et al. 1993) and could explain why the observed SES health gradient over
the life cycle is strikingly similar between countries with relatively low levels of protection
from loss of work and health risks, such as the U.S., and those with stronger welfare
systems, such as the Netherlands (e.g., Smith, 1999; 2004; 2007; Case and Deaton 2005;
van Kippersluis et al. 2010).
38Low at young ages and high in middle and old age as a result of the typical hump-shaped wage prole
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The predictions regarding the eects of SES on health depend on the notion that health
has both intrinsic as well as instrumental value.39 Dierences in endowed wealth qA(0)
have no eect on health if health does not provide utility (e.g., in the pure investment
model, Grossman, 1972a; 1972b). In this case, the eect of greater earnings over the life
cycle would be ambiguous as a higher wage rate increases both the user cost of health
capital H(t) and the production benet of health 'H(t). The eect of education would
mostly operate through greater eciency of medical and curative care.
Thus, if health is mostly valued for its production benet (generating earnings) this
could explain the absence of strong evidence for a causal eect of nancial indicators of
SES on health (e.g., Cutler et al. 2011). Another possible explanation of this nding is
that the eect of SES on health accumulates over time. The eect of nancial indicators
of SES on health is typically estimated contemporaneously (or with a small delay) and the
wealth eect may be countered by the opportunity cost of time. Education, on the other
hand, is obtained early in life (and hence its eect has had ample time to accumulate)
and education potentially increases the eciency of the production and consumption of
curative and preventive care. This may provide an explanation for the strong eect of
education on health outcomes observed in empirical studies (e.g., Grossman, 2000; Lleras-
Muney, 2005; Silles, 2009). It also suggests that the protective eect of SES on health, in
particular education, increases with age (Ross and Wu, 1996; Lynch, 2003).
In order to illustrate the theory and to derive predictions, we have made assumptions
about the nature of the relations between functions of interest. The assumptions (1 to 5)
of diminishing or constant returns to scale are commonly made in economics. If there is
no complementarity in utility of consumption and health (assumption 6) the predictions
would remain the same. If the relation were instead one of substitutability (worse health
improves the utility of consumption), solutions are possible in which greater SES leads
to less investment in curative care. This is generally not observed. If there were no sub-
stitutability in utility of healthy and unhealthy consumption (assumption 7) higher SES
would not lead to a reduction in unhealthy consumption (except for severaly unhealthy
consumption) but would still be associated with a shift toward healthy consumption (a
smaller fraction of a larger budget is devoted to unhealthy consumption).
Our model includes major mechanisms identied in a review of the literature as ex-
plaining (jointly) a large part of the observed disparities in health by SES. Given the
complexity (e.g., Cutler et al. 2011) of the various relations between SES and health, we
39As recognized by, e.g., Mushkin (1962) who noted that \ Health services ...are partly investment
and partly consumption ...An individual wants to get well so that life for him may be more satisfying.
But also when he is well he can perform more eectively as a producer"186 Chapter 5
have focused on potential explanations that a) explain a large part of the gradient and b)
are relatively straightforward to include in our theoretical framework.
Compared to Grossman (1972a; 1972b), Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and Case and
Deaton (2005) the model presented in this paper contains several improvements and ex-
tensions: (i) A distinguishing feature is our interpretation of the relation (5.15) as being
the rst-order condition for optimal health investment Im(t), conditional on the level
of the health stock H(t), rather than the rst-order condition for optimal health H(t).
This interpretation necessitates the assumption of decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRTS) in
the health production function (as in Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990; see also Dustmann and
Windmeijer, 2000; and Liljas, 2000), and addresses the indeterminacy problem (\bang-
bang" solution) for investment in curative care (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990), ensures that
investment in curative (medical) care is non-negative (for the usual assumptions of func-
tional forms), reproduces the observed negative relation between health and the demand
for medical care, nds the health stock to be a function of initial health, past biological
aging and past health investments made, and explains dierences in the level of health
as well as the rate of health decline between low and high SES groups (see Galama, 2011
[Chapter 4]). Addressing these issues has been crucial: unlike alternative life-cycle models
of health, medical care, and SES, our formulation can explain the formation of disparities
in health by SES with age. (ii) We have included the concept of healthy consumption (as
well as unhealthy consumption as in Case and Deaton, 2005) and allow the demand for
consumption to be governed both by the direct monetary price of consumption as well
as the indirect health benet (healthy consumption) or indirect health cost (unhealthy
consumption). Case and Deaton (2005) on the other hand consider an unhealthy con-
sumption good whose price is only paid in terms of health. (iii) We have broadened the
concept of \job-related health stress" to include not only hard/risky labor (as in Case and
Deaton, 2005) but also psychosocial aspects of work that are detrimental to health. (iv)
We have argued that the eect of housing and neighborhood social environment can be
included by extending the denition of healthy consumption as well as exogenous environ-
mental factors to include relevant aspects of housing and neighborhood characteristics.
(v) We have introduced the concept of preventive care.
Numerical methods are required to solve the full model, including endogenous retire-
ment decisions and mortality. With regard to mortality, the model provides a natural way
to include length of life. In Grossman's original formulation (Grossman, 1972a; 1972b)
length of life is determined by a minimum health level Hmin, below which an individual
dies. Endogenous length of life can be incorporated as in Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and
Ehrlich (2000) and simulated and calibrated as in Ehrlich and Yin (2005). With regard to5.4 Discussion and conclusions 187
retirement, as emphasized by Smith (2004) and Case and Deaton (2005), reverse causality
from health to income through labor force participation could be an important mecha-
nism explaining the SES-health gradient. In our model, this could be incorporated by an
endogenous retirement age (as in Galama et al. 2008 [Chapter 3]).
Another important extension of our model would be to incorporate insights from the
literature on socioeconomic dierences in the evolution of child health (e.g., Case et al.
2002; Currie and Stabile, 2003; Currie et al. 2007; Murasko, 2008), and from the literature
on the impact of fetal and early-childhood conditions on health in adulthood (e.g., Barker
et al. 1993; Case et al. 2005; van den Berg et al. 2006).40 This might be feasible by
including the production of health by the family (including the health of the child) similar
to, e.g., Jacobson (2000) and Bolin et al. (2001; 2002a; 2002b).
We do not explicitly take into account the inuence of the wider social context and
social relationships of the family or neighborhood on health (House et al. 1988; Robert,
1998; Kawachi and Berkman, 2003). Less auent areas are more polluted, have lower
quantity and quality of municipal services, have higher crime rates, and are associated
with unhealthy lifestyles (Robert, 1998). Also, the social isolation induced by poor quality
and quantity of social contacts is an important risk factor for health (House et al. 1988).
In our model this is partly captured by the exogenous part of the biological aging rate
(exogenous environmental factors (t)). However, it is likely that social factors are partly
endogenous to socioeconomic status (Robert, 1998). The role of the wider social context,
social relationships, and other psycho-social risk factors (House et al. 1988; 1994; Robert,
1998; Kawachi and Berkman, 2003) can partially be captured in our model by extending
the denition of healthy consumption to include choice of housing / neighborhood social
environment. This might be further extended by including social capital similar to, e.g.,
Bolin et al. (2003).
We have not explicitly included racial and gender disparities in health. Racial cate-
gories importantly capture dierences in power, status, and resources (Williams, 1999).
Dierences in SES between racial groups account for most of the observed racial disparities
in health (Williams and Collins, 1995; Lillie-Blanton et al. 1996). Yet, racial dierences in
health and mortality persist even at \equivalent levels" of SES, and race/ethnicity has an
40The potential inuence of childhood health on education is not included in our formulation as educa-
tion is treated as being predetermined by the time individuals join the labor-force. Childhood conditions
can be accounted for by treating the health status of an individual joining the labor force and investment
in human capital prior to adulthood as initial conditions, i.e., we take initial health H(0) and years of
schooling E as given. Our model is therefore limited to explaining the formation of disparities in health
from early adulthood till old age but not during childhood or the fetal period. As a result, the formulation
cannot model the possible joint determination of education and health.188 Chapter 5
independent eect beyond indicators of socioeconomic status (e.g., House and Williams,
2000). To the extent that racial/ethnic inuences act independently of SES, race/ethnicity
can be included in our formulation through the exogenous component of the biological
aging rate. The same holds for gender disparities in health, if operating independently
of SES (Luchenski et al. 2008). However, it has been argued that gender and race po-
tentially moderate the relation between SES and health. It could be that discrimination
makes it dicult to translate high SES into good health, or that employer discrimination
makes minorities in poor health particularly likely to lose their jobs. The literature is
inconclusive to what extent race/ethnicity and gender moderate the relationship between
SES and health (Matthews et al. 1999; House and Williams, 2000; Luchenski et al. 2008).
Lastly, insights from the behavioral-economic and psychological literature regarding
myopia and lack of self-control (e.g., Blanchower et al. 2009) might be incorporated
following Laibson (1998). Uncertainty (e.g., health shocks) could be included similar to,
e.g., Cropper (1977), Dardanoni and Wagsta (1990), Liljas (1998) and Ehrlich (2000).
Joint determination of health and socioeconomic status due to factors such as intelligence,
cognitive ability and non-cognitive skills may be incorporated by allowing these factors
to raise the eciency of household production in a similar way as education (e.g., Chiteji,
2010).
Empirical estimation of the model is needed to test the assumptions and the theoretical
predictions presented in this work and to assess the relative importance of mechanisms,
study interactions between mechanisms, and disentangle the dierent patterns of causality.
This will require developing structural- and reduced-form relations. Model estimates may
contribute to improving our understanding of the operational roles of major mechanisms




Associated with the Lagrangian (equation 5.12) we have the following conditions:




_ qA(t) =  qA(t) ,
qA(t) = qA(0)e
 t; (5.31)
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Equation (5.33) or (5.34) combined with (5.37) or (5.38) provide the rst-order con-
dition for maximization of (5.12) with respect to healthy consumption (equation 5.19).
Similarly, equation (5.35) or (5.36) combined with (5.37) or (5.38) provide the rst-order
condition for maximization of (5.12) with respect to unhealthy consumption (equation
5.22). Using (5.37) or (5.38) to obtain an expression for _ qH(t) and substituting the results
for qH(t) and _ qH(t) in (5.32) we nd the rst-order condition for maximization of (5.12)
with respect to investment in curative care (equation 5.15). Combining equations (5.37)
or (5.38) and (5.39) to eliminate qH(t) we nd the rst-order condition for maximiza-
tion of (5.12) with respect to job-related health stress (equation 5.25). Lastly, combining
equations (5.37) or (5.38) and (5.40) or (5.41) to eliminate qH(t) we nd the rst-order
condition for maximization of (5.12) with respect to preventive care (equation 5.28).Nederlandse Samenvatting
Inleiding en motivatie
Een van de opmerkelijkste bevindingen in bevolkingsgezondheid is het sterke verband
tussen gezondheid en sociaaleconomische status (SES). Figuur 1.1 (Hoofdstuk 1) toont
de belangrijkste eigenschappen van de SES gezondheidsgradi ent in de V.S. (linkerkant)
en Nederland (rechtse kant) door op elke leeftijd de fractie mensen die in slechte of ma-
tige gezondheid zijn (zelfrapportage) in kaart te brengen per kwartiel van gezinsinkomen
(kwartiel 1 vertegenwoordigt de laagste en kwartiel 4 de hoogste gezinsinkomens; kwartie-
len zijn leeftijdsgebonden). Op elke leeftijd is een lager inkomen geassocieerd met slechtere
gezondheid.
De gezondheidsverschillen met inkomen zijn groot. Bijvoorbeeld, de fractie in slechte
of matige gezondheid in de V.S. rond 60 jarige leeftijd in het hoogste gezinsinkomens-
kwartiel, met ongeveer 8 procent, is zowat 35 procent kleiner dan de fractie in het laagste
inkomenskwartiel, met ongeveer 44 procent (linkerkant van Figuur 1.1). Case en Deaton
(2005) laten zien hoe in de V.S. een 20 jarige man met laag inkomen (laagste kwartiel
van familie inkomen) dezelfde gemiddelde gezondheid rapporteert als een 60 jarige man
met hoog inkomen (hoogste kwartiel). In Glasgow, Verenigd Koninkrijk, is de levensver-
wachting van mensen in de armste gebieden 54 jaar, vergeleken met 82 in de meest rijke
(Hanlon et al. 2006).
Niet alleen hebben individuen met lage SES een slechtere gezondheid maar hun ge-
zondheid gaat ook sneller achteruit dan de gezondheid van individuen met hoge SES.
De ongelijkheid in gezondheid tussen lage en hoge SES groepen lijkt te stijgen over de
levenscyclus tot aan leeftijden van ongeveer 50-60 jaar, waarna zij lijkt te versmallen (zie,
bijvoorbeeld, Figuur 1.1). Vergelijkbare verbanden worden gevonden voor andere indica-
toren van SES, zoals opleiding en vermogen, en andere indicatoren van gezondheid, zoals
aanvang van chronische ziekten, invaliditeit en mortaliteit (zie bijvoorbeeld Adler et al.
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Velen vinden deze grote verschillen in gezondheid tussen SES groepen sociaal onrecht-
vaardig. Het idee is dat dergelijke verschillen in gezondheid te vermijden zijn en het gevolg
zijn van de omstandigheden waarin mensen opgroeien, leven, werken en ouder worden,
en van de ziekenverzorgingsystemen (zie bijvoorbeeld CSDH, 2008). Met dit in gedach-
ten, heeft de Commissie van de Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie (de WGO) over de Sociale
Determinanten van Gezondheid (CSDH) opgeroepen tot wereldwijde actie betreende
de sociale determinanten van gezondheid met het doel gezondheidsgelijkheid te bereiken
binnen een generatie (CSDH, 2008).
Dit edele doel, echter, wordt belemmerd door het feit dat de oorzaken van sociaaleco-
nomische gezondheidsongelijkheden niet goed worden begrepen. Onderzoek in meerdere
disciplines (met inbegrip van epidemiologie, sociologie, demograe, psychologie, evolutie-
biologie en economie) laat zien dat er meerdere verklaringen mogelijk zijn, dat er gebrek
aan consensus is betreende het relatieve belang van de verschillende mechanismen (in de
verklaring van het fenomeen) en dat het moeilijk is om causaliteit, laat staan de onder-
liggende mechanismen, vast te stellen (zie bijvoorbeeld Cutler et al. 2011). Bijvoorbeeld,
een causaal beschermend eect van opleiding op gezondheid is vastgesteld (lleras-Muney,
2005; Oreopoulos, 2006; van Kippersluis et al. 2011) maar het is niet precies duidelijk
hoe hoger opgeleiden hun gezondheidsvoordeel verkrijgen.
Sommige voorgestelde mechanismen impliceren dat SES de gezondheid be nvloedt
(veroorzaakt), andere mechanismen nu juist dat gezondheid SES bepaalt, en weer andere
mechanismen dat SES en gezondheid gezamenlijk worden bepaald, zonder een direct oor-
zakelijk verband. Sommige mechanismen kunnen in alle drie de categorie en vallen. Moge-
lijke verklaringen voor de sociaaleconomische gradi ent in gezondheid omvatten: toegang
tot medische zorg, de rol die gezondheid speelt in arbeidsparticipatie, gezondheidsgedrag
(bijvoorbeeld roken, drinken, sport), psychosociale en milieurisicofactoren, het sociale
milieu van de buurt, sociale verhoudingen en sociale steun, mate van controle, omstan-
digheden in de foetale fase en de vroege kinderjaren, en fysieke, chemische, biologische en
psychosociale factoren op het werk. Zogenaamde \derde factoren"-verklaringen poneren
dat individuele verschillen, bijvoorbeeld, in tijdsvoorkeur en in de mate waarin een indi-
vidu in staat is om zelfcontrole uit te oefenen, SES en gezondheid op een vergelijkbare
manier kunnen be nvloeden met als gevolg de waargenomen sociaaleconomische gezond-
heidsgradi ent. Mogelijk kunnen meerdere verklaringen elk een stukje aan het oplossen van
het raadsel bijdragen (voor een overzicht zie Galama en van Kippersluis, 2010 [Hoofdstuk
5]).
Kennis van het relatieve belang van de verschillende causale mechanismen verantwoor-
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gebrek aan een voldoende uitvoerige theorie. Zonder kennis van de onderliggende mecha-
nismen is het moeilijk om beleid te ontwikkelen dat in staat is de ongelijkheid eectief
en eci ent te verminderen (Deaton, 2002). Daarom is het integreren van de rollen van
voorgestelde mechanismen en hun eect op de lange termijn in een theoretisch kader een
essenti ele eerste stap voor het ontwikkelen van en de evaluatie van doeltreend beleid.
Zo'n kader staat onderzoekers in meerdere disciplines toe om het relatieve belang van elk
voorgesteld mechanisme en de interactie tussen mechanismen vast te stellen en de die-
renti ele patronen van causaliteit te ontwaren. Case en Deaton (2005) beargumenteren dat
het uiterst moeilijk is om de verbanden tussen gezondheid, opleiding, inkomen en arbeid-
participatie te begrijpen zonder een of ander leidend theoretisch kader. Het is daarom
geen verrassing dat meerdere auteurs (zie bijvoorbeeld Case en Deaton, 2005; Cutler et
al. 2011) hebben gewezen op het ontbreken van een theorie van SES en gezondheid over
de levenscyclus en het belang hebben benadrukt deze te ontwikkelen.
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om een bijdrage te leveren aan een theorie van sociaal-
economische verschillen in gezondheid over het leven. De beperkte vooruitgang tot dusver
is mogelijk het gevolg van de volgende factoren. Een aantal van de voorgestelde mecha-
nismen hebben directe gevolgen op korte termijn, meerdere werken echter op de langere
termijn, bijvoorbeeld, door een vrij klein maar blijvend eect op het verouderingsproces of
op de snelheid van vermogensopbouw. Ongelijkheden in gezondheid, evenals verschillen in
SES (bijvoorbeeld vermogen) bouwen op over de levenscyclus, en zijn aanzienlijk groter op
late leeftijd. Met andere woorden, om de bijdrage van elke individuele verklaring volledig
te kunnen beoordelen is het essentieel om processen over de gehele levenscyclus te modelle-
ren. Een geschikt kader waarin de veelvoudige mechanismen en hun cumulatieve eect op
lange termijn kunnen worden bestudeerd is een structureel model van SES en gezondheid
over de levenscyclus. Structurele economische levenscyclusmodellen, waarin individuen
hun nut (utility) maximaliseren over het leven, hebben waardevol inzicht in economisch
gedrag zoals consumptie, spaargedrag, en arbeidsparticipatie geleverd. Echter, tot zeer
recent leden levenscyclusmodellen van gezondheid, medische zorg, en sociaaleconomische
status onder ernstige technische problemen.
De hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 van dit proefschrift zijn daarom gericht op het behandelen
van deze technische kwesties. Hoofdstuk 5 stelt vervolgens een theorie van sociaalecono-
mische ongelijkheid in gezondheid over de levenscyclus voor.196 Nederlandse samenvatting
Overzicht van dit promotieonderzoek
Het onderzoek gepresenteerd in dit proefschrift begon met een eenvoudig idee: om een
theorie van gezondheid en pensionering op te stellen. Economen hebben aangetoond dat
een belangrijk deel van de gezondheidsverschillen met nanci ele indicatoren van SES kan
worden verklaard door het feit dat een slechte gezondheid de mogelijkheid om te werken
beperkt, waardoor het inkomen verminderd (Smith, 1999, 2004, 2007). Pensionering is
dus een essentieel onderdeel van een theorie van SES en gezondheid.
Onze benadering was om het pensioneringsbesluit te integreren in de formulering van
het standaard model van de vraag naar gezondheid en gezondheidsinvestering (Grossman,
1972a, 1972b). In het model van Grossman is de vraag naar medische zorg bepaald door
de consumptievoordelen (gezondheid verstrekt nut) en de productievoordelen (gezonde
individuen hebben een hoger inkomen) die een goede gezondheid oplevert. Het model is
mogelijk  e en van de belangrijkste bijdragen van de Economie tot de studie van gezond-
heidsgedrag geweest. Het model is het standaard kader voor het bestuderen van de vraag
naar gezondheid en medische zorg geworden, en er bestaan nog relatief weinig theoretische
uitbreidingen en alternatieve economische modellen.
Het integreren van het pensioneringsbesluit in de gezondheidsproductieliteratuur (de
literatuur die naar aanleiding van de artikelen van Grossman in 1972 ontwikkeld is) was
echter niet zo makkelijk. Een belangrijk artefact van de oplossing voor gezondheid was
een discontinu teit bij de leeftijd van pensionering (zie Galama et al., 2008 [Hoofdstuk
3]). De theorie voorspelde dat onmiddellijk na pensionering de gezondheid een lagere
waarde zou hebben (of een hogere waarde) ten gevolge van de substitutie van gezondheid
voor vrije tijd en de afwezigheid van een productievoordeel (tijdens pensionering levert
gezondheid geen productievoordeel op aangezien gepensioneerden geen loon verdienen).
Dit kan niet correct zijn. Gezondheid is een voorraad en in tegenstelling tot stromen
(zoals gezondheidsinvestering en consumptie) kan een voorraad niet onmiddellijk worden
aangepast. De gezondheid kan slechts geleidelijk aan door gezondheidsinvestering en
biologische veroudering veranderen.
Hoofdstuk 2 (Galama en Kapteyn, 2009) onderzoekt een algemene oplossing van het
Grossman model, waarin we de gebruikelijke aanname verwerpen dat individuen hun ge-
zondheidsvoorraad instantaan aan een \optimaal" niveau kunnen aanpassen zonder aan-
passingskosten. Het model voorspelt het bestaan van een gezondheidsdrempel waarboven
individuen geen vraag naar medische zorg hebben (een hoekoplossing). Wij vinden dat
de algemene oplossing een groter aantal empirische waarnemingen kan verklaren dan de
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Hoofdstuk 3 (Galama et al. 2008) formuleert vervolgens een gestileerd structureel
model van gezondheid, vermogensopbouw en het pensioneringsbesluit, waarbij we de al-
gemene oplossing gebruiken die in Hoofdstuk 2 werd ontwikkeld. We leiden analytische
oplossingen af voor de tijdspaden van consumptie, gezondheid, gezondheidsinvestering,
vermogensopbouw en pensionering. We vinden dat verbetering in bevolkingsgezondheid
de pensioneringsleeftijd vermindert, terwijl tegelijkertijd individuen pensioneren wanneer
hun gezondheid verslechterd. Dit verklaart mogelijk waarom gepensioneerden verslechte-
rende gezondheid als belangrijke reden voor vroege pensionering geven, terwijl de pen-
sioneringsleeftijd in de ontwikkelde wereld, ondanks de voortdurende verbetering van de
bevolkingsgezondheid en de levensduur, is blijven dalen. Het model voorspelt verder dat
individuen met veel menselijk kapitaal meer in gezondheid investeren en, omdat zij ge-
zonder blijven, later met pensioen gaan dan individuen met minder menselijk kapitaal,
waarvan de gezondheid sneller verslechtert.
Terwijl de hoekoplossingen die in Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 worden gebruikt aanvankelijk
veelbelovend leken, bleven er problemen bestaan met de eigenschappen van de oplossin-
gen voor gezondheid en gezondheidsinvestering. Bijvoorbeeld, de voorspellingen van het
model zijn karikaturen van de werkelijkheid: in de hoekoplossing investeren gezonde in-
dividuen in zijn geheel niet in gezondheid, terwijl in werkelijkheid de meeste mensen de
dokter minstens  e en keer per jaar zien. Een bestudering van de literatuur liet zien dat er
minstens vijf belangrijke beperkingen van gezondheidsproductie modellen ge denticeerd
waren (zie Hoofdstuk 4). In het kort zijn dit: a) het probleem dat de oplossing voor het
niveau van investering in gezondheid niet bepaald is (Ehrlich en Chuma, 1990), b) het
onvermogen van het model om de waargenomen negatieve relatie tussen gezondheid en
de vraag naar medische zorg te voorspellen (Wagsta, 1986a; Zweifel and Breyer, 1997),
c) het onvermogen van het model om verschillen in de snelheid van gezondheidsverslech-
tering (niet alleen het niveau) tussen sociaaleconomische groepen te verklaren (Case en
Deaton, 2005), d) het gebrek aan \geheugen" in de modeloplossingen (Usher, 1975) en
e) de noodzaak om de aanname te maken dat het biologisch verouderingsproces versnelt
met leeftijd zodat het leven eindig is, zodat gezondheid verslechtert naarmate men ouder
wordt, en zodat men de waargenomen toename van de vraag naar medische zorg aan het
einde van het leven kan reproduceren (Case en Deaton, 2005).
Ehrlich en Chuma (1990) wijzen erop dat de algemene aanname in de literatuur van
een lineaire relatie tussen de productie van gezondheid en de consumptie van medische
zorg er toe leidt dat er geen oplossing voor het optimale niveau van gezondheidsinvestering
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Dit suggereert dat het wellicht de moeite waard is deze aanname eens te herzien door
een meer exibele functionele relatie toe te laten tussen de productie van gezondheid en
de consumptie van medische zorg. Dit bleek een belangrijke stap in dit onderzoek te zijn.
Echter, het was in dat stadium van mijn promotieonderzoek verre van duidelijk dat dit
daadwerkelijk iets zou opleveren. Ten eerste was het resultaat van Ehrlich en Chuma be-
twist (Reid, 1998; Grossman, 2000). Ten tweede, werd er algemeen verondersteld dat een
meer exibel gezondheidsproductieproces de complexiteit van het probleem substantieel
zou vergroten waardoor theoretische en econometrische analyse zeer moeilijk zou worden
(Grossman, 2000, p. 364). Deze veronderstelling was wellicht versterkt door het feit dat
Ehrlich en Chuma (1990) hun toevlucht moesten nemen tot vergelijkende dynamica om de
eigenschappen van het model te illustreren. Deze techniek (Oniki, 1973) is een gevoelig-
heidsanalyse waarin het richtingseect van een parameterverandering bepaald kan worden.
Ehrlich en Chuma (1990) konden dus niet meer dan de richting (maar bijvoorbeeld niet
de grootte) van een verandering in een parameterwaarde voorspellen. Ten derde, was het
niet duidelijk dat een meer exibel gezondheidsproductieprocess de aard van het model
wezenlijk zou veranderen. Bijvoorbeeld, er werd algemeen verondersteld dat het optimale
gezondheidsniveau dan geleidelijk aan bereikt zou worden i.p.v. ogenblikkelijk (Gross-
man, 2000, p. 364) { wellicht niet een voldoende belangrijke verbetering van het model
om de grotere complexiteit te rechtvaardigen. Mogelijk als gevolg van de bovengenoemde
factoren heeft men in de literatuur, ondanks het werk van Ehrlich en Chuma (1990), nooit
een exibel gezondheidsproductieproces ingevoerd.41 Dus het verder ontwikkelen van een
model met een exibel gezondheidsproductieproces was nog niet serieus gedaan.
Hoofdstuk 4 (Galama, 2011) presenteert een theorie van de vraag naar gezondheid, ge-
zondheidsinvestering en levensduur, gebaseerd op het werk van Grossman (1972a, 1972b)
en Ehrlich en Chuma (1990). In dit hoofdstuk lever ik verscheidene bijdragen aan de
literatuur. Ten eerste stel ik een nieuwe interpretatie van de evenwichtsvoorwaarde van
de gezondheidsvoorraad voor dan gebruikelijk is in de literatuur. Dit is  e en van de meest
centrale relaties in de literatuur van de gezondheidsproductie: deze relatie bepaald het
optimale niveau van gezondheidsinvestering (en niet de gezondheidsvoorraad zoals alge-
meen wordt verondersteld). Ten tweede toon ik aan dat deze alternatieve interpretatie
een meer exibel gezondheidsproductieproces vereist (anders bestaat er geen oplossing
voor het optimaliseringprobleem; Ehrlich en Chuma, 1990). Ten derde onderzoek ik in
detail de gevolgen van mijn nieuwe interpretatie en van het toelaten van een exibel
gezondheidsproductieproces, en toon aan dat dit de vijf technische problemen in deze li-
41De enige uitzondering is wellicht een ongepubliceerd artikel van Dustmann en Windmeijer (2000) die
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teratuur kan oplossen. In tegenstelling tot de gezondheidsproductieliteratuur voorspel ik
een negatieve correlatie tussen gezondheidsinvestering en gezondheid, dat de gezondheid
van rijke en hoger opgeleide individuen langzamer daalt en dat zij langer leven, dat de
huidige gezondheidsstatus een functie van het aanvankelijke niveau van gezondheid en van
de historie van vroeger gemaakte gezondheidsinvesteringen is, dat gezondheidsinvestering
snel stijgt naarmate het leven eindigt en dat de lengte van het leven eindig is. Ten vierde
leid ik structurele relaties tussen gezondheid en gezondheidsinvestering af (bijvoorbeeld
medische zorg) die geschikt zijn voor het empirisch testen van de voorspellingen van het
model. Deze structurele relaties bevatten het lineaire gezondheidsproductieproces als spe-
ciaal geval waardoor zij toelaten om deze algemene veronderstelling in de literatuur te
veri eren of te verwerpen. Ten vijfde merk ik op dat de theorie niet het algemene begrip
steunt dat individuen een bepaald \optimaal" niveau van de gezondheid nastreven. In-
dividuen beslissen over het optimale niveau van gezondheidsinvestering maar kiezen niet
een gewenst niveau van gezondheid.
Met deze essenti ele aanpassingen kan onze formulering een groter aantal waargeno-
men empirische patronen verklaren. De resultaten suggereren verder dat het Grossman
model een geschikte basis vormt voor de ontwikkeling van een levenscyclusmodel van de
SES-gezondheidsgradi ent. Hoofdstuk 5 (Galama en van Kippersluis, 2010) voltooit dit
promotieonderzoek en presenteert een levenscyclusmodel dat veelvoudige mechanismen
bevat die (gezamenlijk) mogelijk een groot deel van de waargenomen ongelijkheden in
gezondheid met SES kunnen verklaren. Het theoretisch kader omvat vereenvoudigde wis-
kundige representaties van belangrijke mechanismen, hetgeen ons toestaat ons begrip van
hun operationele rol te verbeteren in het verklaren van de SES gezondheidsgradi ent en
voorspellingen te maken. Ons uitgangspunt is de gezondheidsproductieliteratuur die naar
aanleiding van het werk van Grossman (1972a; 1972b) ontwikkeld is en de uitbreidingen
van dit model door Ehrlich en Chuma (1990) en Case en Deaton (2005). Onze bijdrage
is als volgt.
Ten eerste gebruiken wij de alternatieve interpretatie van de evenwichtsvoorwaarde
voor gezondheid (zoals in Galama, 2011 [Hoofdstuk 4]). Dit lost de vijf technische pro-
blemen in deze literatuur op.
Echter gebruik van medische diensten en toegang tot zorg verklaart slechts een deel
van de relatie tussen SES en gezondheid (Adler et al. 1993). Onze tweede bijdrage is
daarom vele potenti ele mechanismen in het model op te nemen die mogelijk de ongelijk-
heden in gezondheid tussen SES groepen kunnen verklaren. Een belangrijk concept in
ons werk is \gezondheidsstressoren ten gevolge van werkomstandigheden". Dit concept
kan ruim worden ge nterpreteerd als de gezondheidsgevolgen van fysieke werk omstan-200 Nederlandse samenvatting
digheden (bijvoorbeeld zware arbeid) maar ook van de psychosociale aspecten van werk
(bijvoorbeeld lage status, beperkte controle, veel herhaling, enz.). Het idee is dat aspecten
van werk die schadelijk zijn voor de gezondheid geassocieerd zijn met een loonpremie (een
compenserend loonverschil). Andere belangrijke eigenschappen van het model zijn levens-
stijlfactoren (preventieve zorg, gezonde en ongezonde consumptie), curatieve (medische)
zorg, pensionering en mortaliteit.
Wij vinden dat groter aanvankelijk vermogen, permanent hoger inkomen (over de
levenscyclus) en een hoger niveau van opleiding, individuen er toe aanzet om meer te
investeren in curatieve en in preventieve zorg, gezonder te consumeren, en gezondere
werkomgevingen en woonmilieus te kiezen. Aanvankelijk vermogen, permanent inkomen
en hogere opleiding, verhoogt de vraag naar curatieve zorg. De marginale kosten van
curatieve zorg worden daardoor verhoogd. Hogere marginale kosten van curatieve zorg
verhogen het gezondheidsvoordeel van preventieve zorg en gezonde consumptie, en verho-
gen de gezondheidskosten van ongezonde werk- en woonmilieus, en ongezonde consumptie.
Gezamenlijk leiden deze gedragskeuzen geleidelijk aan tot een substantieel gezondheids-
voordeel met leeftijd. Verder voorspelt het model een aanvankelijke verwijding en mogelijk
een latere vernauwing van de SES-gezondheidsgradi ent, aangezien lage SES individuen
hun gezondheidsinvestering sneller verhogen en hun gedrag sneller verbeteren als gevolg
van hun snellere achteruitgang in gezondheid. Resultaten van eerdere studies (Ehrlich en
Chuma, 1990; Ehrlich, 2000; Galama et al. 2008 [Hoofdstuk 3]) suggereren dat de sneller
verslechterende gezondheid van lage SES individuen tot vroege terugtrekking uit de ar-
beidsmarkt kan leiden (en daarmee mogelijk de verwijding van de gradi ent op vroege en
middelbare leeftijd verklaart), en tot kortere levens leidt (en daarmee mogelijk de latere
versmalling van de gradi ent verklaart). Ons model is dus in staat een aantal empirische
gezondheidspatronen te verklaren. Een dergelijk model bestond nog niet eerder en eco-
nomen hebben het belang benadrukt van het ontwikkelen van zo'n theoretisch kader voor
het begrijpen van de complexe relaties tussen indicatoren van SES en gezondheid over de
levenscyclus (Cutler et al. 2011; Case en Deaton, 2005).References
Adler, N.E., Boyce, T., Chesney, M., Folkman, S. and Syme, L. (1993), \Socioeconomic
inequalities in health: no easy solution", Journal of the American Medical Association,
269: pp. 3140-3145.
Adler, N.E., Boyce, T., Chesney, M.A., Cohen, S., Folkman, S., Kahn, R.L., Syme, S.L.
(1994), \Socioeconomic status and health: the challenge of the gradient", American Psy-
chologist, 49(1): pp. 15-24.
Almond, D. (2006), \Is the 1918 inuenza pandemic over? Long-term eects of in utero
inuenza exposure in the post-1940 U.S. population", Journal of Political Economy, 114:
pp. 562-712.
Auld, M.C. and Sidhu, N. (2005), \Schooling, cognitive ability, and health", Health Eco-
nomics, 14(10): pp. 1019-1034.
Banks, J., Blundell, R. and Tanner, S. (1998), \Is there a retirement-savings puzzle?",
American Economic Review, 88(4): pp. 769-788.
Barker, D., Gluckman, P.D., Godgrey, K.M., Harding, J.E., Owens, J.A. and Robinson,
J.S. (1993), \Fetal nutrition and cardiovascular disease in adult life", Lancet, 341(8850):
pp. 938-941.
Barsky, R.B., Juster, F.T., Kimball, M.S. and Shapiro, M.D. (1997), \Preference parame-
ters and behavioral heterogeneity: an experimental approach in the health and retirement
study", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2): pp. 537-579.202 References
Bazzoli, G.J. (1985), \The early retirement decision: new empirical evidence on the in-
uence of health", The Journal of Human Resources, 20(2): pp. 214-234.
Beckett, M. (2000), \Converging health inequalities in later life: an artifact of mortality
selection?", Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 41: pp. 106-119.
Behrman, J.R. and Rosenzweig, M.R. (2004), \Returns to birth weight", Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 86(2): pp. 586-601.
Bernheim, B.D., Skinner, J. and Weinberg, S. (2001), \What accounts for the variation
in retirement wealth among U.S. households?", American Economic Review, 91(4): pp.
832-857.
Black, S.E., Devereux, P.J. and Salvanes, K.G. (2007), \From the cradle to the labor
market? The eect of birth weight on adult outcomes", Quarterly Journal of Economics,
122(1): pp. 409-439.
Blanchower, D.G., Oswald, A.J., van Landeghem, B. (2009), \Imitative obesity and rel-
ative utility", Journal of the European Economic Association, 7: pp. 528-538.
Blau, D.M. (2008), \Retirement and consumption in a life cycle model", Journal of Labor
Economics, 26: pp 35-71.
Blau, D.M. and Goodstein, R. (2010), \Can social security explain trends in labor force
participation of older men in the United States?", Journal of Human Resources, 45(2):
pp. 328-363.
Bleakley, H. (2007), \Disease and development: evidence from hookworm eradication in
the American South", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1): pp. 73-117.
Blundell, R. and MaCurdy, T. (2000), \Labor Supply", In: Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D.
(eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland: pp. 1559-1695.
Bolin, K., Jacobson, L. and Lindgren, B. (2001), \The family as the producer of health -
when spouses are Nash bargainers", Journal of Health Economics, 20: pp. 349-362.References 203
Bolin, K., Jacobson, L. and Lindgren, B. (2002a), \Employer investments in employee
health { implications for the family as health producer", Journal of Health Economics,
21: pp. 563-583.
Bolin, K., Jacobson, L. and Lindgren, B. (2002b), \The family as the health producer {
when spouses act strategically", Journal of Health Economics, 21: pp. 475-495.
Bolin, K., Lindgren, B., Lindstrom, M., and Nystedt, P. (2003), \Investments in social
capital { implications of social interactions for the production of health", Social Science
and Medicine, 56(12): pp. 2379-2390.
Borg, V. and Kristensen, T.S. (2000), \Social class and self-rated health: can the gra-
dient be explained by dierences in life style or work environment?", Social Science and
Medicine, 51: pp. 1019-1030
Case, A. and Deaton, A. (2005). \Broken down by work and sex: how our health de-
clines", In: Wise, D.A. (ed.), Analyses in the Economics of Aging, The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 185-212.
Case, A., Lubotsky, D. and Paxson, C. (2002), \Economic status and health in childhood:
the origins of the gradient", American Economic Review, 92: pp. 1308-1334.
Case A., Fertig, A. and Paxson, C. (2005), \The lasting impact of childhood health and
circumstance", Journal of Health Economics, 24(2): pp. 365-389.
Chiteji, N. (2010), \Time preference, non-cognitive skills and well being across the life
course: do non-cognitive skills encourage healthy behavior?", American Economic Re-
view: Papers and Proceedings, 100: pp. 200-204.
Cochrane, A.L., St Leger, A.S, and Moore, F. (1978), \Health service `input' and mor-
tality `output' in developed countries", Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health,
32: pp. 200-205
Coe, N.B. and Zamarro, G. (2010), \Retirement eects on health in Europe", Journal of
Health Economics (forthcoming).204 References
Contoyannis, P. and Rice, N. (2001), \The impact of health on wages: evidence from the
British Household Panel Survey", Empirical Economics, 26: pp. 599-622.
Contoyannis, P., Jones, A.M. and Rice, N. (2004), \The dynamics of health in the British
Household Panel Survey", Journal of Applied Econometrics, 19(4): pp. 473-503.
Cropper, M.L. (1977), \Health, investment in health, and occupational choice", Journal
of Political Economy, 85: pp. 1273-1294.
Cropper, M.L. (1981), \Measuring the benets from reduced morbidity", The American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Third Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association, 71(2): pp. 235-240.
CSDH (2008), \Closing the gap in a generation: health equity through action on the
social determinants of health", Final Report of the Commission on Social Determinants
of Health, Geneva, World Health Organization.
Currie, J. and Madrian, B.C. (1999), \Health, health insurance and the labour market",
In: Ashenfelter, O., Card, D. (eds.), Handbook of labour economics, 3: pp. 3309-3415,
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V.
Currie, J. and Stabile, M. (2003), \Socioeconomic status and child health: why is the re-
lationship stronger for older children?", American Economic Review, 93: pp. 1813-1823.
Currie, A., Shields, M. and Price, W. (2007), \The child health/family income gradient:
evidence from England", Journal of Health Economics, 26: pp. 213-232.
Cutler, D.M. and A. Lleras-Muney (2008), \Education and health: evaluating theories
and evidence", in Robert F. Schoeni et al. (eds.), Making Americans Healthier: Social
and Economic Policy As Health Policy, National Poverty Center Series on Poverty and
Public Policy: pp 29-60
Cutler, D.M., Lleras-Muney, A. and Vogl, T. (2011), \Socioeconomic status and health:
dimensions and mechanisms", Oxford Handbook of Health Economics, forthcoming.References 205
Dardanoni, V. and Wagsta, A. (1987), \Uncertainty, inequalities in health and the de-
mand for health", Journal of Health Economics, 6: pp. 283-290.
Dardanoni, V. and Wagsta, A. (1990), \Uncertainty and the demand for medical care",
Journal of Health Economics, 9: pp. 23-38.
Dave, D., Rashad, I., and Spasojevic, J. (2006), \The eects of retirement on physical
and mental health outcomes", NBER Working Paper 12123.
Deary, I. (2008), \Why do intelligent people live longer?" Nature 456: pp. 175-176.
Deaton, A. (2002), \Policy implications of the gradient of health and wealth", Health
Aairs, 21(2): pp. 13-30.
De Serpa, A.C. (1971), \A theory of the economics of time", The Economic Journal,
81(324): pp. 828-846.
Duncan, G.J. and Holmlund, B. (1983), \Was Adam Smith right after all? Another test
of the theory of compensating wage dierentials", Journal of Labor Economics, 1(4): pp.
366-379.
Dustmann, C., and Windmeijer, F. (2000), \Wages and the demand for health { a life
cycle analysis", IZA Discussion Paper 171, Germany.
Dwyer, D.S. and Mitchell, O.S. (1999), \Health problems as determinants of retirement:
are self-rated measures endogenous?," Journal of Health Economics, 18(2): pp. 173-193.
Ehrlich, I. and Chuma, H. (1990), \A model of the demand for longevity and the value
of life extension", Journal of Political Economy, 98(4): pp. 761-782.
Elo, I.T. and S.H. Preston (1996), \Educational dierentials in mortality: United States,
1979-85", Social Science and Medicine, 42: pp. 47-57.
Erbsland, M., Ried, W. and Ulrich, V. (2002), \Health, health care, and the environment:
econometric evidence from German micro data", In: Econometric Analysis of Health Data,206 References
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, pp. 25-36.
Finkelstein, A., Luttmer, E.F.P. and Notowidigdo, M.J. (2008) \What good is wealth
without health? The eect of health on the marginal utility of consumption", NBER
Working Paper 14089.
Forster, M. (2001), \The meaning of death: some simulations of a model of healthy and
unhealthy consumption, Journal of Health Economics, 20: pp: 613-638.
French, E. and J.B. Jones (2007), \The eects of health insurance and self-insurance on
retirement behavior", MRRC working paper 2007-170
Fonseca, F., Michaud, P.-C., Galama, T. and Kapteyn, A. (2009) \On the rise of health
spending and longevity", RAND Working Paper, WR-722.
Fuchs, V.R. (1982), \Time preferences and health: an exploratory study", in Victor Fuchs
(ed.), Economic Aspects of Health, Chicago: U. Chicago Press: pp. 93-120.
Fuchs, V.R. (1986), The Health Economy, rst ed. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Galama, T.J., Kapteyn, A., Fonseca, F., Michaud, P.C. (2008), \Grossman's health
threshold and retirement", RAND Working Paper, WR-658.
Galama, T.J. and Kapteyn, A. (2009), \Grossman's missing health threshold", RAND
Working Paper, WR-684.
Galama, T.J. and van Kippersluis, H. (2010), \A theory of socioeconomic disparities in
health over the life cycle", RAND Working Paper, WR-773.
Galama, T.J. (2011), \A contribution to health capital theory", RAND Working Paper,
WR-831.
Gerdtham, U.G., Johannesson, M., Lundberg, L. and Isacson D. (1999), \The demand
for health: results from new measures of health capital", European Journal of PoliticalReferences 207
Economy, 15(3): pp. 501-521.
Gerdtham, U.G., and Johannesson, M. (1999), \New estimates of the demand for health:
results based on a categorical health measure and Swedish micro data", Social science
and medicine, 49(10): pp. 1325-1332.
Glied, S. and Lleras-Muney, A. (2008), \Technological innovation and inequality in health",
Demography, 45(3): pp. 741-761.
Goldman, D.P. and Smith, J.P. (2002), \Can patient self-management help explain the
SES health gradient?", Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 99: pp. 10929-
10934.
Grossman, M. (1972a), \The demand for health - a theoretical and empirical investiga-
tion", New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Grossman, M. (1972b), \On the concept of health capital and the demand for health",
Journal of Political Economy, 80(2): pp. 223-255.
Grossman, M. (1998), \On optimal length of life", Journal of Health Economics, 17: pp
499-509.
Grossman, M. (2000), \The human capital model", In Culyer, A.J. and Newhouse, J.P.
(Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics, Volume 1, pp. 347-408, Elsevier Science.
Gruber, J., and D. Wise (eds) (1999), Social security and retirement around the world,
University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
Gruber, J., and D. Wise (eds) (2004), Social security programs and retirement around the
world: micro-estimation, University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
Gruber, J., and D. Wise (eds) (2010), Social security programs and retirement around the
world: the relationship to youth employment, University of Chicago Press: Chicago.208 References
Hanlon, P., Walsh D., and Whyte, B. (2006), \Let Glasgow ourish", Glasgow: Glasgow
Centre for Population Health.
Herd, P., Schoeni, R.F. and House, J.S. (2008), \Upstream solutions: does the supple-
mental security income program reduce disability in the elderly?", Milbank Quarterly,
86(1): pp. 5-45.
House, J.S., Landis, K.R., and Umberson, D. (1988), \Social relationships and health",
Science, 241(4865): pp. 540-545.
House, J.S., Kessler, R.C., Regula Herzog, A. (1990), \Age, socioeconomic status, and
health", Milbank Quarterly, 68(3): pp. 383-411.
House, J.S., Lepkowski, J.M., Kinney, A.M., Mero, R.P., Kessler, R.C., Regula Herzog,
A. (1994), \The social stratication of aging and health", Journal of Health and Social
Behavior, 35(3): pp. 213-234.
House, J.S. and D.R. Williams (2000), \Understanding and reducing socioeconomic and
racial/ethnic disparities in health", In: Smedley, B.D. and Syme, S.L. (eds.), Promoting
Health: Intervention Strategies from Social and Behavioral Research, Washington, DC:
284 National Academy Press: pp. 81-124.
Hurd, M. and Rohwedder, S. (2003), \The retirement-consumption puzzle: anticipated
and actual declines in spending at retirement", NBER Working Paper 9586.
Hurd, M. and Rohwedder, S. (2006), \Some answers to the retirement-consumption puz-
zle", NBER Working Paper 12057.
Jacobson, L. (2000), \The family as producer of health { an extension of the Grossman
model", Journal of Health Economics, 19: pp. 611-637.
Kapteyn, A. and Panis, C. (2005), \Institutions and saving for retirement: comparing
the United States, Italy, and the Netherlands" in: David A. Wise (ed.), Analyses in the
economics of aging, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 281-316.References 209
Kawachi, I., and Berkman, L. (Eds.) (2003), Neighborhoods and health, Oxford, U.K.:
Oxford University Press.
Kirk, D. (1970), Optimal control theory: an introduction, Prentice-Hall.
Khang, Y.H., Lynch, J.W., Yang, S., Harper, S., Yun, S.C., Jung-Choi, K., et al. (2009),
\The contribution of material, psychosocial, and behavioral factors in explaining edu-
cational and occupational mortality inequalities in a nationally representative sample of
South Koreans: relative and absolute perspectives", Social Science and Medicine, 68(5):
pp. 858-866.
Kunst, A.E. and J.P. Mackenbach (1994), \The size of mortality dierences associated
with educational level in nine industrialized countries", American Journal of Public Health,
84: pp. 932-937.
Laibson, D. (1998), \Life-cycle consumption and hyperbolic discount functions", Euro-
pean Economics Review, 42: pp. 861-871.
Lantz, P.M., House, J.S., Lepkowski, J.M., Williams, D.R., Mero, R.P., Chen, J. (1998),
\Socioeconomic factors, health behaviors, and mortality { results from a nationally repre-
sentative prospective study of U.S. adults", Journal of the American Medical Association,
279(21): pp. 1703-1708.
Leu, R.E. and Doppman, R.J. (1986), \Gesundheitszustandsmessung und Nachfrage nach
Gesundheitsleistungen", In: Wille, E. (Hrsg.) Informations- und Planungsprobleme in of-
fentlichen Aufgabenbereichen, Frankfurt am Main/Bern/New York: Lang 1986, pp. 1-90.
Leu, R.E. and Gern, M. (1992), \Die nachfrage nach gesundheit - ein empirisher test des
Grossman-modells (Demand for health - an empirical test of the Grossman model)", In:
Oberender, P. (Ed.), Steuerungsprobleme im Gesundheitswesen, Baden-Baden: Nomos,
pp. 61-78.
Liljas, B. (1998), \The demand for health with uncertainty and insurance", Journal of
Health Economics, 17(2): pp. 153-170.210 References
Liljas, B. (2000), \Insurance and imperfect nancial markets in Grossman's demand for
health model - a reply to Tabata and Ohkusa", Journal of Health Economics, 19(5): pp.
821-827.
Lillie-Blanton, M., Parsons, P.E., Gayle, H., and Dievler, A. (1996), \Racial dierences in
health: not just black and white, but shades of gray", Annual Review of Public Health,
17: pp. 411-448.
Lleras-Muney, A. and Lichtenberg, F. (2005), \The eect of education on medical technol-
ogy adoption: are the more educated more likely to use new drugs", Annales d'Economie
et Statistique, special issue in memory of Zvi Griliches, No. 79/80: pp. 671-696.
Lleras-Muney, A. (2005), \The relationship between education and adult mortality in the
United States", Review of Economic Studies, 72(1): pp. 189-221.
Luchenski, S., Quesnel-Vallee, A, Lynch, J. (2008), \Dierences between women's and
men's socioeconomic inequalities in health: longitudinal analysis of the Canadian popu-
lation, 1994-2003", Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 62: 1036-1044.
Lynch, J.W., Kaplan, G.A., Shema, S.J. (1997), \Cumulative impact of sustained eco-
nomic hardship on physical, cognitive, psychological, and social functioning", New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine, 337(26): pp. 1889-1895.
Lynch, S.M. (2003), \Cohort and life-course patterns in the relationship between educa-
tion and health: a hierarchical approach", Demography, 40(2): pp. 309-331.
Mackenbach, J.P., Huisman, M., Andersen, O., Bopp, M., Borgan, J.K., Borrell, C., et
al. (2004), \Inequalities in lung cancer mortality by the educational level in 10 European
populations", European Journal of Cancer, 40(1): pp. 126-135.
Marmot, M., Bosma, H., Hemmingway, H., Brunner, E., Stansfeld, S. (1997a), \Contri-
bution of job control and other risk factors to social variations in coronary heart disease
incidence", Lancet, 350(9073): pp. 235-239.
Marmot, M., Ry, C.D., Bumpass, L.L., Shipley, M., Marks, N.F. (1997b), \Social in-
equalities in health: next questions and converging evidence", Social Science and Medicine,References 211
44(6): pp. 901-910.
Marmot, M. (1999), \Multi-level approaches to understanding social determinants", in
Lisa Berkman and Ichiro Icawachi (eds.), Social Epidemiology, Oxford: Oxford University
Press: pp 349-367.
Matthews, S., Manor, O., and Power, C. (1999), \Social inequalities in health: are there
gender dierences?", Social Science and Medicine, 48(1): pp. 49-60.
Michaud, P.-C. and A. van Soest (2008), \Health and wealth of elderly couples: causality
tests using dynamic panel data models", Journal of Health Economics, 27: pp. 1312-1325.
Miguel, E. and Kremer, M. (2004), \Worms: identifying impacts on education and health
in the presence of treatment externalities", Econometrica, 72(1): pp. 159-217.
Mincer, J.A. (1974), Schooling, experience, and earnings, Columbia University Press,
ISBN: 0-870-14265-8.
Murasko, J.E. (2008), \An evaluation of the age-prole in the relationship between house-
hold income and the health of children in the United States", Journal of Health Economics,
27(6): pp. 1489-1502.
Mushkin, S.J. (1962), \Health as an investment", Journal of Political Economy 70(5): pp.
129-157.
Muurinen, J-M. (1982), \Demand for health: a generalized Grossman model", Journal of
Health Economics, 1: pp. 5-28.
Muurinen, J-M., and Le Grand, J. (1985), \The Economic analysis of inequalities in
health", Social Science and Medicine, 20(10): pp. 1029-1035.
Nelder, J.A. and Mead, R. (1965), \A simplex method for function minimization", Com-
puter Journal, 7: pp. 308-313.
Nocera, S. and Zweifel, P. (1998), \The demand for health: an empirical test of the Gross-
man model using panel data", In: Zweifel, P. (Ed.), Health, the medical profession and212 References
regulation, Kluwer academic publishers, Boston/Dordrecht/London, pp. 35-49.
OECD (2005), \Pensions at a glance: public policies across OECD countries".
Olson, C.A. (1981), \An analysis of wage dierentials received by workers on dangerous
jobs", Journal of Human Resources, 16(2): pp. 167-185.
Oniki, H. (1973), \Comparative dynamics (sensitivity analysis) in optimal control the-
ory", Journal of Economic Theory, 6: pp. 265-283.
Oreopoulos, P. (2006), \Estimating average and local average treatment eects of educa-
tion when compulsory schooling laws really matter", American Economic Review, 96(1):
pp. 152-175
Preston S.H. and Elo, I.T. (1995), \Are educational dierentials in adult mortality in-
creasing in the United States?", Journal of Aging and Health, 7: pp. 476-496.
Ried, W. (1996), \Willingness to pay and cost of illness for changes in health capital
depreciation", Health Economics, 5: pp. 447-468.
Ried, W. (1998), \Comparative dynamic analysis of the full Grossman model", Journal
of Health Economics, 17: pp. 383-425.
Robert, S.A. (1998), \Community-level socioeconomic status eects on adult health",
Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 39(1): pp. 18-37.
Ross C.E. and Wu, C.L. (1996), \Education, age, and the cumulative advantage in health",
Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 37: pp. 104-120.
Royer, H. (2009), \Separated at girth: U.S. twin estimates of the eects of birth weight",
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(1): pp. 49-85.
Schrijvers, C.T.M., van de Mheen, H.D., Stronks, K., Mackenbach, J.P. (1998), \Socioe-
conomic inequalities in health in the working population: the contribution of working
conditions", International Journal of Epidemiology, 27: pp. 1011-1018.References 213
Seierstad, A. and Sydsaeter, K. (1977), \Sucient conditions in optimal control theory",
International Economic Review, 18(2): pp. 367-391.
Seierstad, A. and K. Sydsaeter (1987), Optimal control theory with economic applications,
Advanced textbooks in economics, Volume 24, Elsevier, North Holland.
Silles, M. (2009), \The causal eect of education on health: evidence from the United
Kingdom", Economics of Education Review, 28(1): pp. 122-128.
Skalicka, V., van Lenthe, F., Bambra, C., Krokstad, S. And Mackenbach, J. (2009),
\Material, psychosocial, behavioural and biomedical factors in the explanation of relative
socio-economic inequalities in mortality: evidence from the HUNT study", International
Journal of Epidemiology, 38(5): pp. 1272-1284
Smith, A. (1776), An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, Reprinted,
Roy H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner, eds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.
Smith, R.S. (1978), \Compensating wage dierentials and public policy: a review", In-
dustrial and Labor Relations Review, 32(3): pp. 339-352.
Smith, J.P. (1999), \Healthy bodies and thick wallets", Journal of Economic Perspectives,
13(2): pp. 145-166.
Smith, J.P. (2004), \Unraveling the SES-health connection", Population and Develop-
ment Review, 30, Supplement: Aging, Health, and Public Policy, pp. 108-132.
Smith, J.P. (2007), \The impact of socioeconomic status on health over the life course",
Journal of Human Resources, 42(4): pp. 739-764.
Stock, J.H. and Wise, D.A. (1990), \Pensions, the option value of work, and retirement,"
Econometrica, 58: pp. 1151-1180.
Stringhini, S., Sabia, S., Shipley, M., Brunner, E., Nabi, H., Kivimaki, M. and Singh-
Manoux, A. (2010), \Association of socioeconomic position with health behaviors and
mortality", Journal of the American Medical Association, 303(12): pp. 1159-1166.214 References
Sydsaeter, K., Strom, A. and Berck, P. (2005), Economists' mathematical manual, ISBN-
10 3-540-26088-9, 4th ed., Springer Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
Usher, D. (1975), \Comments on the correlation between health and schooling", In: N.E.
Terleckyj (ed.), Household Production and Consumption, (Columbia University Press for
the National Bureau of Economic Research, New York): pp. 212-220.
Van den Berg G., Lindeboom M. and Portrait, F. (2006), \Economic conditions early in
life and individual mortality", American Economic Review, 96(1): pp. 290-302.
Van de Ven, W. and van der Gaag, J. (1982), \Health as an unobservable: a MIMIC-
model of the demand for health care", Journal of Health Economics, 1: pp. 157-183.
Van Doorslaer, E.K. (1987), Health, knowledge and the demand for medical care, Assen:
Van Gorcum, 171, ISBN 90-232-2335-7.
Van Doorslaer, E.K., Van Kippersluis, H., O'Donnell, O., Van Ourti, T. (2008), \Socioe-
conomic dierences in health over the life cycle: evidence and explanations", Netspar
Panel Paper 12, December 2008.
Van Kippersluis, H., Van Ourti, T., O'Donnell, O. and Van Doorslaer, E. (2008), \Health
and income across the life cycle and generations in Europe", Tinbergen Institute discus-
sion paper series 08-009/3, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Van Kippersluis, H., O'Donnell, O., van Doorslaer, E., and Van Ourti, T. (2009), \So-
cioeconomic dierences in health over the life cycle in an egalitarian country", Tinbergen
Institute discussion paper series 09-006/3, Erasmus University Rotterdam.
Van Kippersluis, H., O'Donnell, O., van Doorslaer, E., Van Ourti, T., (2010), \Socioeco-
nomic dierences in health over the life cycle in an egalitarian country", Social Science
and Medicine, 70(3): pp. 428-438.
Van Kippersluis, H., O'Donnell and van Doorslaer, E. (2011), \Long run returns to ed-
ucation: does schooling lead to an extended old age?", Journal of Human Resources,
forthcoming.References 215
Van Oort, F.V., van Lenthe, F.J. and Mackenbach, J.P. (2005), \Material, psychosocial,
and behavioural factors in the explanation of educational inequalities in mortality in the
Netherlands", Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 59(3): pp. 214-220.
Viscusi, K.W. (1978), \Wealth eects and earnings premiums for job hazards", Review
of Economics and Statistics, 60: pp. 408-416.
Viscusi, K.W. (1979), Employment hazards: An investigation of market performance,
Cambridge: Harvard U. Press.
Viscusi, K.W. (1993), \The value of risks to life and health", Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, 31(4): pp. 1912-1946.
Wagsta, A. (1986a), \The demand for health: some new empirical evidence", Journal of
Health Economics, 5: pp. 195-233.
Wagsta, A. (1986b), \The demand for health: theory and applications", Journal of Epi-
demiology and Community Health, 40: pp. 1-11
Wagsta, A. (1993), \The demand for health: an empirical reformulation of the Grossman
model", Health Economics, 2: pp. 189-198.
Wolfe, J.R. (1985), \A model of declining health and retirement", Journal of Political
Economy, 93(6): pp. 1258-1267.
Williams, D.R., and Collins, C. (1995), \U.S. socioeconomic and racial dierences in
health: Patterns and explanations", Annual Review of Sociology, 21: pp. 349-386.
Williams, D.R. (1999), \Race, socioeconomic status, and health: the added eects of
racism and discrimination", Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 896: pp. 173-
188.
Yen, I.H. and Kaplan, G.A. (1999), \Neighborhood social environment and risk of death:
multilevel evidence from the Alameda county study", American Journal of Epidemiology,
149(10): pp. 898-907.216 References
Zweifel, P., Breyer, F. (1997), Health Economics, Oxford University Press, New York.